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This dissertation advances a novel systemic theory of international politics. Today, the 
most salient feature of the international system is not the presence of multiple opposing 
great power poles, but rather, an enduring leading power commercial confederacy. The 
Western order develops out of a US led hegemonic subsystem following World War II 
and steadily deepens and expands. Chapter 2 of the dissertation argues that this Western 
order is a great deal more enduring than previously thought, precisely because cohesion 
rests on the interactive combination of multiple unifying bonds. This order is now a semi-
permanent, path-dependent, and remarkably resilient feature of the international political 
landscape. The commercial confederacy is a leading power configuration that now 
conditions the behavior, to varying degrees, of every state in the system. Bonding, or 
commercial and institutional integration, is now the dominant behavior induced by the 
system. To be competitive, states are led to pursue distinct politico-economic strategies of 
integration. Chapter 3 develops a novel systemic theory of international politics. Chapter 
4 discusses how systemic theory should be tested and outlines a preliminary research 
program. Chapter 5 is plausibility probe of China’s grand-strategic behavior in the reform 
era. As an outsider, China has responded to the prevailing systemic pressures by pursuing 
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The history of international politics is a drama whose leading characters, th  great powers 
and imperial states, have always occupied center stage. The varying plots and themes 
emerge from the actions and interactions of these players. Where autonomous political
units have interacted, the stage has been set by the strongest among them. Whether 
through coercion or cooption, they often determine the fates of lesser states. Even wher  
peripheral regions appear to have exercised some degree of agency at the cost of leading 
powers, most notably in the era of decolonization, these developments cannot be fully 
appreciated without reference to important causes flowing from the core: the world wars 
that left imperial metropoles in ruin, the new international norms propounded by 
emerging hegemonic states, and so on. The point is simply this: inquiry into the nature of 
international politics must be informed by an understanding of the system’s leading 
actors, and in particular, the relations among them.  
Systemic theory is premised on a single powerful insight: the leading powers in 
the international system create a strategic environment in which they, as well as others, 
must operate. As the architects of international society, they have written the rules and 
established the norms around which expectations have converged. Periods of relative 
stability—the decades following the Napoleonic wars—or times of systemic 
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convulsion—the world wars of the twentieth century—are chapters in this political 
drama, whose effects have reached far beyond the confines of the great power arena.   
 Today, systemic theorizing in International Relations is embattled, some would
say moribund. Many realists have moved away from the systemic level and focused 
greater attention on unit-level variables. Liberals have by and large rejected systemic 
thinking, instead gravitating toward unit-level or bottom-up modes of theorizing. This 
overall rejection of Waltzian systemic theorizing is understandable: It is both limited in 
what it claims to explain and unsuccessful in explaining those things it does claim to 
explain. However, despite our greatest efforts to move beyond systemic thinking, we are
continually drawn back because it is necessary to a complete understanding of 
international politics. Bottom-up accounts paint an incomplete picture. 
 The distinction is not completely dissimilar to that between micro and macro 
economics. The focus of systemic theory is on the whole, and not the individual parts that 
comprise it. It is tempting, but ultimately wrong, to think that the whole can be 
understood simply by aggregating actor preferences at a lower level. This isessentially 
what liberal approaches to IR attempt to do.1 The fundamental premise of systemic theory 
is that the whole has properties that are different from the sum total of the parts. If this is 
true, reducing the system to its component parts cannot give us insight into the nature of 
the system as a whole.  
 Consider a simple illustration drawn from Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons.”2 
Supposing there is a small pastoral community that shares a common grazing area. Each 
                                                
1 Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics” International 
Organization  Vol. 5, No. 4 (1997)  




member of the community has an interest in feeding their flock but also in ensuring that 
the pasture will be sustainable into the future. The community and common pasture form 
a kind of simple system. Let’s assume for the moment that each has the same preference 
set—to use the pasture and ensure its continued viability. A preference aggregation 
model would predict the following outcome: because everyone has the same preferences 
the members will find ways to share the pasture and ensure its continued health. But what 
happens in a system of multiple actors is often quite different from what their individual 
preferences might suggest. Snyder sees that Jones has increased his flock. A it happens, 
Snyder is pleased with his current yield of wool and meat. In the interest of keeping 
things manageable he decides to limit the size of his flock until he realizes that bo  Jones 
and Daniels have substantially increased theirs. Snyder decides to increase th  size of his 
flock reasoning that if he doesn’t others are likely to do so at his expense. The result, of 
course, is that individually rational decisions have led to a collectively suboptimal 
outcome—namely, over-grazing and erosion of the land. Once these actors find 
themselves in a system of multiple players, individual behaviors and collective outcomes 
are brought about that were not a part of anyone’s original intent. In this illustration, a 
systemic approach gives us vital insight into the behavior of rational actors nd the 
collective outcomes that follow.  
 Examples in international relations abound as well. Consider the familiar example 
of a security dilemma.3 Again, let’s assume that each state has the same overall 
preference. They all wish to maximize their safety and security. These states are not 
revisionist, nor are they bent on aggression, but merely maintaining the “status quo.” 
                                                
3 John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1950); 
Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics Vol. 30 (1978) 
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Once multiple players with this preference form a system, behaviors and outcomes may 
be vastly different from what a simple preference aggregation model might lead us to 
believe. The security dilemma explains how one state’s effort to increase its security 
often decreases the security of another, or may at least appear threatening. This leads 
others to respond to state A’s initial increase in its security capacity by ncreasing theirs, 
in turn alarming state A. In this situation, efforts to increase security can lead to a spiral 
that leaves everyone less secure. In the worst case scenario, status-quo security seekers 
may launch a strike in order to avoid what they fear is an imminent attack on them. Here 
again, a systemic approach yields insight unachievable through mere preference 
aggregation. 
 At its most basic level, systemic theory in IR involves multiple big players 
interacting in a strategic situation. General explanations about actor behavior are derived 
from an understanding of the nature of the strategic situation. There are many ways to 
conceive of this strategic situation. For Neorealists this conceptualization involves a 
specific understanding of anarchy and the distribution of capability among the Great 
Powers. But as we will find, there are other ways to conceive of the overall strategic 
environment created by leading power interaction.  
  Though liberals have not produced a systemic theory many leading scholars do 
understand its value. Keohane has argued (in agreement with Waltz) that “theories of 
world politics that fail to incorporate a sophisticated understanding of the operati n of the 
system—that is how systemic attributes affect behavior—are bad theories.”4 Ruggie also  
 
                                                
4 Keohane “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” in Keohane ed. Neorealism and 
 its Critics ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 193 
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sees value in structural thinking: 
 
…a clear understanding of the structure of any social totality, including the 
international polity, is an essential ingredient in the study of its continuity or 
transformation.5 
 
Systemic theory is valuable for three broad reasons: it is a way for us to conceptualiz  the 
international strategic environment and how this conditions state behavior; because the 
focus is on the whole, systemic theory gives us the “big picture,” and therefore it yields a 
contextual understanding of actor behavior; and finally, it offers explanatory power, 
general in character.  
 Before turning to systemic theory itself, a definition of “theory” must be 
provided. The act of theorizing is less a science and more an art. Unlike the photograph, 
which captures the intricate details of the landscape, the impressionistic paintng seeks to 
capture its essence.6 Here, much of what we see must be ignored focusing attention on 
those elements that are most essential. The goal: to isolate the most pertinent causal 
mechanisms. This implies that reality must be simplified. To simplify, one must abstract 
from reality so as to construct a caricature of it. Simplicity is a virtue of course, but one 
which poses a danger. Like infinite complexity, oversimplification will not lead to valued 
progress in the sciences. This implies a delicate balancing act. Fat is to be haved off 
while leaving as much meat on the bone. While fat makes for a delicious dish, it will 
ultimately clog the arteries and disrupt the efficient operation of the machine. But there is 
a notable difference between the two vices of complexity and oversimplification. Where 
a theory is oversimplified it will quickly run amok with reality. Rich description, on the 
                                                
5 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization  (New York: 
Routledge,1998), p. 139 
6 The point is made by Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1973), p. 3 
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other hand, is more pernicious. While seductive, one is always left to wonder: could the 
same be accomplished with less? This vice implies that the true or most important causes 
have not been isolated. Much like the ‘trashcan’ strategy, every plausible variable is 
thrown at a puzzle until the false appearance of causal explanation is achieved.  
     Much of what passes in the literature for theory, upon closer inspection, does not 
live up to the title. Of course, “theory” is a large tent. Here we are concerned with 
empirical theory, most often confused with what is best classified as an “approach.” The 
distinction is simple: an approach may offer a conceptual taxonomy, useful distinctions, 
and variables that might be important. A theory tells us a causal story about how they 
interact in a given area so as to yield expected behaviors and outcomes. In international 
relations, we’re interested in classes of behavior and outcomes. In other words, a theory 
of international relations accounts for behavior and outcomes by explaining how the 
relevant elements and variables interact to produce them. It must include both theoretical 
form—a logic specifying the operation of causes—and a substantive content. The 
statement, rational actors behave in ways that further their interests, i  not a theory. 
Without additional content—that is, without prior knowledge of interests and how they 
form—one cannot predict how actors are likely to behave. Rational choice, like 
constructivism, has theoretical form but is substantively empty until actors and 
preferences, for instance, are specified. Where either form or content are missing, one is 
not operating in the realm of empirical theory. 
 Systemic theory is premised on a basic insight: state actors must respond to a 
strategic environment. The strategic environment arises out of the interaction of he 
system’s principal units. That actors must take into account others with possibly differing 
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preferences is not a controversial proposition in the social sciences. Systemic th ory is 
not a synonym for ‘strategic interaction.’ As we noted above, the interconnections that 
form among the parts produce a whole that has its own characteristics and which cannot 
be reduced to them. As Durkheim explains, 
Whenever certain elements combine and thereby produce, by the fact of their 
combination, new phenomena, it is plain that these new phenomena reside not in 
the original elements but in the totality formed by their union.7 
 
Once this insight is appreciated, one quickly sees how particular unit level actions are 
often a reaction to system level forces. And if this is true, deriving explanations of u it 
behavior from internal characteristics and processes will yield an incomplete picture at 
best. 
  Systemic theory is a way for us to get at the “big picture.” The big picture is 
indispensable because in many respects it guides and informs more focused and technical
empirical research. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics is almost entirely lacking in 
empirical content yet spawned an important research program that continues to influence 
new scholarship, including my own, nearly thirty years after its initial publication. Big 
and small picture scholarship both have their own value, each has its place. Both tasks 
can rarely be accomplished at once. Big idea work implies that a lot of ground is covered. 
Theorizing allows the scholar to cover ground while not getting bogged down in the 
comprehensive empirical defense of every assertion and premise along the way. In
covering large tracts of land the precise contours of the landscape and the shapes of the 
trees are not given full attention. Overall, it is similar to observing the globe using a 
satellite. Zooming in brings objects on the ground into clearer focus but the viewing 
range correspondingly shrinks; similarly, as one zooms out the range broadens, but 
                                                
7 Rules of Sociological Method (Glencoe: Free Press, 1984), p. xlvii 
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objects on the ground become more blurred. While objects on the ground become 
blurred, some of which disappear from sight, the larger image reveals a picture which 
cannot be seen when focused closely on a smaller area. If the field of IR focuses solely on 
the content of those small, albeit very clear, images, we run the unacceptable risk of 
entirely ignoring the larger picture which can be seen only by zooming out and expanding 
the viewing range. To avoid this, the field must make space for big picture scholarship 
even though it strikes one as unacceptable when judged from the vantage point of more 
empirically sophisticated smaller image studies. 
 If properly crafted, systemic theory can offer a broad yet useful conceptualization 
of the system: broad because the focus is on the whole; useful because it directs our 
attention at important elements. It is also a way for us to understand behavior with n a 
broader context. As Keohane puts it, “systemic theory is important because we must 
understand the context of action before we can understand the action itself.”8 The drama 
of international politics does not unfold in a political vacuum. Actors must respond to the 
incentives and constraints they face; some of these are domestic while some are 
international.      
Finally, systemic theory promises explanatory power, general in character. 
Structure influences outcomes because it conditions state behavior. It does so by causing
certain strategies to dominate over others. Some of the most important social science 
contributions employ this theoretical form. Consider for instance the game of Pris ner’s 
Dilemma or the collective action problem. In each case, the nature of the situation causes 
certain strategies to dominate over others. We know from these ideas that structure does 
not determine behavior—large groups regularly overcome the collective action problem 
                                                
8 “Theory of World Politics,” p.193 
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even where no enforcement mechanisms are present—but instead it “pushes” and “pulls” 
actors in different directions. Structural theory explains regularities and ptterns and as 
such it wields an impressive amount of explanatory power, general in character.  
 
The state of systemic theory in IR—‘a patient on life-support’ 
 Systemic theorizing in IR is mainly a realist enterprise. Systemic and structural 
thinking has a long pedigree.9 The seminal contemporary piece, and our starting point, is 
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. According to Neorealism and indeed 
most variants of Realism, the international system is an ungoverned anarchy. The 
international system is conceived of as a Hobbesian “state of war” characterized by fear, 
uncertainty, and ongoing security competition. Most behavioral propositions derive from 
the logic of self-preservation. It is assumed that states do the things they do because these 
strategies promise to maximize security and the prospects for survival.10  
 For realists, the most important variable is the distribution of power. The system’s 
structure refers to a given distribution of power. With these two master variables: 
anarchy—or an ungoverned realm characterized by ubiquitous fear and uncertainty—and 
the distribution of capability—multi, bi, or unipolarity—realists have generated a number 
of important propositions relating to actor behavior and systemic outcomes. According to 
Neorealists, states will pursue relative over absolute gains;11 the system will push states 
                                                
9 Morgenthau,  Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: Alfred A.  
Knopf, 1985); Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York, 1957); Aron, 
Peace and War 
10 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2001) 
11 Waltz, Theory; Grieco, “Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a re list critique of the newest liberal 
institutionalism” International Organization Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988);  Mearsheimer, The False Promise of 
International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95) 
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toward autarky;12 states may balance against greater powers or threats13; great powers 
may pursue aggression so as to maximize security;14 bipolarity is more stable than 
multipolarity.15 
 Liberal theorizing in IR mainly develops in response to Realist theory.16 Adopting 
realist premises and assumptions, this liberal project set out to demonstrate that con rary 
to Realist expectations, states can overcome the debilitating effects of anarchy and 
achieve cooperative outcomes and avoid conflict.17 Liberals were mainly concerned with 
explaining “cooperation under anarchy.”18 This influential strand of liberal theory did not 
offer a new framework for systemic thinking, but rather, merely sought to modify 
Neorealism by focusing on international institutions and interdependence. Neoliberals do 
not seek to destroy structural realism but simply modify it, accepting its assumptions and 
premises but ultimately reaching different conclusions regarding cooperati n and 
conflict. 
 John Gerard Ruggie mounted the most influential critique of Waltz yet. His 
central argument was that Waltz’s model could not explain change. That the model had 
no generative logic capable of explaining the formation of the anarchic system of states 
with which the theory is concerned; that is, it contains only a reproductive logic but none 
that is generative or transformative. Ruggie insists that the defects present in Waltz’s 
                                                
12 Waltz, Theory 
13 Waltz, Theory; Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1987) 
14 Mearsheimer, Tragedy 
15 Waltz, Theory; Mearsheimer, Tragedy 
16 Keohane and Nye,  Power and Interdependence 3rd Ed. (New York: Longman, 2001[1977]) 
17 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984) 
18 Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Axelrod and 
Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 8 (Oct 
1985); Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” International 
Organization Vol. 36 (Spring 1982) 
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theory can be fixed by reintroducing the differentiation of units to account for diffe ences 
in the medieval and modern systems and Durkheim’s concept of dynamic density as a 
source of change. Dynamic density, as we know, is the primary source of structural 
change in Durkheim’s work and could be used, according to Ruggie, to account for 
change if grafted onto Waltzian structural realism.19 His analysis did not offer an 
alternative to Neorealism but suggests that it should be modified, and in fact did spawn 
important efforts to do so.20 
In the mid-1980s Richard Rosecrance observed the following: 
Since 1945 the world has been paralyzed between trading and territorial 
imperatives. One group of states has largely focused on trade, keeping their 
military expenditures limited; another group, particularly the superpowers and 
certain Middle Eastern states, has engaged in arms races, military interventions, 
and occasional war.21 
 
By the end of the century, Rosecrance was arguing that the post-war trading states—
states such as Japan and Germany—were evolving into a new form of “virtual state,” 
epitomized by the likes of Hong Kong.22 According to the author, the rise of the virtual 
state has ushered in a new era of peaceful forms of international politics; it ha  been 
marked by the overall replacement of security politics with forms of peaceful competition 
among an important, powerful, and growing cluster of states.  
 These new forms of political intercourse, Rosecrance theorizes, are related to  
single causal mechanism: the reduced importance of land and territorial resources as 
determinants of state power. In short, “Mastery of flows is more important th  
                                                
19 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, ch.5   
20 Buzan, Little and Jones,  The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (Columbia: Columbia 
University Press, 1993)  
21 Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State  (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 162 
22 Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p.  4  
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possession of large fixed territorial stocks of resources.”23 Underlying Rosecrance’s 
theoretical apparatus lies a simple premise: the primary causes of war relate to the state’s 
obsession with territorial aggrandizement. Change the incentive structure and interstate 
conflict makes less sense. In The Rise of the Trading State, a state’s political 
orientation—conceptualized in terms of the military and territorial pole on the one hand 
and the trading pole on the other—largely depends upon the individual state’s choice.24 
While Rosecrance’s conclusions have potential implications for systemic thinking—as a 
large number of trading state’s occupy a place in the international system—he is not in 
the business of systemic theorizing because causes are located at the level of the unit.   
 Other notable liberal approaches have drawn attention away from the system 
level—these  are the so called bottom-up, unit-level, or dyadic liberals.25 Most 
prominently, these scholars have focused on democracy, commerce, or both, as sources 
of international peace.26 This empirically robust body of literature challenges the realist 
view that individual regime characteristics can safely be ignored while damning the 
assumption that international anarchy is inevitably an environment of “relentless security 
competition.” With some degree of success, others have developed various domestic 
politics explanations for state behavior in the international sphere.27 This scholarship is 
significant because it challenges the dominant view that domestic politics explanations 
are hopelessly descriptive and cannot be developed in a parsimonious way. But perhaps 
                                                
23 Ibid., p. 21 
24 Rosecrance, Rise of the Trading State, p. 22 
25Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously” 
26 Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs” Philosophy and Public Affairs  (Summer 1983); 
Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace  (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Gartzke, “The Capitalist 
Peace,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 51, No. 1 (2007); Huth and Allee, Democratic Peace 
and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
27 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” International 
Organization  (Summer 1988); Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations  (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1997) 
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the most damaging blow to systemic theorizing comes not from the liberal side of the 
isle, but from rank and file, self-identified realists.  
In recent times Realists have been moving away from the systemic level, leading 
some to ask whether “anyone is still a Realist?”28 In the 1990s a growing number of 
Realists began to incorporate unit-level variables, traditionally thought to be the domain 
of liberalism, into their analyses.29 In much contemporary realist thinking, the system and 
structure are doing less work than before. Alexander Wendt’s seminal Soci l Theory of 
International Politics and John Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power Politics 
notwithstanding, the overall popularity of systemic thinking has seen a dramatic decline.  
In this respect, systemic theory, even among realists, has been in retreat. This book is 
partly an effort to revive systemic theory in IR. 
 
The argument in brief 
 Structural realism has been on the defensive because of two glaring empirical 
problems. Because structural realism i  systemic theory, the latter has been thrown into 
disarray as a result. The first problem stems from the theory’s inability to anticipate the 
peaceful end to the Cold War.30 The second problem results from the theory’s inability to 
                                                
28 Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999) 
29 J. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition  (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1991); 
Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. (Princeton: Princeton 
Press, 1998); Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 
(Winter 1994-95); Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign 
Policy” World Politics Vol.51,No.1 (1998); Lobell et.al. Eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) ; Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical 
Realism” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed. Progress in International Relations Theory: 
Appraising the Field. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003) 
30 Lebow and Risse Kappen, eds. International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995) Chaps. 1 and 2 
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explain stability and the absence of security competition in the post-Cold War era.31 In 
tackling the second, realists developed new accounts of hegemonic stability.32 
Accordingly the post-Cold War world represents a unipolar structure in which US power
has been the primary source of stability. Most believe that unipolarity will not last 
indefinitely, and because of this, security competition and balance of power behavior can 
be expected to return as US hegemony declines.33 
 Scholars generally agree that the nature of great power politics in the 21st c ntury 
to a large degree hinges upon what the system’s rising powers will do—the “BRIC” 
states of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Realists predict that as the US declines while 
these states rise, security competition will likely follow. While liberals make strong 
predictions about relations among Western democracies, because these states are non-
Western and some of them non-democratic, liberals and constructivists are largely silent 
on what their rise will mean. While peace is said to prevail among democracies, many 
liberals argue that conflict between democracies and non-democracies is more likely.34 
Constructivist scholarship, that emphasizes shared identity, is silent as these powers do 
not, or only partly, share in the “Western” Kantian culture founded on liberal values and 
human rights.35 Meanwhile, liberal institutionalism will have difficulty explaining the 
behavior of states that are not fully integrated into the Western institutional order. While 
China is partly integrated, Russia is not. Understanding the likely behavior of the BRICs 
                                                
31 Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton: Princeton Press, 2001) 
32 Wohlforth, “Stability of a Unipolar World” 
33 Layne, “Unipolar Illusion Revisited” 
34 Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” 




is of the utmost importance. Unfortunately, non-realist theories are either ambiguous or 
silent on this question.   
 To date, liberals have made partial, or no predictions about the likely behavior of 
these states. But if power-centered realist theories are wrong about systemic tability in a 
“post-American” world, how is this result to be interpreted? The systemic theory that is 
developed in the pages that follow claims to account for the behavior of these states and 
overall predicts a continuation of systemic stability even as US relative pow r inevitably 
declines.   
 The starting premise is that the system is no longer dominated by antagonis ic 
great power poles but by a cohesive cluster of liberal states—the commercial 
confederacy. This grouping evolves out of a US led hegemonic subsystem following 
World War II. Its initial formation was influenced by a variety of contingent historical 
circumstances though it quickly developed a strong path-dependent, expansive, logic. At 
the core of this grouping are the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan, though scores 
of junior partners can be included—collectively the OECD. This cluster is characterized 
by a unique form of social cohesion that has allowed it to escape the logic of anarchy—o  
the fear and uncertainty inherent in international politics. Chapter 2 sets out to explain 
why the Western order, or confederacy, is much more enduring than most have thought. 
It explains how various cohesive bonds operate in mutually reaffirming ways to maintain 
group unity. The Confederacy has developed a strong path-dependent, reproductive logic, 
able to withstand crises and changes in the underlying distributions of power among 
constituent units.  
16 
 
 The Confederacy is the dominant, leading power configuration. Since the end of 
World War II it has solidified and expanded. The most impressive feature of this 
configuration is the extent of commercial interaction. This interaction brings in to being a 
gravitational sphere that conditions the behavior of every actor in the system. Chapter 3 
develops a power-centered systemic theory of international politics based upon two 
premises: (1) the system is not anarchic but confederate because the leading power 
configuration is a cohesive commercial cluster of states; and (2) in this new environment 
competition is driven by a strong prosperity motive. The structure conditions behavior 
because to be competitive states must find ways to integrate themselves into the order. 
Realists strategies of autarky, balancing, and aggression have become self-defeating. 
Rather, bonding has become the dominant strategy induced by the system. That is, states 
are led to pursue internal and external strategies designed to forge enduring institutional 
and commercial links for the purpose of creating prosperity and enhancing 
competitiveness. Those who fail to integrate find themselves at a decided competitive 
disadvantage. The structure both rewards and punishes.  
 The project makes two distinct but related contributions. The first is a general 
approach to the study of group cohesion in IR. The more immediate task is to explain 
how the commercial confederacy came into being. It is important to note that there are 
numerous theoretical paths to the same result, though the theory of group cohesion has 
many advantages over rival accounts. Theories of Kantian culture, democratic zones of 
peace, Western security communities, and institutional theories all predict v ry similar 
outcomes. The task of getting leverage on their theoretical claims is compliated by their 
number, but not rendered impossible. I will try to make some headway in this direction 
17 
 
though my efforts will ultimately fall short. In the end, the task of sorting out cmpeting 
theoretical accounts requires wide and sustained empirical examination. The broad r goal 
is to advance a general theoretical framework for studying cohesion that is applicable to 
many different kinds of groups.  
 The second is a systemic theory of international politics that begins from the 
premise that the system is dominated by a cohesive league of leading players. Perhaps the 
greatest contribution of this theory is that it predicts outcomes and behaviors with regard 
to large, rising, non-western, illiberal countries that are not adequately covered by extant 
non-realist theories. This renders the task of getting leverage over competing claims more 
manageable since, as I argue, the alternatives are few and strikingly different. The two 
theoretical projects are related but distinct. Each demands scrutiny independent of th  
other. Finally, the entirety of the project need not be accepted to find utility in one of th  
two parts. The dissertation does not push the reader to make an up or down vote on the 
work as whole.     
 The theory challenges each of the major paradigms in important ways. It 
challenges liberals to consider systemic thinking by explaining how systemic forces can 
induce states to integrate and cooperate. It challenges realists to consider the possibility 
that antagonistic poles are not the only kind of great power configuration imaginable. 
Second, if it is granted that states also have a strong prosperity motive, systemic theory 
yields vastly different expectations under some conditions. The arguments that unfold in 
the pages that follow are both an effort at theory building and synthesis. Much of what 
the reader will encounter is, on its face, paradigmatically neutral. While special emphasis 
is placed on different variables variously privileged by each of the schools, one quickly 
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notices that the concepts contained therein—social cohesion for example—have the 
potential to form the basis of much needed inter-paradigmatic debate. The dissertation is 
not an effort to defend any particular school, but rather, to move beyond all of them by 
incorporating many of their variables and insights into a novel theory.  
 
Agency, structure, and theory testing 
 
 The intended contribution of this book is mainly theoretical. It offers a general 
systemic theory with special application to the post-Cold War world. But systemic 
theories, as all theories of international relations, have limits. The international structure 
confronts actors as a set of distinct incentives and disincentives. However, that there is a 
dominant strategy available does not necessarily mean that the strategy will be pursued. 
Oftentimes there are multiple ways to achieve the same goal. Structures push and pull, 
shape and shove, reward and punish. They do not determine behavior.  
 Structural causes are confirmed to the extent that actors respond to systemic 
incentives in predictable ways over an extended period of time. That is, a single historical 
snapshot can neither confirm nor disconfirm a systemic theory. Trends in great power 
grand-strategies can. A systemic theory makes claims of the form: Given a particular 
systemic structure, actors are likely to pursue a family of strategies consisting of X, Y and 
Z. In a confederate system, for example, states have strong incentives to engage in 
commercial integration. They face strong incentives to join trade agreements, attract 
foreign investment, and join multilateral institutions. While the theory predicts that states 
are likely to pursue a family of strategies it cannot tell us precisely how t is will be done. 
That is, the same goals are often multiply realizable. China did not liberalize its economy 
all at once, as Russia attempted to do. But rather, proceeded incrementally by creating 
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special economic zones. Systemic theory is at its strongest when explaining and 
predicting grand-strategies and macro trends. The theory is less able to deliver 
expectations of a more specific kind. Similarly, Neorealism predicts balancing behavior. 
But it cannot tell us precisely what states will do. Will they form an alliance or build up 
their own military capacity, or both? When will they balance? In building their own 
military capacity are they likely to focus on air or sea power? Systemic theory cannot 
answer these more specific questions because causes are found at a lower level of 
analysis. This is a major concession and it points toward a synthetic, or what I call 
“complementary” approach to the study of international relations.  
 Following Giddens, Wendt and others, it is intuitively attractive and empirically 
correct to think of agents and structures as co-constituted.36 That is, agents create 
structures and structures in turn condition agents. While true, this insight cannot form the 
basis of a useful theory. That is, for analytic purposes these levels must be separated. If 
we insist on unifying these levels into a single theory the project will fail. Instead of 
simplifying, infinite complexity will be introduced. At best, we could only arrive at a 
framework for descriptive history. Imperfect as it is, these levels mu t be isolated and 
theorized separately. However, this does not imply that they need be mutually exclusive 
or always in conflict with each other. After all, this is the basic intuition driving the 
emerging school of Neoclassical Realism. Chapter 4 develops the complementary 
approach in which both bottom-up and top-down theories occupy a place in a single 
research program. The idea behind the approach is that each method compensates for 
                                                
36 Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Wendt, Social 
Theory of International Politics (Cambrdge: Cambridge Press, 1999) 
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weaknesses inherent in the other. However, we must avoid combining levels in an ad hoc 
manner. The approach outlines a clear division of labor.  
 To help illustrate the theory’s logic and render the theory amenable to critical 
evaluation, in Chapter 5 I explore China’s grand-strategy in the reform era. China is at 
the center of many important theoretical debates in the field. It is both an important case 
and a hard case. This illustrative case is offered as a plausibility probe. Significantly, it 
challenges the dominant view among China scholars that the PRC’s foreign policy is best
explained by virtue of its domestic politics; it challenges dominant realist interpretation 
that China is a revisionist power. It does not present definitive empirical “findings” but 
represents a preliminary analysis using a new theoretical lens. The exercis  is important 
for several reasons. First, through an encounter with reality theories develop and are 
refined—their strengths and limits brought to light. Second, a plausibility probe lends the 
theory some preliminary credibility. This dissertation does not purport to be a final 
theoretical statement and comprehensive empirical defense. As such, it is but a preface to 
a much larger theoretical and empirical exploration. The dissertation can be criticized for 
being “incomplete.” This misses the point. Science is a collective enterprise and should 
seek to exploit the talents and knowledge of many. Some of the best theories are those 
that leave something for others to do. Attempting to “exhaust” a topic is a poor strategy. 
Seldom is the theorist best suited to test his own theory, and seldom is an idea best served 
by having a single mind engage it. This philosophy will be fleshed out explicitly ater, 
though the reader will become cognizant of intentional and unintentional gaps along the 







The Western Way—or, why the Western Order is stronger than most believe 
 
 
There’s just something about the West. The story of international relations is 
mainly a Western story, both in terms of the content of that story and the scholars that 
have told it. International relations theorizing has been, with few exceptions, a Western 
enterprise. From the pens of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, to Carr, Morgenthau, 
and Waltz, modern theorizing about international relations has focused on the Western 
experience, and in particular, the continent of Europe. “The theory, like the story” writes
Waltz, “of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an er .”37 The 
theory and story of international politics, it seems, is also written in terms of the Western 
powers.38  
Curiously, while the Western experience gave rise to Realism, it has also led 
many to question the paradigm’s continued relevance. The West remains a persistent 
thorn in the side of the Realist canon. Defying the laws and dominant tendencies of the 
system, it is the Western states that have escaped anarchy and the security dilemma. It is 
the Western states, and the strongest among them, that were the architects of pos  WWII 
                                                
37 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 72 
38 Consider for instance several recent theoretical works, almost certainly destined to become classics in the 
field, each focusing to lesser or greater degrees on the Western experience: Ikenberry, After Victory: 
Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton Press 2001); 
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Daniel Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security 
Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton: Princeton Press, 2007).  
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international order. It is the Western powers that together have forged a Kantin 
confederation of democratic republics. As it continues to define international politics, so 
too does the Western order continue to define theoretical debates in the field.  
This confederal Western order emerges out of a US dominated hegemonic 
subsystem following WWII.39 The core powers within this arrangement are the US, 
Britain, France, Germany and Japan. While this confederal league centers around these 
leading states, scores of junior partners can be included: collectively the OECD. This 
arrangement has been stable. It has also been enduring. The league has weathered 
numerous political and economic convulsions—the Suez Crisis, the fall of Bretton 
Woods I, the economic turmoil of the 1970s and early 80s, the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the era of US unilateralism, and most recently, the Great Recession.40 Inspired by the 
realist baseline, several generations of pessimists have predicted its d m se.41 With each 
new transatlantic tiff the thesis resurfaces, and so it persists, but so does the Western 
order. But what makes this political amalgam, the confederation, so resilient and 
enduring? 
Whether directly or indirectly, the above question has inspired an impressive body 
of scholarship; so much so, that one wonders whether anything new can be said. Each of 
the main paradigms has offered explanations to account for Western unity. Realist
                                                
39 Arthur Stein, “The hegemon’s dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the international economic 
order,” International Organization Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984); Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton: 
Princeton Press, 2001); Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The nature and sources of liberal 
international order,” Review of International Studies, 24 (1999) 
40 For a useful survey and analysis of some of these cri s see Anderson et.al. The End of the West? Crisis 
and Change in the Atlantic Order (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 2008) 
41 For a sampling of this literature see Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the 
Cold War” International Security (Spring 1990); Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” 
International Security (Fall 1993); Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New 
World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003); Charles Kupchan, “The End of the West,” Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 
2002; Stephen Walt, “The Ties that Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart,” National Interest, 




literature explains how states unite in the face of greater power or a menacing threat.42 
Liberals emphasize democracy, commercial interaction and interdependence, and 
international institutions.43 Constructivists talk about a shared liberal identity and Kantian 
culture of peace.44 So long as the confederation persists, it seems hopelessly over-
determined. Because it is unprecedented in the annals of history, little comparative 
leverage can be gained. We are left with numerous variables and many theoretical 
accounts. In the final analysis it is likely that many variables matter. But if numerous 
variables matter, it is difficult to assign causal weight. This, then, is the state of the most 
momentous question in IR theory: numerous possible sources of cohesion with no way to 
determine their relative importance.  
To compound the problem, some variables are material, distributions of power 
and economic interdependence, while others are ideational, liberal values and identity.
Still others are institutional. Some pertain to ‘structure’ while others to ‘process.’ 
Measuring each variable is one thing, comparing the relative weight of measures 
fundamentally different in kind is quite another. It is highly unlikely that these questions 
can be sorted out in a satisfactory way. But again, we may be asking the wrong questions. 
What makes for a consolidated, stable, and cohesive republic, like the US or Finland? 
Most would agree that the answer would not involve any single master variable but th
                                                
42 See for example, Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979); Walt, Origins of 
Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1987); Jervis, “From Balance to Concert” in Oye, ed. Cooperation Under 
Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into 
the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 
43 Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1984) ; Oye, ed. Cooperation Under Anarchy; 
Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace; Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace;  
44 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1999); Adler and Barnett, 
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operation of many. Perhaps more importantly, we might say that there are many vari bles 
that interact with each other to produce a greater combined effect. 
 Presently, we are looking at an informal confederal union that lies somewhere 
right of center on a continuum which ranges from anarchy on the one end to a cohesive, 
consolidate republic on the other. The literature identifies numerous sources of order—or 
unifying bonds. The literature is divided in its treatment of variables but is united by a 
common tendency of privileging a narrow set of paradigmatic variables while perhaps 
acknowledging the relevance of others, bringing them in on an ad hoc basis, or ignoring 
them entirely.  With the possible exception of the most zealous partisans, most would 
perhaps agree that some combination of realist, liberal and constructivist variables are 
central to the explanation. Intuition is a useful starting point but to date, synthetic efforts 
have been hamstrung by the over-determined nature of the puzzle and difficulties 
associated with assigning causal weight. This essay will not resolve these difficulties.  
 I argue, however, that the confederal Western order is a great deal more durabl
and stable than most have believed. The analysis is theoretical and begins from several 
basic assumptions: First, I assume that there is truth in each of the most important 
paradigmatic variables. That is to say, each of these variables exerts an independent 
effect on cohesion or unity. I will not specifically try to answer the question of which 
variables are most important. Second, I will assume that each of the variables works to 
create and maintain cohesion. That is to say, each works in the same overall direction, 
understanding fully that variables often work in multiple directions—trade wars arising 
from interdependence can be a significant source of conflict for example. The reason why 
the West may be more enduring and stable than most expect, is that theoretically there is 
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strong reason to believe that each of these variables has not only an independent effect, 
but also a strong interactive effect. These variables do not combine to produce something 
different, but something that is stronger.   
 This article unfolds as follows. The first section reviews literature and defines the 
conceptual framework. Part II of the paper is devoted to a theoretical exploration of he 
interactive effects of each of the variables. The conclusion discusses the significance of 
the analysis and its implications for IR theory.  
The West, Order, and Cohesion 
   The West, most obviously, can be thought of in terms of geography. The problem 
with this is that some states that we typically associate as being part ofthe Western Order 
lie outside of the West, like Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The West can be thought
of in terms of its historical origins in Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations. This seems 
more appropriate given that Western ideas can be traced back through the modern 
enlightenment project to their ancient origins. The West, and Western Order, for purposes 
of this paper is conceived of in terms of a particular historical project. The project is 
founded on a specific understanding of the most desirable form of political organization 
and the most appropriate modes of interstate interaction. The Western project is built on
democracy and limited self-government, individual political liberty, and individual 
economic rights. The project claims that free-markets and relatively unfettered interstate 
commerce will lead to shared prosperity and pacific relations. Finally, the project 
maintains that a world populated by democratic republics is most conducive to peace. 
The West, and Western Order, is a project. It is a project animated by distinct principles 
and ideals. Ideas that have their origins in a particular civilization that develop d in a 
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certain geographic region comprised of certain racial and ethnic groups to be ure. But 
these ideas are also universal in so far as the project has universal aspirations. Whe  
speaking of Western Order we are referring to a project with Western origins but one that 
is not exclusive, but rather, seeks universality. 
 Western Order, most obviously, means order constructed with the building blocks 
of the Western project. Order is typically, and not inappropriately, thought of in terms of 
rules and norms. Political order leads to predictable and stable patterns of interaction. 
Stable patterns of interaction usually imply institutional, or rule based order.45 But order 
implies two distinct conditions: rules, but also, stable patterns of interaction that follow. 
However, the latter does not always follow from the former. Stable patterns imply that 
rules are actually being followed. This is why order implies much more than simply a 
rule based arrangement. History furnishes a rich array of examples demonstrating, as did 
the failed League of Nations, that rule based arrangements do not always lead to d sired 
patterns of behavior. Order depends on the way in which political relationships are 
constituted, some of this necessarily being rule based, but much depending on features of 
the relationship that have little to do with rules. The study of order then becomes the 
study of political community which has elements that are rule based and institutional, but 
also dimensions that are economic and social.  
                                                
45 Political order, according to one leading theorist “refers to the governing arrangements among a group of 
states, including its fundamental rules, principles, and institutions.” Ikenberry, After Victory, p. 23. 
Similarly, Bull conceives of a society of states, or international order, as existing when “a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the 
working of common institutions.” The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) 
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 Cohesion can be thought of as a bond or glue.46 Ultimately, the bonds or ties refer 
to the various “sources” of Western Order.47 Or, in the now familiar phrase of John 
Ruggie, “what makes it hang together?”48 So, why not simply speak of the sources of 
Western order? Why propose the concept of cohesion? Aside from the fact that the latter 
sounds better, the term “cohesion” implies something that the term “sources” does not. 
“Sources of order” suggests that there are multiple but distinct causes of unity. Cohesion 
implies that the combination of the parts creates a whole which is greater than the 
operation of the parts individually. The whole is greater than the parts not because it 
produces something separate and new, but merely something that is stronger. Like the
strands of a rope woven together, their combination is stronger than the force that th  
unwoven strands could together withstand. Or, translated into social science parlance, 
cohesion captures the ‘interactive effects’ of different variables. What we call it 
ultimately does not matter, what does matter is that the chosen term succeeds in captur g 
both the independent and interactive effects of each unifying link, or bond.   
 The Western Order, resting as it does on a particular combination of cohesive 
bonds, can be thought of as a type of political confederation. The present Western Order 
emerges as a US led hegemonic subsystem following WWII and has since steadily
deepened and expanded. This league is best thought of as a type of confederation. Unlike 
a federation, in which member states cede sovereignty to a formal political body, this is 
                                                
46 I am aware of a large body of literature on “social ohesion” mainly in sociology and social psychology. 
After reflecting on this literature I do not feel it serves as a particularly useful vehicle for thinking about 
Western Order. For a sampling of this literature se: Simmel, “The Sociology of Sociability,” American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Nov. 1949); Libo, Measuring Group Cohesiveness (Ann Arbor: 
Institute for Social Research, 1953); Lott and Lott, “Group cohesiveness as interpersonal attraction,” 
Psychological Bulletin 64 (1965); Cartwright and Zander, eds. Group Dynamics: Research and Theory 
(London: Tavistock, 1968); Friedkin, “Social Cohesion,” Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004); Hogg, 
The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness (New York: New York University Press, 1992) 
47 Deudney and Ikenberry, “The nature and sources of liberal international order” 
48 Constructing the World Polity (New York: Routledge, 1998) Introduction 
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an informal league in which states retain formal sovereignty. The league is less 
supranational in that institutions have little autonomy and authority independent of 
member states. To be sure, a layer-cake of institutions has reduced state autonomy, and 
though the EU has many properties of a federal government, these institutions are still 
primarily intergovernmental in that authority still mostly resides in memb r governments. 
Western Order is not a compound federal republic but a loose confederal league.49  
 Western Order is not easily understood as a single entity. Rather, it consists f a 
web of institutionalized relationships. To add yet another layer of confusion, membership 
often varies. As a useful starting point, we might think of Western Order as consisting of 
a “core”—the transatlantic alliance or NATO.50 If we include the scores of extra-regional 
leading powers and junior partners we might consider the OECD. But as one begins to 
consider other important layers in the politico-institutional web—WTO, IMF, World 
Bank, G-7—one begins to realize that certain important states that we think of as being 
part of the Western Order are in fact not members of some of these other institutions. For 
instance, though Japan has strong security ties with the US it is not a member of NATO. 
Moreover, Western Order exhibits a strong expansive tendency. Membership in 
institutions has grown to include, in many instances, states that were formerly in the 
eastern Soviet Bloc. To further complicate things, there is the question of regional 
institutional arrangements, most notably the EU and NAFTA, which are clearly part of 
                                                
49 On federations and confederations see Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Federal 
Republic: Designing the American Experiment, 3rd ed. (Lexington Book, 2007); Murray Forsyth, Unions of 
States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation (Holmes and Meier, 1981); Daniel Elazar, Exploring 
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the Western project but limited in their geographic reach. Western Order is md eval in 
many respects, consisting as it does of multiple overlapping institutional sphere .  
Ikenberry captures this complexity when he notes that “Postwar institutions came 
in many guises—regional, global, economic, security, multilateral, and bilateral.”51 
Western Order is a patchwork quilt. With the possible exception of European 
integration—Monet’s ‘United States of Europe’—order building did not take place 
pursuant to a grand design aimed at building political community. Rather, order building 
to a large degree was problem driven. NATO was formed to ‘keep the Americans in, the 
Germans down, and the Soviets out.’ The IMF was formed to create stability in the global 
economy by providing aid to states experiencing balance of payments difficulties. The 
GATT was designed to promote freer trade. Thus, order building proceeded with an eye 
toward specific problems and particular areas of governance. Western Order is a quilt 
comprised of these many diverse, overlapping, patches.  
There is a discernible tension in that Western Order must be defined, and its 
membership identified, without creating overly restrictive categories because of the 
overlapping nature of the order and because it continues to develop and expand. With 
these caveats in mind, the Western Order might be summarized according to the 
following schematic: 
 
Table I. The contours of Western Order 
Membership (“the Core + Junior 
Partners”) 
OECD Countries 
Regional bodies EU, NAFTA 
International bodies NATO, WTO, World Bank, IMF, G-7, 
OECD  
 
                                                
51 Ikenberry, After Victory, p. 9 
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 How resilient and enduring the order is, the question with which we began, 
depends upon the level of cohesion. In the table below I have identified six prominent 
hypotheses drawn from the literature which fit under three broad rubrics: interests, 
values, and institutions. One can certainly think of other unifying bonds that deserve 
consideration. My objective is not to exhaust the subject but to select the most important 
variables and theoretically explore how these might exhibit interactive effects:  
Table II. Six propositions regarding cohesion within the Western Order 
Interest I.         Commerce  Shared commercial interests contribute to peace and 
lead to the stable reproduction of Western Order. 
Intererst II.       Threat External security threats, like the Cold War, solidify 
Western Order by encouraging cooperation. 
Values I.           Identity A liberal identity reduces fear and suspicion within the 
order, creating stable expectations of peaceful change. 
Values II.         Liberalism Shared liberal values form the normative basis for 
cooperation within the Western Order, contributing to 
overall stability. 
Institutions I .   Democracy Transparency and the externalization of democratic 
norms contribute to peace and stability within the 
Western Order. 
Institutions II.  
Multilateralism 
Multilateral institutions create predictable patterns of 
behavior by facilitating cooperation and reducing the 
returns to power. 
_______________________
___ 






Multilateralism, Threat-Identity, Threat-Liberalism, 





Part II of this paper is devoted to a theoretical exploration of these fifteen interactiv  





Cohesion and Interactive Effects 
Threat-Commerce 
 
 In general, states will lay their differences aside when faced with a common 
threat.52 A spirit of unity is easily forged in the face of dire circumstance—the We is 
quickly found when confronted with a menacing Them. Within an alliance, common 
threat is the unifying bond.53 The Soviet threat directly contributed to the creation of 
NATO and overall US engagement of Europe. To contain the spread of communism a 
united Western front was necessary. The security imperative quickly spilled over into the 
commercial realm. 
 Commerce refers to the primary forms of interstate economic interaction: trade, 
capital, and monetary flows. While its forms have changed, commercial interaction, like 
war, has been a feature of international politics throughout the ages. Historically, war and 
commerce have been closely linked.54 The complex historical record notwithstanding, an 
important strand of liberal theory claims that commerce creates peace.55  How did 
commerce work to create cohesion within the confederacy? Immediately following 
World War II, peace within the Western bloc is not particularly surprising. Numerous 
factors, most notably US hegemony and Cold War bipolarity, converged to keep the 
                                                
52 For an excellent review of the ‘conflict in-group thesis’ see Arthur Stein, “Conflict and Cohesion” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 20 (1979) 
53 Stephen Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1987) 
54 See for example, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1989); 
Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the 
Second Millenium (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) 
55  See Erik Gartzke, Quan Li and Charles Boehmer, “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence 
and International Conflict,” International Organization, 55 (2001); Bruce Russett and John Oneal, 
Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2001); Stephen Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the 
Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Richard Rosecrance, The 
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Western bloc united. In the West, peace is hopelessly over-determined.56 What is more 
interesting is how the commercial confederacy has steadily grown, expanded, and 
withstood a number of convulsions. The question is not peace, but rather, how cohesion 
has been maintained and cooperation sustained. It is conceivable that states can be at 
peace, but not engaged in the kinds of cooperative relations we associate with liberal 
international orders. Peace is the absence of armed conflict; cooperation implies positive 
interaction. The latter does not necessarily follow from the former. This was the case 
during the years leading up to World War II. A number of democratic republics existed; 
they were at peace, but relations were nevertheless characterized by isolationism and 
competitive protectionism. The point is simply that a non-violent status-quo, even among
democracies, does not necessarily involve stable institutionalized cooperation and 
interstate commerce.  
Economic self-interest, and the prospect of making gains, has the effect of 
drawing states into commercial arrangements. As interstate economic itercourse grows 
in volume and density and expands beyond trade into areas of investment, finance, labor 
and production, cohesion among states is solidified. Where this type of interdependence 
grows states become more sensitive to changes taking place in other countries—today, 
nothing better illustrates this than how financial markets react to changes cross the 
globe. Sensitivity is itself not a measure of cohesion but it does highlight the extent to 
which states are tied to each other. Put another way, their economic fates are intertwined 
one with the other. It is difficult to calculate one’s own interest without considering the 
predicament of one’s rival. The longer the confederacy persists, the greatr the degree to 
                                                
56 Realists talk about bipolarity, nuclear deterrence, and hegemonic stability; liberals prefer democracy, 
interdependence, and institutions; constructivists a Kantian culture and security community.   
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which the interest of the part is tied to the continued viability of the whole. If the 
commercial confederacy sinks, its core members will sink.  
The Cold War threat and commercial interest contributed to cohesion 
independently but also interacted in important ways. Reconstruction and European 
integration were primarily driven by the need to rebuild and create a buffer against 
possible Soviet aggression.  For President Truman, the Marshall Plan and the Truman 
Doctrine were ‘two halves of the same walnut.’ At Harvard University in 1947, George 
Marshall outlined the main objectives of the US plan for European reconstruction. One of 
the central themes was to create European unity through economic and political 
cooperation so as to counter communism and Soviet expansionism. Aid was made 
conditional upon cooperation on the continent. The European’s preferred a more national 
approach to recovery; the Marshall Plan insisted that they develop a comprehensiv , 
cooperative plan.57 Aid recipients formed the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation in 1948. The more important organization turned out to be the European 
Coal and Steel Community, designed to manage vital strategic resources along the 
Franco-German border. Threat led to deeper forms of economic interaction and political 
cooperation across the Atlantic, as institutions took hold and the US permitted trade on an 
asymmetrical basis. Regardless of original intent, the Bretton Woods system beca e an 
important instrument in solidifying Western cohesion, bringing about recovery and the 
German and Japanese economic miracles, and in general, raising a capitalist bulwark 
against communism.  
                                                
57 For a useful account of early European integration see Walter Lipgens, A History of European 
Integration (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982) 
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The commercial order was an integral part of the security strategy. Not only was 
an open commercial order believed necessary to prevent the recurrence of the economic 
nationalism and competitive protectionism that exacerbated the great depression and were 
believed to have contributed to the rise of fascism, but also, economic cooperation was 
understood to be one important means by which Western allies would be rebuilt 
economically, newly democratic countries like Japan and West Germany would be 
consolidated and integrated, and overall, a strong barrier to the spread of communism 
would be raised. Threat perception encouraged economic cooperation, while capitalism 
accentuated the differences between East and West and contributed to a heightening of 
mutual suspicion.  
East-West competition during the Cold War amounted to a massive race; each 
side responding and trying to outpace the other. The Soviet Union was not simply facing 
the US, it was contending with an open bloc and global production network. This gave 
the West a significant advantage.58 To the extent that the West’s power and dynamism 
was linked to open commerce, it exacerbated the threat, at least as seen from the Svie  
side. The Soviet response in turn exacerbated the level of threat as seen from the West. 
Second, as the Soviets squared off against a commercial bloc and military allance, how 
this group was faring as a whole mattered. During the Bretton Woods years the secondary 
powers—an integrated and rearmed West Germany for example—were soaring ahead. 
Third, the prospect of economic aid, foreign investment, and market access are the 
primary means by which outsiders have been drawn in and integrated into the Western 
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commercial order. The spread of capitalism was inimical to the socialist project just as 
communism was incompatible with free market capitalism.  
Identity-Commerce/Liberalism 
In the tradition of Kant and Wilson, the commercial confederacy can be thought 
of as a league of liberal republics. Totalitarianism had been defeated in two great wars; 
freedom and democracy, it was believed, could deliver peace. John Owen offers a 
persuasive account about how liberalism should be seen as underlying the democratic 
peace. States must perceive each other as liberal in order for them to trust and repect 
fellow democracies.59 In this regard, liberalism has the effect of creating a certain 
ideological solidarity among states and societies. This leads to a more robust and durable 
relationship. Indeed, there are strong theoretical reasons for this: With regard to virtually 
any human relationship, longevity and stability are most often secured when the edific  is 
built on a shared ideational foundation. Workers are more productive when they believe 
in the company and product; lawmakers are better public servants when they believe in 
the legislative tradition and the public good; homegrown soldiers make for a better 
defense than do mercenaries, and so on. Where cooperative relationships are premised on 
self-interest alone, the resulting relationship is less stable. To the extent that there might 
be a thin “Kantian” identity, it is premised on liberalism.60 
This thin layer of identity is a unifying force. But by itself it is weak, altogether 
prone to disruption. While identity may be a source of cohesion because it facilitates 
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agreement and mutual understanding, the greatest conflicts are often fought out among 
kin and compatriot. If cultural or ideological affinity were all that is needed, the problem 
of international politics would have been solved long ago. This notion is contradicted by 
millennia of political experience. The case of the Greek city-states is instructive. The 
Greeks prayed to the same Gods. The Amphictyonic Council, a primitive IGO, was 
created to effectuate common religious traditions and secure the shrine at Delphi. The 
Greeks fended off a mutual enemy in the Persians. They participated in the same games 
and shared numerous cultural traits. Plato refused to label violence among the Greeks 
“war” but preferred the term “civil strife,” suggesting that Greeks should treat each other 
not as foreign enemies but “men who will some day be reconciled.”61 By all accounts, 
there was something like a pan-Greek identity. Tragically, these sources of ohesion 
notwithstanding, the city-states were continually mired in conflict. From the anci nt 
Greeks to the Arab world today, history furnishes a rich array of evidence in defe se of 
this general proposition.  
But while generally weak, ideological compatibility and identity are nevertheless 
significant, especially when they combine with other mechanisms. In terms of great 
power relations, this variable helps to account for cohesion within other important 
historical arrangements. For example, cohesion among the Spanish and Austrian 
Hapsburgs, a dynasty which threatened to dominate Europe for a century and half, was 
maintained not only by mutual political-military interests but family ties, Catholicism and 
the counter-reformation as well. The 19th century Concert of Europe was a league of 
monarchs whose aim was not only to keep imperial France from reasserting itself, but 
more generally, it sought to keep the people down. Popular revolution was feared, the 
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Concert could keep these conflagrations from spreading across Europe. The monarchic 
creed was an important source of cohesion. After World War II, the cohesion withithe 
coalition of the victors was short-lived precisely because two hegemonic powers 
espoused ideologies which were the very antithesis of each other. A purely powr 
centered analysis misses these important ideological dimensions. 
 Commercial intercourse reinforces a liberal ideology and works to constitute and 
reproduce a thin liberal identity.  The simple fact is that ideas are popular when they 
work, or appear to work. The orthodoxy usually prevails and is reinforced as long as it 
delivers. For example, Jeffrey Legro argues that collective ideas are usually replaced by a 
new orthodoxy only after they experience a shock and collapse.62 It cannot be the case 
that ideas exist independently of material conditions. It’s hard not to be a liberal when 
you’re getting rich. Similarly, it’s hard to remain a commie when you’re standing in a 
breadline. To the extent that communist countries had a communist identity, this never 
prevented its demise once confronted with a blitzkrieg of material reality. Ideas and 
identity are intimately connected to the material world.  
Constructivists acknowledge that commercial interaction and interest contributes 
to the formation of a shared identity. For Wendt, commercial interdependence is a 
“master variable” while for Adler and Barnett, commerce is a precipitating factor leading 
to the formation of a security community.63 The problem is that once an identity or 
culture is formed, it is supposed to supersede other factors like economic 
interdependence. This is a mistake. Commercial interest and interaction helps reproduce 
and sustain a shared identity once formed. Social constructivism, with its strictly 
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ideational ontology, has difficulty appreciating the role that material forces play in the 
construction and reproduction of identity.64 Identities are not only constructed through 
intersubjective interaction but also through various material activities that actors are 
engaged in. In this way, commerce reinforces identity.  
Commercial relationships create mutual dependencies. Realists have long argued 
that dependency and losses in autonomy endanger security.65 Because identity and 
ideational solidarity can contribute to ‘stable expectations of peaceful change’ states are 
more likely to accept mutually dependent relationships. European institutional deepening 
has proceeded, even after the Cold War, partly because leading states like France and 
Germany no longer fear one another. While French are French and Germans still 
Germans, European politics seems to be animated by a “Kantian culture” of fi ndship.66 
This is not to say that politics is harmonious, but that states are willing to operate 
peaceably and cooperatively within a shared regional political system. Shared identity 
contributes to each state’s willingness to accept losses in autonomy and the attendant 
risks that accompany economic integration. Second, identities are tied to the “r les” that 
actors play.67 These roles are defined intersubjectively. To be a “trading state,” part of a 
trading order, is to be engaged commercial interaction with others. Or put differently, a 
state’s liberal identity is tied to the very act and process of engaging othersin commerce. 
Hence, shared identity and commerce tend to operate in mutually reaffirming ways.  
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Liberalism is an ideology, or a system of ideas. It is often associated with things
like individual rights and liberties, limited self-government, and free markets. Liberalism 
makes strong normative claims about what is right and just. It provides prescritions for 
action. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, it promises particular outcomes (i.e. 
justice, peace and plenty). It would be unhelpful to produce a detailed account of the 
content and evolution of the liberal tradition. Here, we will confine our analysis to the
role liberalism plays in the commercial confederacy.  
Independently, liberalism contributes to cohesion most obviously because it forms 
the ideological foundation of the group. Among these states, agreement on values and 
first principles has contributed to overall group cohesion. Liberalism therefore r lat s 
most directly to the values dimension of cohesion although it also implicates the ‘inter st’ 
dimension as well. Throughout the ages—from Athens to America—leading powers have 
shown a striking propensity to spread their ideas and values. Not surprisingly, the US and 
its allies shared an important interest in promoting the ‘liberal model.’ Authoritarian 
states, it was believed, were more inclined toward aggression. Democracy and open 
commercial cooperation were the answer. For liberal internationalists like Wilson and 
Roosevelt, liberalism not only served US interests but was to form the basis of a new 
world order conducive to general peace and prosperity. Liberalism contributes to 
cohesion because of agreement on basic values and a thin identity, but also, it forms the 
basis of an important common interest: spreading liberal values and ideas. Cohesion is 
enhanced to the extent that actors share the conviction that their values are universal and 
should be universalized. 
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Economic liberalism prescribes specific means and ends. Ricardo’s attack on 
Mercantalism established a strong theoretical foundation for free market economics. 
According to this school, the best way to increase national wealth is to exploit 
comparative advantage and encourage divisions of labor by imposing as few restriction  
on trade as possible. This openness, liberals assert, does not only lead to prosperity but 
peace as well. According to the liberal normative view, the appropriate form of interstate 
rivalry is open economic competition. After World War II, the US and its allies se med 
ripe for this new experiment. The isolationism of the 1920s and 30s combined with 
strong protectionist policies failed to deliver neither peace nor prosperity. The US was 
founded a commercial republic, and after World War II it had the relative power and will 
to rebuild the world in its own image. Not surprisingly, the American vision of post-war 
order features two liberal pillars: commercialism and constitutionalism. 
The commercial confederacy is partly premised on a mutually reinforcing 
congruence between the logics of appropriateness and consequence.68 That is, the 
instrumental and normative are in substantial harmony. Liberalism does not manifest 
itself because of selfless adherence to a system of normative ideas. Much like the 
“protestant ethic” it encourages behavior which is very much in the instrumental interest 
of actors. To the extent that actors reap benefits, liberalism is reinforced. For instance, 
after World War II, West Germany’s turn to democracy and overall integration into the 
Western bloc was reinforced by the economic miracle brought on by these developments, 
just as China’s turn to market reform today has been reinforced by several decades of 
stunning growth. While the post-war boom among the countries of, what would become, 
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the OECD was dramatic across the board, nowhere was this truer than in Japan where 
output grew eightfold in twenty five years!  
Democracy-Commerce 
Democracy is limited self-government. In general, democratic countries a e those 
in which the executive and legislature are chosen through contested elections.69 A 
substantial body of literature supports the conclusion that democracies do not, or only 
rarely, fight wars against other democracies.70 Through mechanisms of institutional 
restraint and externalization of democratic norms, democracies have succeeded in forging 
a zone of peace. Hence, democracy has been a fundamental source of stability within the 
Western order.  
Democracy does not automatically lead to interdependent commercial ties. During
the interwar years democratic states found themselves participants in a vicious cycle of 
competitive protectionism as trade decline precipitously. But democracy does facilitate 
commercial ties once states make the decision to enter into such relations with each other. 
As Russett argues, “…democratic states presumably feel their security less threatened by 
other democratic states, and hence can enter into relationships of economic 
interdependence for absolute gain without worrying as much about the relative gains that 
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so centrally impact the realist model of relationships.”71 Not surprisingly then, greater 
levels of trade are found between democratic states.72 
Democracy also facilitates economic linkages by allowing democratic stes to 
make more credible commitments.73 Democracies are better able to make credible 
commitments because of transparency and, in general, it is institutionally more difficult 
for democracies to abruptly change policy.74 Where commitments are greater, the 
“shadow of the future” can be expected to operate with greater effect. Cooperation in 
present rounds is more likely when actors anticipate relations to continue long into the 
future.75  
The democracy-commerce nexus is important in understanding the ways in which 
the Western order operated in practice, but it is also crucial to understanding the very 
process of order building itself. In the tradition of Woodrow Wilson, post-World War II 
order building proceeded according to a liberal blue-print, first outlined in the Atlantic 
Charter, in which democratic states together formed a commercial league. Promoting free 
trade was critical to avoiding the economic turmoil of the 1930s, but development and 
trade were also important for ensuring the success of democracy and its consolidation in 
West Germany and Japan.   
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Institutions are sets of rules and procedures that govern behavior. In recent 
history, international institutions and organizations have been a regular and important 
feature of international life. Unfortunately, major institutions and organizations have too 
often failed to deliver lasting order among the system’s leading powers. The Conc rt of 
Europe faded after some decades; the League of Nations faltered. Though the UN 
persists, its record is mixed. After World War II, as many have argued, systemic stability 
probably rested on bipolarity and nuclear deterrence.76 The Security Council can hardly 
be credited for maintaining great power peace in the Cold War era. Quite logically, this 
historical record has led many realists to marginalize the importance of international 
institutions.77 Yet this wholesale dismissal has been altogether too hasty.  
When they work well, institutions regulate interaction and produce predictable 
and stable outcomes. We are specifically concerned with the ‘layer-cake’ of multilateral 
institutions which include, or center around, the system’s core commercial powers; 
specifically, the ‘Bretton Woods Sisters’ (IMF, World Bank, GATT/WTO), the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union, 
NATO and to a lesser degree regional organizations like NAFTA and APEC. 
Multilateralism, as Ruggie has defined it, is an arrangement that “coordinates behavior 
among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.”78 
Multilateral institutions are general in character; they govern conduct by specifying rules 
over classes of actions; they do this on a non-arbitrary basis.  
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Scholars first began to give serious attention to rules and procedures in the 
context of regime theory.79 Liberal institutionalism, which grows out of regime theory, 
has developed into an important paradigm and research program. Liberal institutionalism 
is a functionalist perspective; states seek out institutional solutions because these provide 
functional benefits. Institutions reduce uncertainty, provide information, reduce 
transaction costs, increase transparency and allow actors to signal intentions, provide 
enforcement mechanisms and create incentives for future cooperation through sunk costs 
and the “shadow of the future”.80 Liberal institutionalism developed in response to 
realism’s pessimism about the prospects for cooperation. The central task ofin titutional 
theory was to demonstrate how cooperation was possible in anarchy and even after the 
decline of a hegemon. Scholars have focused a great deal of attention on how the 
collective action problem is solved and the suboptimal outcomes of a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
avoided.81 In so doing they have produced an impressive arsenal of theoretical ideas that 
show why self-interested state actors will gravitate toward institutional solutions so as to 
more efficiently reap cooperative gains. Institutions and institutionalized relations are not 
only path-dependent and “sticky,” they tend to gather momentum.82 For those on the 
outside, it may be difficult to be economically competitive if you remain excluded.83 For 
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those on the inside, “As the cost of leaving a group rises, so does the net benefit of 
remaining in it.”84 
 Stability is enhanced to the extent that the commercial confederacy is ableto 
resist undesirable changes that may threaten to dissolve it. There are several notable ways 
in which multilateral institutions accomplish this. First, multilateralism is characterized 
by “diffuse reciprocity”—a loss today may be cancelled out by tomorrow’s gains.85 
While benefits are more diffuse they are not distributed evenly. It may not even be the 
case that actors have an equal voice. For instance, IMF voting is weighted according t  
the amount each state contributes. What multilateralism does mean is that the rules of the 
game are not arbitrarily stacked in favor of one or the few. It does not promise equality of 
results, but it does promise a fair process.  
The principle of multilateralism has intrinsic normative appeal but it also 
represents an order in which both the strong and weak remain relatively content. It does 
not preclude the powerful from getting theirs, nor are the weak subject to arbitrary 
domination. Multilateral institutions have the effect of “reducing the returns to power” by 
decreasing state autonomy. Put simply, institutions can help prevent domination by 
strong states over weaker partners.86 This insight flows from the general character of 
multilateral rules which limit the arbitrary use of power. In restraining their power, 
through institutional mechanisms, strong states abandon an imperial posture. Finally, the 
multilateral order accommodates rising powers by integrating them. The unlik ly 
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brilliance of the principle of multilateralism enables the strong to reap due ben fits while 
allowing the weak to retain formal equality and autonomy. The multilateral orderassigns 
to each according to capability. To a limited extent it reflects the advantages of greater 
strength. Granted, multilateralism can never quench the thirst of the truly ambitious, but 
again, never are their mouths so dry as to motivate aggression.  
 Stability is created because power is restrained and the behavior of the strong is 
rendered more predictable; it is also created because institutions limit the sources of 
possible contention. We have already noted how institutions can produce a convergence 
of interest, but interests will not always converge. Ideological affinity and identity may 
also limit dissension. But regardless, disputes are a part of any ‘normal’ politics. If 
disputes and wrangling prevail in domestic politics, how can we expect the international 
realm to be any more harmonious? It is not the presence of disputes, but how they are 
dealt with which is of greatest concern. Where there is order, rules govern relations. In 
theory, rules should preempt many sources of disagreement, or change the nature of 
disagreement. Institutions also limit disputes by creating transparency and providing 
reliable information. They can offer a forum in which dialogue and diplomacy might be 
pursued. Some institutions are even equipped with mechanisms to manage disputes once 
they have erupted. The reason why the WTO is perhaps the most important international 
institution is because it is armed with a powerful dispute settlement mechanism which 
adjudicates trade disputes and in certain cases legitimizes retaliatory measures where 
violations occur. What is important is that disputes are channeled through a rule governed 
institutional process. In general, enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms 
facilitate cooperation. Information can help identify defectors and reduces the likelihood 
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of miscalculation. State commitments are all the more reliable and credible where neutral 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms raise the risks and costs of defection and 
cheating.  
 Finally, any system is vulnerable to a sudden shock. Often these shocks are 
difficult to foresee and they may threaten to derail cooperation. Shocks cannot always be 
prevented but institutions can help the system absorb or weather them. The commercial 
confederacy is unique in that states are highly interdependent. Economic shock or 
collapse in one state or region will have far reaching reverberations—recall the “Asian 
contagion” of the late 90s and the more recent “American contagion” of 2008 which has 
affected virtually every market in the world. Indeed, the IMF was created for the very 
purpose of bailing out troubled economies so that heavy weather in one country would 
not threaten the viability of the whole. Today’s ongoing crisis, as it began in the most 
powerful state, and has spread to every other, is clearly of a vastly different magnitude. 
Regardless, the point is, institutions can work to manage both diplomatic crises as well as 
economic shocks.  
The institutional dimension interacts directly with the commercial. After World 
War II, economic cooperation and integration was to be pursued through institutional 
means. The Bretton Woods ‘sisters’ were specifically designed to effectuat  these goals. 
Just as commerce has encouraged institutional development, institutions have in turn led
to an impressive expansion of the global economy. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the 
level of economic openness in the absence of multilateral institutions like the 





Threat and identity interact in several important ways.  Many constructivists agree 
with the proposition that a common enemy or threat contributes to collective identity 
formation.87 That is, the “We” is more easily found when confronted with a menacing 
“Them.” Group identities often develop around shared characteristics and interests, but 
also, identities are defined by the “other.” Groups are identified by what they are not. 
Members of the Western order shared common characteristics: the “Western” states were 
democratic and shared a liberal value commitment. They also had important group 
interests, commerce and development. But these shared liberal characteristics and 
interests were all the more significant because they stood in such stark contrast to hose 
embodied by the Soviet Bloc.  
The Soviet threat solidified Western cohesion around a shared commitment to 
liberalism, democracy, and capitalism, thus leading to identity formation. But by bringing 
East-West differences into such sharp focus, the liberal-identity had the effect of 
exacerbating the Cold War conflict itself. Like nationalist fervor, rallying around the 
democratic-capitalist flag had the effect of enflaming Cold War fears. In this way, threat 
helped solidify a liberal identity while the development of a liberal identity in urn 




The need to contain Soviet aggression drove important post-WWII developments. 
Franco-German reconciliation and German rearmament proceeded from the increasingly 
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urgent need to forge a stable and strong Western European front. America’s proactive 
involvement was itself a necessary condition of success. In 1919 Britain and the US
refused to give France a security promise in the event of another German attack. In 1947, 
the Dunkirk Treaty not only created a self-defense pact, but more importantly, provided 
France with security assurance that proved vital to integration and German rearmament. 
US security guarantees and leadership were driven by an interest in countering and 
containing the Soviet Union. 
Most directly, the Soviet threat led to US support of the Marshall Plan and 
European Integration. Between 1947 and 1951, the US spent about $12.5 million on the 
European Recovery Program. Most significantly, it led to the creation of NATO, a form l 
treaty alliance, embodying the policy of the “double containment” of Germany and the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet threat was an important reason, and political justification, for 
costly US commitments. The threat was symbolized in Churchill’s 1946 speech which 
warned that a great Iron Curtain lay across Europe. In 1947, Truman introduced the 
doctrine whereby the US would assume leadership of the “free world” and assist 
countries like Greece and Turkey in their efforts to resist communism. After the 1948 
blockade of Berlin, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 indicating that the US 
was not merely willing to use economic aid but military might as well.  
Threat and democracy interacted insofar as democracy was important to the 
success of multilateral security cooperation while the success of fledgling emocracies in 
the Western block critically hinged on US security guarantees. Democracy enabled the 
US to make binding commitments and to render these commitments less threatening.88 
Meanwhile, the US security guarantee was a necessary condition for the European Coal 
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and Steel Community to take hold; in guaranteeing German security and assuaging 
French fears, democracy was consolidated in West Germany.  
Identity-Liberalism/Democracy 
Identities emerge and evolve through a process of intersubjective interaction.89 
During repeated rounds self and other cast each other and in so doing develop 
understandings of self and other. Shared identity involves in-group We feelings that 
create group cohesion among actors and may lead to altruistic behavior—the interest of 
the individual becomes tied to the collective well-being of the group as a whole. In this
way, identities can influence the way actors conceive of themselves and their inter sts in 
relation to others.  
Identity involves how actors understand self and other. It is partly about a 
subjective feeling: do I understand myself to be a part of a particular group? But group 
identity also involves certain objective features. Groups are often defined by language, 
shared experience, race, and so on. Identity not only rests on mutual trust and feelings of 
attraction, but also objective features, commonalities, or interests that actors share. 
Within the Western order, shared identity primarily rests on liberal values nd 
democracy. As Adler and Barnett note, “At the present moment if scholars of 
international politics are likely to identify one set of political ideas and meanings that are 
related to a security community it is liberalism and democracy.”90 These were the 
defining features of in-group identification in the West. In his 1947 address to Congress,  
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Truman explained that: 
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose betwen alternative 
ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of 
the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free 
elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom 
from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority 
forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press 
and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.91 
Those committed to the first way of life are good, part of the We; those committed to the second 
way of life are bad, part of the Them. Identity was not only based upon We feelings but perhaps 
more importantly on the objective fact that members of the Western bloc were committed to 
liberalism and democracy, defining features of group membership.  
Identity-Multilateralism 
Constructivists have claimed that institutions are sites of social learning a d 
identity formation. Constructivist international theory has produced a growing body of 
literature on the role of institutions in the construction of state identities and by extension 
state interests.92 There is a common pattern of thinking among constructivists on the 
question of identity formation. Identity evolves through stages where initially actors are 
motivated by instrumental concerns or logics of consequences but through continued 
institutionally directed interaction and socialization, identities change such that interests 
no longer rest on self-interest alone.93 Recently, scholars have claimed large-N support 
for the constructivist thesis by establishing a relationship between policy cnvergence 
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and IGO membership.94 However, it is unclear why policy convergence is prima facie 
evidence for the constructivist thesis when rationalist models predict it as well.95
Constructivists are correct, however, in highlighting the importance of institutions in 
socializing members and building identities. Institutions help constitute members as 
participants of good standing in a liberal order. Even if actors are not fully socialized, 
institutions may cause actors to “role play” or behave as if they were.96 Overall, there is 
strong theoretical reason to believe that interaction within institutional contexts has some 
effect on the way states understand themselves, and their interests, in relatio to others.  
Liberalism-Multilateralism/Democracy 
As was discussed above, the Cold War security imperative was a major force 
driving the US policy of engagement, assistance, and cooperation with its allies on the 
continent and in Asia. While acknowledging the importance of this security imperative 
we are here interested in the internal dynamic of the Western subsystem. As David Lake 
has suggested, states must choose among a number of possible relations lying on a 
continuum.97 However, his contracting theory seems to ignore an obvious possibility: 
great powers tend to create the world in their own image.98 After World War II, order 
building flowed from a liberal system of ideas. It would certainly be odd if the Soviet 
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Union had pursued a policy of multilateral engagement with junior partners in its eastern 
sphere of influence. 
 Realists often assume that the content and character of a liberal internatonal order 
flows directly from the overwhelming concentration of power in a single actor.99 
However, it is difficult to infer from the presence of power, exactly how that power will 
be used. It is reasonable to suppose that great powers will take on ambitious tasks. But 
the nature and content of these undertakings cannot be explained by power alone. As 
Ruggie points out,  
…to say anything sensible about the content of international economic orders and 
about the regimes that serve them, it is necessary to look at how power and 
legitimate social purpose become fused to project political authority into the 
international system.100 
In the case of the commercial confederacy, legitimate social purpose flows from 
liberalism.   
 The post-war institutional order is manifestly liberal. It was not enough that the 
Western order was to be animated by a set of liberal aspirations; they had to be 
effectuated by a range of new international institutions. The ends were to be liberal and 
so the means as well. The multilateral order exhibits a number of important liberal
features. States are recognized as e jure equals, that is, none is formally superior.  
Second, constitutionalism is a ‘reign check.’ The institutional order not only respects th  
inviolability of state sovereignty, it is designed to reduce domination and the arbitrary 
exercise of power through a system of rules. Non-domination has been a corner stone of 
liberal republican political theory from Machiavelli on. After the war, a large part of the 
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institutional strategy was designed to reduce the likelihood of domination. As Ikenberry 
explains:  
…the array of institutions and practices of the order serve to reduce the returns to 
power—or more precisely, to regularize that power and extend the returns on 
power further into the future—which lowers the risks of participation by strong 
and weak states alike.101 
Third, multilateral rules are general in character, applying equally to all parties 
involved.102 That is, the rules are not overtly stacked in favor of one or a few. This 
conception of multilateral rules mirrors the liberal conception of the rule of law. Laws 
should be both general in character and non-arbitrary; the similarly situated should be 
treated in a like manner. To be non-arbitrary, outcomes must flow from an objective rule 
guided process and not free discretion. The principles embodied in the multilateral liberal 
international order were a generalized adaptation of the animating principles of most 
member governments. The democratic form of government finds its origins in liberal
modern thought; success of the liberal project in many countries, most notably the US, 
paved the way for its application to the international realm. It is no coincidence that 
building of liberal international order was led by liberal democratic states, nd in 
particular, the strongest among them.   
 
Conclusions: virtues and vices of holistic thinking 
 Mono-causal explanations have the virtue of being parsimonious. They are also 
more amenable to empirical testing. The problem with mono-causal explanations is that 
they’re usually incomplete. More often than not, mono-causal predictions prove to be 
wrong. The Western order was supposed to fade along with the Cold War. In the 1980s, 
                                                
101 After Victory, p. 269 
102 John Gerard Ruggie ed., Multilateralism Matters (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1993)  
55 
 
the waning of US hegemony was thought to spell the end of the West. The end of Bretton 
Woods in the early 1970s and more recently the tumult surrounding the great recession 
were believed to mark the beginning of the end. Nor is identity a sufficient condition for 
cohesion: in the early years of the Cold War, before Franco-German reconciliation h d 
taken place, order was maintained by US hegemonic power and the Cold War threat. 
Similarly, it is unclear how much of an independent role institutions played early on. The 
World Bank was eclipsed by the Marshall Plan while the resources of the IMF were not 
impressive. Institutions take time to develop.  
 The main virtue of thinking in terms of interactive effects is that it overcomes 
many of the pitfalls associated with oversimplification. Above, I have tried to 
demonstrate that there is strong theoretical reason to believe that many pardigm tic 
variables interact with each other and in so doing produce greater combined effects. It is 
also likely to be true that variables operate differently in different contexts. During 
Détente, the Soviet threat was relaxed; after 1991 it had vanished. During the Breton
Woods years the Western bloc was making astonishing economic gains; the 1970s and 
80s were marked by economic turmoil. The effect of shared identity may also go through 
cycles; during the era of US unilateralism and the Bush Doctrine, transatlantic relations 
were heavily strained. Senior American officials began to talk about a “NewEurope” and 
an “Old Europe” while European public opinion of the US was low. Because of 
interactive effects cohesion may be maintained even if one of the dimensions becomes 
strained. This, in part, helps to explain the impressive resilience of the Western ord .  
 The problem with complexity is complexity. Given the complexity of the picture I 
have painted, it seems nearly impossible to determine the relative weight of each of the 
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variables and their interactive combinations. If everything is important, is anything 
important? Of course, not everything has been included, but much has. The challenge is 
to introduce enough complexity so that an accurate explanatory picture emerges without 
introducing too much. This requires sustained empirical scrutiny. There is value in 
exploring complexity.103 I have assumed that each of the paradigmatic variables is 
important. The exercise is not intended to offer a comprehensive theoretical account of 
cohesion within the Western order, but rather, to explore new theoretical possibilitie . By 
focusing on interactive effects the analysis yields a range of novel propositi ns while 
surveying and bringing together many existing propositions found in the literatur . It is 
my hope that many who conduct empirical research in this area will find some of these 
propositions worth examining.  
 The paradigmatic debates that have taken place in the field seem to have taken 
place pursuant to the assumption that one paradigm can in fact be judged superior to 
another. The tendency is to privilege a narrow set of paradigmatic variables whi  
perhaps bringing in others on an ad hoc basis to mop up remaining explanatory messes. 
But in thinking, for instance, about the question of why groups of states cohere or ‘hang 
together’ it becomes evident that no single variable is in fact sufficient. During the early 
Cold War years in the West, unity existed despite the fact that a common identity had yet 
to develop, exemplified by strong mutual suspicions between the French and Germans. 
Common threat cannot be a sufficient condition seeing as the Western order enduresven 
after the Cold War comes to an end. Institutions cannot be sufficient, epitomized by the 
fact that the League of Nations never prevented World War II while the Unitd Nations 
was ineffective in preventing or managing East-West conflict during the Cold War. 
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Commercial interdependence is not sufficient as manifest in the fact that Globalization I 
never did prevent World War I. While democracy may be sufficient to prevent armed 
conflict, it failed to prevent deterioration in relations during the 1930s, characterized by 
competitive protectionism and the like.  
 A ‘holistic approach’ begins not from the premise that empirical scholarship 
should not set out to confirm the superiority of a given paradigm, but rather, accepts the 
possibility that certain paradigmatic variables and propositions are necessary parts of a 
larger puzzle. Often, empiricists zoom in on particular empirical questions, discover 
things, and then proceed to draw general conclusions about the superiority of a given 
theoretical paradigm. But as I have endeavored to show, the superiority of a given 
paradigm often depends on the specific historic context—Realism may be superior in 
explaining the early Cold War years but less useful in explaining the early post-Cold War 
years.104 Empirical work should still focus on specific pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, 
keeping in mind that these pieces are connected to the larger image. Thinking about 
interactive effects is a useful way to study the ways in which each of the piec s to the 
jigsaw puzzle is connected. Researchers should therefore strive to be cognizant of how 
their specific research fits together in a larger puzzle.  
 Now, it may in fact be the case that some of the above theoretical propositions are 
wrong. Thinking holistically does not mean that anything that is logical or theoretically 
attractive is right. It does suggest that we should not begin from the premise that a given 
paradigm is superior, though it may be more useful depending upon the question and 
context. In this respect, this article is inter-paradigmatic, but in other important respects, 
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it is post-paradigmatic. A post-paradigmatic science does not aim to defeat competing 
paradigms but to discover the circumstances and contexts in which different explanations 
are more appropriate and useful. In the process, some propositions and explanations will 
be defeated, others marginalized. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it aimsto 




































A Systemic Theory of International Relations 
 
International relations theory aspires to explain political events, but as is often the case, 
theories adjust and develop in response to events as they unfold. In the early years ofthe 
Cold War it was believed that multipolar structures were generally more stabl th n those 
that were bipolar,105 but as years passed, and the Cold War failed to turn hot, new 
accounts of bipolar stability developed.106 After the Cold War ended, and the system 
entered a new phase of “unipolar stability,” systemic theory evolved to account for the 
new political reality.107 Developments have now unfolded such that power-centered 
systemic theory must confront two momentous questions: (1) is US hegemony declining, 
and (2) how are rising powers—China and India most prominently—likely to behave in a 
“post-American” world? Or put differently, what do waning US preeminence a d the rise 
of non-Western great powers mean for systemic stability, defined as the bsence of 
conflict and security competition?  
 Up until quite recently, the dominant view among IR scholars was that the US 
was indeed an unrivaled superpower, or unipole.108 Scholarly debate largely centered on 
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how enduring and stable the unipolar system is109; whether secondary powers are hard-
balancing, soft-balancing, or not balancing at all against the US110; and whether or not a 
coming multipolarity can be stable.111 But even as the nature of the unipolar system was 
being debated, many were already anticipating the decline of US hegemony as power was 
increasingly shifting east.112 In the wake of the economic collapse that began in 2008, the 
case for American decline seems to have gained added momentum.113 US decline is a 
hotly debated question, the answers to which are not at all clear.114 However, even the 
most vocal proponents of the unipolar stability theory believe that unipolarity cannot 
endure indefinitely.115What this means is that sooner or later, perhaps sooner, systemic 
theories of IR will be put to a critical test. As the leading power drama unfolds, the 
discipline should focus on two central, related, tasks. First, there is the empirical question 
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of whether or not and how fast the US is declining. And second, in the interest of 
properly determining the significance of the empirical record, and in avoiding a  hoc 
adjustments to extant theories, it would serve us well to line up existing systemic th ories 
and review the competing predictions generated from them. This chapter focuses on the 
latter.  
 In the debate taking place among power-centered systemic theorists, attention is 
mainly focused on two possibilities: In the first, the US succeeds in arresting it  relative 
decline and maintaining primacy for some time. Systemic stability can be expected to 
continue.116 In the second, the US declines relative to its rivals and systemic instability 
follows.117 For theorists of unipolar stability, declining hegemony is likely to bring with it 
increased security competition among the system’s leading players. But a third scenario 
exists which power-centered systemic theory, to date, has largely ignored: stability 
prevails at the system’s core, even as the US declines relative to its rivals, while rising 
secondary states continue to pursue strategies of integration and cooperation. As n w 
formulated, power-centered systemic theories could not explain this (not unlikely) 
outcome. 
In the early 90s, Japan and Germany’s rise to great power status was being 
debated.118 Today, the future of great power relations may crucially hinge on the behavior 
of rising powers—most importantly, that of China.119 In the field at large, great 
controversy surrounds, and less theoretical leverage is available, when discussion turns to 
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the system’s rising, or secondary, powers—Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC), for 
instance.120 For example, identity based theories find less traction as some of these 
players do not, or only partially share in the “Western,” or Kantian identity, founded on 
ideas of popular self-government, human rights , and free-market capitalism. Similarly, 
theories of democratic peace are not helpful in explaining the behavior of China and 
Russia. While liberals are mostly silent, power centered systemic theories almost 
universally predict trouble. However, similar realist predictions, made in the early 90s, of 
impending security competition and conflict were disconfirmed by two decades of 
stability at the core of the system.121 But what if extant power-centered systemic theories 
are again wrong about stability and the behavior of secondary, or rising, powers? What if
stability again prevails in a post-American world? This is precisely th result predicted by 
a variant of power-centered systemic theory developed below.  
Systemic theory is premised on the idea that competitive dynamics are largely 
conditioned by the prevailing configuration of great, or leading, powers.122 Today, at the 
core of the system, we find a commercial league of leading states. Many gloomy 
prognostications to the contrary, relations among the core Western powers, plus Japan, 
have endured and remain remarkably stable.  A theory of systemic confederacy explains 
stability by virtue of the overwhelming concentration of power in a cohesive commercial 
league centered around the strongest Western powers plus Japan. This league is a major 
power configuration that has altered competitive dynamics such that commercial 
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integration, or bonding, not military opposition and revision, has become the dominant 
competitive strategy for outsiders like China and India.   
 The theory of confederacy gains confidence to the extent that its main rival, 
hegemonic theory, appears less and less persuasive. Both unipolar stability and the theory 
of confederacy gain traction in the post-Cold War world. Each theory explains the 
absence of security competition and balancing behavior. Each predicts similar results, but 
for vastly different reasons. The crux: how can we get leverage on these divergent 
claims? The difference is that the logic of unipolarity will cease to operate if the 
distribution of power becomes multipolar, which seems inevitable in the long run; or, if 
the US ceases to perform hegemonic functions, a likely outcome in the short-run. Were 
either of these two scenarios to materialize, hegemonic theory predicts trouble. The 
theory of confederacy expects that the basic systemic trajectory will continue, as its logic 
does not rest on US power alone but the combined interaction of a core of leading states. 
According to this theory, it will persist, much as it has since the end of the Cold War 
because the international system is but a generalized version of the US dominated 
Western subsystem that has evolved along a steady path since the end of World War II. It 
has a strong reproductive logic that will continue to operate despite underlying shifts in 
the distribution of power among constituent units. In short, an exciting political 
experiment of epic proportions is unfolding.   
This chapter sets out to accomplish two ambitious goals. First, it will review th  
unipolar stability theory in order to clarify the underlying logic and the expectations 
generated. The more important, and original, goal is to fill a large gap in the literature. 
Section three will lay out the logic and behavioral propositions of a novel systemic theory 
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which accounts for both systemic stability and the behavior of rising (non-Western) 
powers. 
  
Unipolarity and Hegemonic Stability Theory 
 
Neorealist theory predicts that weaker states will flock to each other in the face of 
stronger actors.123 This has not happened. Why? The strongest realist argument derives 
from the logic of unipolarity. The ‘puzzle of the missing balance’ is apparently resolved 
if a unipolar distribution of power precludes the emergence of an effective balancing 
coalition. Unipolarity also leads to stability because no combination of secondary powers 
is able to effectively challenge it. And second, rivalry among the secondary powers 
themselves is muted because once a world hegemon takes sides, the game is over. 
Further, the hegemon maintains stabilizing regional security arrangements and 
institutions.124 The US may simply be so strong that balancing is rendered futile. Clearly 
US military and economic might is impressive, but is the US so dominant that no 
combination of powers could reasonably balance it? This raises an apparent dilemma for 
the unipolar thesis: clearly one can conceive of a combination of states whose aggregate 
force could balance US power. Wohlforth argues that a balancing coalition, while 
perhaps imaginable, is highly unlikely because the US is an offshore power, it is difficult 
to coordinate counter-hegemonic alliances, and finally, challengers must contend with an 
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extant hegemonic bandwagon.125 There is theoretical reason to believe that unipolarity is 
stable, and potentially enduring.126   
 As with stability in the security realm, at first glance, hegemonic theory seems to 
resolve questions about the persistence of economic cooperation. Hegemonic stability 
theory posits that cooperative, liberal trading orders are created and maintained by a 
preponderant power—Great Britain in the 19th century and the US in the 20th.127 The 
hegemon does not eliminate the logic of self-preservation but temporarily creates an 
environment in which its effects are subdued. Because secondary powers can make gains 
under an arrangement managed by a superpower, the hegemon solves collective action 
and enforcement problems that plague cooperation under anarchy, and in any event, no 
one is capable of challenging the order, states are inclined to pursue economic 
cooperation. Unipolarity changes the relative gains logic. Because the hgemon feels 
invincible it is less concerned about relative loss; only when second tier powers appear to 
be overtaking it does it grow nervous. For their part, secondary great powers go along 
because they are gaining at the expense of the hegemon. And in any event, the hegemon’s 
game is likely to be the only one in town.  
Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon provides benefits. For 
example, Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets f 
benefits in the area of international political economy: First, it provided a stable 
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international monetary system that facilitated trade and payments; second, it provided a 
market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis; and third, the US helped 
its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices.128 Sadly, all good things must 
come to an end. Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that the arrangement is 
ultimately unsustainable. The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance in the face of 
mounting costs, losses in relative power, and inevitable overextension. Challengers will 
rise. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war, and thereafter begins anew: “Th  
conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth, expansion, 
and eventual decline.”129 Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist 
indefinitely. 
 Whether system-wide economic cooperation rests on US preeminence raises two 
important questions for hegemonic theory: First, how much hegemony is required to 
maintain cooperation? In the 1970s it indeed appeared that the US led economic order 
was crumbling—the symbolic event occurred when Nixon dismantled gold convertibility 
in 1971. The shrinking of the economic gap between the US and its allies was partly a 
function of post-war recovery; it was also brought on by the asymmetric nature of the 
Bretton Woods system.130 Of course, an energy crisis and a stagnating US economy made 
matters worse. During the 1970s and early 80s protectionist pressures were mounting at a 
time when US hegemonic leadership was not forthcoming. As the hegemon was seen to 
be declining and protectionist pressures were mounting, many thought the global 
                                                
128 After Hegemony, Chap. 8 
129 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 210. For 
full analysis see Chaps. 4-5. 
130 Arthur Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma” International Organization Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984) 
67 
 
commercial order was on the verge of collapse.131 Since then, while the US has been the 
leading player—with a GDP that dwarfs every competitor— within the international 
economic order, cooperation has been less hegemonic and increasingly multilateral and 
symmetric. While America’s role as system maintainer and underwrite has become less 
pronounced, cooperation has accelerated, expanded and deepened. Curiously, even as the 
US’ role has changed from system underwriter to participant; even as it became 
increasingly intolerant of asymmetric trade and free riding, neverthelss, the order 
persists. These developments seem peculiar when approached from a hegemonic stability 
perspective.  
 Second, the functioning of a world market implies that at its center sits a powerful 
hegemon.132 Today, the US is not the only center of economic cooperation. Granted, the 
US is the biggest player, but multilateral cooperation is most pronounced at the regional 
level.133 Institutionalization, integration, and economic cooperation in Europe have 
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steadily expanded.134 While less institutionalized, economic cooperation in Asia has also 
accelerated135; at times the US has played a role, at times it has observed from the 
sideline.136 Regional hegemony may explain NAFTA. But since the end of the Cold War, 
the role US hegemony has played in the evolution of regional economic cooperation 
elsewhere is not exactly clear.137 That cooperation has been most pronounced at the 
regional level challenges the view that US power is the driver of these developments. In 
economic affairs, the US is not the epicenter of action, but behaves like a giant among 
lesser equals. It does not outright dominate the economic game.  
 What the above suggests is that hegemony in the military-security context has 
been rather different from US hegemony in the context of the world economic system. In 
the former, the US has maintained important security ties with Europe and Japan; US 
involvement has probably worked to manage regional security dilemmas. For instance, 
US security guarantees have played an important role in German and Japanese decisions 
not to build military capability befitting of a great power, developments that would 
certainly change regional security dynamics. In security affairs, the US has tolerated free 
riders and shown a willingness to foot the bill.138 But in the economic realm, since the 
1970s, the US has become increasingly intolerant of asymmetry and unwilling to 
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underwrite the system.139 This became evident when Nixon ended the gold standard and 
instituted an import surcharge.  US impatience with its allies was also apparent in the 
trade conflicts between the US and Japan throughout the 1980s and into the 90s. Since 
the 1970s the economic order appears much less hegemonic when viewed from the lens 
of political economy than it does when viewed with an eye toward security.   
At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic 
age.’140 But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion.141 With 
its armed forces over-extended, and resources stretched, the US appears much weaker 
today than it did five years ago.142 The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into 
the present predicament the US finds itself in: 
This three-way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) 
produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the 
consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the 
society neglects to pay the costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead 
to its defeat by rising powers. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient 
fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture, the economic basis of the 
society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline.143 
 
Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and 
investment have been sustained by deficit spending. It is unclear how long this formula 
will work.144  
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The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two 
wars, it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. Of course, everyone is 
getting hit. Because all are suffering, the US is still a giant in terms of relative power 
differentials.145 Relative power is important, but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do 
things. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on 
major international undertakings. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw f om Iraq 
and Afghanistan; however, these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources 
and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign 
powers like China.146 For the time being, the dollar is still the main reserve currency 
though there are signs that this may be changing.147 The broader point is that America’s 
hegemonic assertiveness on the international scene is changing.148 US security guarantees 
may prove less credible than they once were, leading allies to enhance their own military 
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capabilities. The US may still be a giant, but one that, for now at least, seems more 
bound.  
From the perspective of realist hegemonic theory, declining US power or its 
inability to act like a hegemon does not bode well for international stability and economic 
cooperation. As Wohlforth argues, “If…the United States fails to translate its potential 
into the capabilities necessary to provide order, then great power struggles for power and 
security will reappear sooner.”149 Challengers may emerge while regional security 
competition may be heightened. Absent US influence, and the stabilizing role it plays, 
institutionalized multilateral economic cooperation will face hard-times. The rise of 
economic nationalism and the dissolution of the liberal economic order, one might 
expect, will be accelerated by the ongoing global economic meltdown. Security 
competition can be expected to follow. These pessimistic predictions assume that there is 
latent distrust, uncertainty, and fear that US power has only temporarily subdued. It 
assumes that the security imperative is the primary motivation and that the distribution of 
power is the primary systemic variable of importance. But what if these prmises are 
inaccurate or incomplete? As we shall discover below, if these basic assumptions are 
relaxed, power-centered systemic theory yields vastly different explanations and 
behavioral expectations. 
 
 The Logic of Confederacy—or, a liberal systemic theory 
 
 Systemic theory is leading, or great power, theory. It is top-down theory that 
explains how a strategic environment arises out of the coactions of the system’s principal 
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actors that in turn conditions the behavior of all states in the system.150 To date, liberals 
have not produced a systemic theory. In their response to realist systemic theorizing, 
liberals adopted two different approaches. Neoliberals accepted many of neorealism’s 
foundational assumptions but arrived at different conclusions regarding the nature of 
anarchy and the prospects for cooperation.151 In this respect, they did not seek to replace 
realist systemic theory but merely modify it.152 A second group of liberals, the so called 
bottom-up or dyadic theorists, rejected realist systemic theorizing entirely. According to 
many of these liberal theorists, the very definition of “liberal theory” excluded systemic 
thinking.153 Whether by rejecting systemic thinking or merely seeking to modify it, a 
survey of the literature reveals that liberals have failed to produce a top-down systemic 
theory of their own.  
 A liberal systemic theory begins from the premise that the system is not 
dominated by a multitude of antagonistic and opposing great power poles, but rather, a 
relatively cohesive Western order that includes most of the system’s leading powers. This 
order evolves out of a US led hegemonic subsystem following World War II. This 
subsystem was formed by a number of leading commercial states: the US, Britain, 
France, Germany and Japan. Scores of junior partners can be included in this expanding 
cluster, collectively the OECD for the sake of simplicity. The ‘core’ of the Western order 
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does not include all states in the system but it does include most of the major players and 
many important secondary powers.  
This Western order is a kind of security community in so far as war among this 
group of states is unthinkable.154 Cohesion within this community is sustained by 
multiple different bonds. Firstly, it is sustained by a web of institutions that effectuate 
cooperation and bind actors, reducing the returns to power and lessening the security 
dilemma.155 Secondly, cohesion is sustained by commercial ties and economic 
interdependence.156 Thirdly, unity is created through a collective identity based on shared 
liberal values and political culture.157 Fourth, it is sustained by democracy.158 Additional 
sources of stability include US hegemonic power and nuclear arms.159 Finally, during the 
Cold War years, unity among the Western allies (plus Japan) was also fostered through 
the security imperative and the communist threat. There is substantial debate regarding 
which of the above sources of cohesion is most important. What is less controversial is 
that the Western order has been remarkably enduring. It has survived numerous political
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and economic crises—the end of gold convertibility and the Bretton Woods system, the 
economic turmoil of the 70s and early 80s, the fall of the Soviet Union, the era of US 
unilateralism, and most recently the ‘Great Recession—and despite the steady str m of 
pessimistic predictions the order continues to persist.160 A detailed review and 
examination of these debates is beyond the scope of this article. Two separate questions 
are central: First, how is order maintained? And second, if anarchy is escaped, what does 
this mean for our understanding of systemic theory? In this article I will bracket the first 
question while exploring the second.  
 A liberal systemic theory begins from the assumption that the system is not 
anarchic but confederate. I will make this claim by standing on the shoulders of giants—
or, roughly half a century of liberal international theory. The assumption of confederacy 
implies several important things. First, the most salient feature of the present international 
system is not the presence of antagonistic great power poles, but rather, a singular liberal 
confederacy of leading powers, or what Ikenberry and others refer to as the “Western 
Order”.161 It assumes that this leading power order is semi-permanent, that is to say, it is 
a stable and enduring feature of the international strategic environment. I have chosen the 
term “confederacy” because while the order consists of an overlapping web of 
institutions, and relations are highly interdependent, it is still an intergovernmental 
configuration in which each state retains formal sovereignty. Further, it is an informal 
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political entity. While there is no ‘government over governments,’ there is governance 
without government. While states are not bound by law, they are subject to binding 
institutional commitments. While there is no complete division of labor there is a great 
deal of specialization. While there is nothing approaching a national identity, there is a 
thinner shared ‘liberal’ identity. In short, the confederacy falls somewhere in the middle 
on a continuum ranging from anarchy to a consolidated federal republic. 
For those inside of the informal league, the logic of self-preservation and 
structural realist theory more generally is rendered obsolete. If the deep structure of 
anarchy does not operate, the system no longer conditions state behavior in the way 
Neorealist theory expects. If these states no longer fear each other, and g e ter certainty 
exists about future relations, there is no reason for states to balance one another or pursue 
aggression so as to enhance security. Second, the security imperative will relax the 
relative gains logic and cause states to become less jealous of their autonomy. As the 
logic of self-preservation is gutted, security competition has been replaced by economic 
rivalry and the rise of a “trading world.”162 Among these actors, the low politics have 
replaced the high politics. If a cohesive confederacy of leading powers exist , how does 
this change the way we think about systemic theory and its main propositions? Put 
slightly differently, what becomes of systemic theory if the system is not dominated by a 
multiplicity of opposing great powers, but rather, the dominant configuration happens to 
be a core cluster of major powers locked into a tightly woven, cohesive, commercial 
league?  
                                                




To briefly summarize and anticipate the broader argument that follows: at the
center of the system sits a cluster of liberal states engaged in vigorous commercial 
rivalry. The most impressive feature of this cluster is not its membership, per se, but the 
magnitude of their commercial interaction. The size of this cluster, and the magnitude of 
commercial interaction, brings into being a gravitational sphere that conditions the 
competitive behavior of both these actors and outsiders as well. Since WWII, those state  
that successfully integrated themselves into the liberal economic order have soared.
Consider Japan, a country that in 1950 was poorer than Peru, whose post-WWII 
economic output grew eightfold in 25 years. In 1948 Western Europe, North America, 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan produced $3.7 trillion. The combined output of these 
countries grew to $12.1 trillion by 1973.163 Prosperity was in no small measure tied to the 
US led liberal commercial order. Since the Bretton Woods era, the commercial order has 
only deepened and expanded. Because economic strength to a large degree hinges on a 
state’s ability to integrate itself into the dominant order, the system leads st tes to pursue 
distinct politico-economic strategies toward that end. Thus follows the central theoretical 
proposition: In the current system, the most powerful driver of competitive behavior 
relates not to survival but prosperity and commerce. Because the system is competitive, 
outsiders face a stark choice: either find a way to play or fall behind.  
If the above propositions are accurate, the way we think about systemic theory 
and structure must be revised. First, the system can no longer be thought of in terms of 
antagonistic great power poles. In Neorealist thinking, the distribution of capability 
allows us to identify the system’s dominant configuration. This is a positional picture. 
But how is the commercial confederacy, or western order, to be understood? Is it a 
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separate actor or an entity that exists only by virtue of unconstrained stat agency? It is 
neither. While it is not a political amalgamation in the way a federal union is, neither is it 
an ephemeral configuration like an alliance. It is not a kind of hierarchy nor is it 
accurately described as an ungoverned anarchy. To get an accurate distributional picture, 
the singularity of this cluster must be recognized while still understanding that it is 
comprised of semi-autonomous agents. But doesn’t this move violate a basic principle of 
structural theory? Poles are represented by great powers; polarity is deermin d by 
counting the number of poles. The answer is no. Counting poles makes sense only if the 
nature of their interaction is assumed to be one of opposition and conflict. 
Institutionalized cooperation and social cohesion change the game. It matters less 
whether there are one, two, or five trucks on the freeway if they’re all moving in the sam  
direction. If each is charting its own course it makes sense to count them separately; if 
they’re all on the same road it makes more sense to focus on the ‘highway.’ The 
aggregate force resides not only in its individual members and their actions, but more 
significantly, the combination of their interaction. The magnitude of commercial 
intercourse is immense. This totality is big—according to the World Bank, in 2007 the 
countries of the OECD accounted for 71 percent of the world’s GDP.164 
Up until quite recently, international trade has overwhelmingly revolved around 
the world’s developed economies. In 1970 these states accounted for 75 percent of world 
exports; in 1996 70 percent.165 Table I reveals the stratified nature of world trade:  
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Table III: Direction of world exports, 1965-1995 (percentage of world total) 




Between developing  
economies 
1965 59.0 32.5 3.8 
1970 62.1 30.6 3.3 
1975 46.6 38.4 7.2 
1980 44.8 39.0 9.0 
1985 50.8 35.3 9.0 
1990 55.3 33.4 9.6 
1995 47.0 37.7 14.1 
Source: Held, et.al. Global Transformations, p.172; Calculated from IMF, Direction of 
Trade Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
 
Data on FDI flows reveals a similar pattern. For example, between the years of 1983 and 
1988 average annual FDI outflows among the developed countries was over $88.2 billion 
whereas the average annual outflow among developing countries was about $5.4 
billion.166  
Table IV. Developed economy FDI inflow/outflows 1989-2004 (percentage of world 
total) 
 1989 1994 1999 2004 
FDI inflows 85.5 59.8 73.5 58.6 
FDI outflows 92.8 85.1 91.4 87.2 
 
Source: Calculated from UNCTAD, World Investment Report, years 1995, 2000 and 
2005. 
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The globalized economic system develops out of a US led hegemonic subsystem 
following World War II.167 This order centered around a core league of leading powers 
(the G-5) and their junior partners (collectively the OECD). When this cluster is 
examined as a whole, it becomes apparent that it is big with quite striking levels of 
interdependence. For example, in 1990 the level of trade in goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP among the OECD was 32 percent.168 Between 1991 and 2004, trade-
to-GDP ratios for the OECD increased by 11 percent.169 As Table II shows, a vast 
majority of the world’s FDI outflows come from developed countries and most foreign 
investment still flows from developed countries into other developed countries.170 
Despite the growing salience of a number of emerging economies, economic 
globalization was a game created, and one that is still led, by the world’s developed 
economies, and in particular, the strongest among them.    
The extent of commercial interaction brings into being a gravitational sphere t at 
conditions the behavior, to varying degrees, of every actor in the system. It is not any 
particular political entity that attracts, but rather, the desired benefits d rived from 
membership and inclusion in the commercial order writ large. Commerce is the cen ral
arena; economic competition is the dominant game. If the balance has shifted from guns 
to butter, one quickly sees how the survival assumption is no longer very useful in 
explaining relations among the system’s leading actors.171 First, the survival assumption 
operates only if states fear one another. By definition, a security community deflates the 
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logic of self-preservation. But even those who might arguably have justifiable reason to 
fear one another—as the US might be wary of China’s rise—none can actually afford to 
act on these fears in the ways Neorealism expects.172 The curious reality is that among 
most of the key players the logic of self-preservation no longer applies, while for the rest, 
the logic of self-preservation is rendered moot because there is a new overriding 
structural imperative: to be competitive, states must prioritize prosperity over security 
competition. By and large, and other concerns notwithstanding, these states must find 
ways to integrate themselves into the dominant liberal economic order, or suffer.   
The reason why a liberal systemic perspective, as opposed to a dyadic logic, is 
necessary is that systems of multiple actors create powerful network exte nalities.173 
Network externalities are incentives and disincentives produced, at times unintentionally, 
as a byproduct of the interactions of multiple actors. Consider for instance a scenario in 
which a multitude of PC users creates a network community that disadvantages the lone 
MAC user, assuming relative incompatibility of the two operating systems. Because 
strategies are conditioned by social environments, what the majority of major powers do 
collectively often disciplines the competitive strategies each can entertain individually. 
Once a critical mass or even a few large players adopt a certain course, network 
externalities may be triggered. In a system where most pursue autarky and mercantalism, 
a strategy of liberalization is dangerous. No pure cases of such behavior can really be 
found, although Great Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries pursued a policy of 
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freer trade while tolerating rivals’ discriminatory barriers. Similarly, during post-WWII 
reconstruction the US permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis. Both were hegemonic 
states. Both paid a price as rivals were rapidly gaining ground in terms of relative power. 
Under these conditions losses in relative gains and competitiveness are unsustainable in 
the long-term even if the state is reaping benefits in absolute terms. In the twenty year 
period leading up to WWI, Germany’s economy grew by 90 percent, whereas Britain’s 
grew by 56 percent.174 Even though Cobdenite free traders held power in Britain, it was 
unclear how long she could go on in the face of growing protectionist opposition at 
home.175 Similarly, the US was growing increasingly frustrated with the asymmetrical 
trading order as its commercial rivals were quickly catching up during the Bretton Woods 
years.176  
Conversely, in a system where most pursue liberalization and open trade, a 
strategy of isolation and autonomy is likely to be self-defeating as well.177 The absolute 
gains from open multilateral cooperation are likely to exceed whatever economic 
progress a state is able to achieve in isolation.178 Put differently, a closed state in an open 
world will experience losses in both absolute and relative gains. In short, the opportunity 
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costs of opting out, whether measured in absolute or relative gains, are substantial in most 
cases, decisively high in others. Deng Xiaoping seems to have been aware of this when 
he remarked: “Reviewing our history, we have concluded that one of the most important 
reasons for China’s long years of stagnation and backwardness was its policy of closing 
the country to outside contact.”179 The crucial point here is that these systemic pressures 
arise out of the interactions of the leading commercial powers. A dyadic approach simply 
fails to capture these dynamics.  
As Waltz explains, states under anarchy will strive for autonomy through 
“imperial thrusts,” to control those they depend upon, or “autarkic strivings,” in orderto 
enhance their self-sufficiency.180 But today, few states are striving for autarky and it is 
not difficult to see why. To opt out of the global commercial order is to forgo a number 
of obvious benefits. Closed states do not benefit from foreign investment and 
accompanying transfers in technology and know-how. Looking around China’s 
neighborhood, Deng Xiaoping was keenly aware of this: 
Profound changes have taken place and new leaps have been made in almost all 
areas… we must be clear-sighted and recognize that there is still an enormous gap 
between the level of our science and technology and that of the most advanced 
countries…One must learn from those who are more advanced before he can 
catch up with and surpass them.181 
 
Autarkic states forgo market access and limit their ability to specialize nd exploit 
comparative advantage. Overall, in an effort to achieve self-sufficiency and homegrown 
development by shielding domestic industries from potentially harmful outside 
competition, states stultify long-term innovation, sacrifice economic effi iency, and settle 
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for inferior goods at higher prices.182 Furthermore, for many companies, competitiveness 
hinges on their ability to exploit global production networks. The assumption that given 
time and some degree of protection infant industries would become more efficient simply 
proved to be wrong in most cases. Consider two auto companies created in the same year, 
Toyota and Hindustan Motors. After fifty years of over regulation and overprotection by 
the Indian government, Hindustan was rolling a scant 18,000 cars off of the production 
line while Toyota was manufacturing over 5 million. Hindustan Motors was still 
producing only one model, the very same model it had been manufacturing since the 
beginning: the classic Ambassador!183 
Most states are pulled by the gravitational sphere—the network externalities 
created by the core—and the prospect of making gains while others are pushed by the 
possibility of being punished and falling behind. We have known since Lindblom’s 
classic essay that markets constrain and punish states.184 In the international context, 
where markets become wary of the policies and strategic course of a particular country, 
capital exits and investment flows are disrupted. In a globalized economy, as Friedman 
has argued, the “electronic herd” can quickly wreak havoc on individual countries.185 
Capital follows opportunity, but it also seeks out political stability and a friendly 
environment. China experienced an economic disruption after Tiananmen as growth 
dropped to 4% from 11.3% the year before.186 Russia saw a capital flight in the wake of 
                                                
182 For a critique of development economics see Ian Little, Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and 
International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1982) 
183 See Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy. Public Broadcasting System (PBS) series 
based on the book by Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw.  
184 Charles Lindblom, “The Market as Prison,” Journal of Politics, 44 (1982) 
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its brief military adventure in Georgia.187 Second, states punish other states. Systemic 
pariahs are isolated states. They may be sanctioned or excluded from institutions—as 
Russia’s behavior has complicated G-8 membership and its WTO bid.188 In a globalized 
world, you’re less competitive if excluded from the international economic order.  
Today, while few are balancing, most major powers are engaging and integrati g, 
or bonding. Because weaker actors often gravitate toward strength, bonding is easily 
confused with bandwagoning. Bandwagoning behavior is motivated by one of two 
reasons: a weaker state’s desire to avoid the wrath of a stronger state through 
appeasement, or profit from another’s aggression by sharing the spoils.189 Bandwagoning 
was originally theorized as the opposite of balancing behavior.190 The concepts were 
intended to apply in the security-military context. But like the balance of power, 
bandwagoning too has fallen victim to a deleterious theoretical dilution.191 It has come to 
describe numerous different behaviors, unrelated to a security imperative or milita y 
conflict, in which weaker states gravitate toward stronger ones.192 Theoretical punch in 
no small measure derives from conceptual clarity. Balancing and bandwagoning are 
                                                
187 The economic fallout from Russia’s August occupation of Georgia was quick and precipitous: 
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188 Doug Palmer, “Russia WTO bid still faces big US obstacles,” Reuters (April 1, 2009) 
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and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), Ch. 6; Simon 
Collard-Wexler talks of European integration as a form of bandwagoning. See “Integration Under Anarchy: 
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concepts that refer to a military-security phenomenon and a corresponding set of motives. 
For theorists, coining new terms is a favorite pastime; for the rest, it’s a necessary 
nuisance. The appropriateness of a new term must be judged by its utility.193 In this case, 
it is harmful to stretch the bandwagoning concept to include institutional and commercial 
integration and engagement outside a security-military context because we’re dealing 
with different behaviors and motivations. Bonding can be defined as the deliberate 
forging of enduring economic and institutional linkages for the purpose of creating 
prosperity and enhancing economic competitiveness. At bottom, bonding behavior is not 
driven by ephemeral security imperatives or the desire to profit from another’s 
aggression.  
In general, bonding strategies fall into one of two categories. Internally, states 
undertake policies to make themselves more attractive to foreign investment and 
capital—usually by creating an amiable regulatory environment, building infrastructure, 
and offering protections and incentives to foreign companies. China’s Special Economic 
Zones are a case in point. Drawing lessons from China’s successful neighbors, Deng 
clearly understood the value of attracting foreign economic forces: 
A special economic zone is a medium for introducing technology, management 
and knowledge. It is also a window for our foreign policy. Through special 
economic zones we can import foreign technology, obtain knowledge, and learn 
management, which is also a kind of knowledge. As the base for our open policy, 
these zones will not only benefit our economy and train people but enhance our 
nation’s influence in the world. 194 
 
                                                
193 In general, new terms are created in order to describe something not adequately captured by an existing 
concept. If a term exists, we must ask: what happens to the term if used to describe this new thing? Will the 
integrity and analytic power of the concept be compromised? There is often a tradeoff between keeping the 
language as simple and user friendly as possible, on the one hand, and maintaining conceptual integrity on 
the other.  
194 See Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994) pp. 61-62 
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For China this strategy seems to have paid off: roughly 80 percent of the world’s top 500 
companies had invested in China by 2004.195 Foreign-owned firms accounted for 58 
percent of China’s exports in 2005.196 Externally, states bond by locking each other into 
long-term cooperative commitments through institutions and policy coordination. China’s 
involvement in multilateral institutions is well documented.197 Recently, China has 
assumed an active role in the ongoing G20 process, increased institutional cooperation 
with ASEAN, and entered into “enhanced engagement” with the OECD, all of which 
suggests that China is continuing its policy of institutional integration.198 External 
bonding has both an institutional dimension and an economic dimension, referring mainly 
to trade, finance and capital flows. China currently holds the world’s largest stockpile of 
foreign reserves, amounting to well over $2 trillion.199 These figures highlight the extent 
to which China has been willing to tie itself to the global market—striking for a country 
whose combined imports and exports were less than $15 billion in 1975.  
Bonding behavior is driven by multiple, related motives. First and foremost, it is 
driven by the prosperity motive. It is also driven by competitive pressure. Wh re 
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conditions of free trade do not exist, or exist only marginally, relative competitiveness 
hinges on a state’s ability to mobilize and develop its economy in relative isolation. 
Under conditions of open trade, a state’s relative competitiveness not only derives from 
domestic policy but also hinges on its ability to access foreign markets, attract foreign 
investment, specialize in areas in which it enjoys a comparative advantage, participate in 
policy coordination conducive to commercial interaction, and assure neighbors and 
partners of benign and cooperative intentions.  In an open world, certain types of actors 
are disposed to become more successful than others. The international system is a 
competitive one, though competitive strategies are always conditioned by the 
environment in which they are pursued. Today, it is difficult to be competitive unless you 
evolve into a trading state. Autarkic garrison states are simply not competitive. In today’s 
world, Realpolitik strategies driven by a structural condition of anarchy, such as 
balancing and autarky, are self-defeating.  
 
While hard balancing and autarky make little sense, because the system is 
competitive, every state still prefers to make gains relative to rivals.200 “Firms [like 
states] are constrained to strike a compromise” says Waltz, “between maximizing their 
profits and minimizing the danger of their demise.”201 As with balancing, states are 
driven by the survival imperative. This point is the source of much confusion and so 
bears repeating: structural realist cooperation theory derives from the logic of self-
preservation. Structural realism must not only produce instances of relative gins 
behavior but demonstrate that these flow from a security imperative. In studying US-
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Japanese trade relations in the 1980s, Mastanduno found that while relative gains 
concerns were important, these were not motivated by security interests.202 Krasner found 
that even in a policy area as mundane as global communications, powerful states were 
able to secure more favorable distributions of benefits. 203 These findings are not 
inconsistent with our theory. Because it is better to approach politics from a position f 
strength rather than weakness, relative gains matter. Relative power enhances the state’s 
ability to make greater gains, now and in the future. Powerful actors can coerce, ffer 
payoffs, or create incentives through issue linkages. Powerful states often succed in 
writing the rules in a way that affords them greater advantage. Consider for instance how 
the first world has succeeded in exempting the agriculture sector from the WTO while 
creating a strong intellectual property rights regime that has disadvantaged the world’s 
poorer countries. Because states operate in a world of scarcity, getting the bes  deal for 
themselves and their people requires them to outpace rivals. The crucial distinction 
hinges on whether this behavior is driven by a security or prosperity motive. Like 
security, the prosperity motive is also a powerful driver of relative gains behavior.  States 
will routinely employ a variety of strategies to enhance competitiveness at the cost of 
rivals—non-tariff barriers, currency devaluation, dumping, export subsidies, and so on.  
Because of competition and relative gains behavior, the system does not add up to 
a “harmonious world.” Among the leading powers, what has changed is that competition 
has primarily shifted from guns to butter. This is not to say that geopolitical and territorial 
disputes are a thing of the past, but merely that the balance has shifted. To varying
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degrees, each major power has an interest in the overall viability of the global 
commercial order, and will act to preserve it when threatened.204 At the end of the day, 
each state has a strong incentive to avoid collective ruin. Barry Eichengreen, for example, 
has described the US-China relationship as a kind of mutually assured economic 
destruction.205 The mere fact that each is vested in the other and the system, though, does 
not preclude strategic and competitive behavior. For example, the US has been frustrated 
for some time with China’s strategy of devaluing its currency relative to the dollar in 
order to enhance the competitiveness of Chinese exports.206 While none has an interest in 
a general trade war or a collapse of the system, each is interested in maximizing gain. 
While the general political climate is cooperative, there’s always room fr strategic 
maneuvering on the margins. Because different arrangements have different distributional 
consequences disagreement is common. Disagreements have the potential to lead to more 
intense conflict. Trade conflicts can resemble security spirals in which ea  actor 
reciprocally retaliates for moves made by others during a previous round. Relations can 
be quite tense as actors may be tempted to play commercial ‘brinkmanship’—that is, how 
far can things be pushed before a commercial war is sparked?  
Though disputes are a regular feature of relations, commercial conflict is less 
likely to spiral out of control for at least three reasons. First, disputes are ch nneled 
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through a rule governed process—the WTO’s dispute resolution panel for instance. 
Second, the danger associated with fear and miscalculation is less severe becaus
information is more readily available and disputes usually do not involve an existential 
threat. For instance, a dispute over chickens, tires, or a devalued currency is quite 
different from one involving nuclear arms. One party may suspect another of engaging in 
unfair trading practices, but this is a far more manageable kind of fear. Third, 
interdependence, diffuse reciprocity, reputational concerns, and the “shadow of the 
future” encourage states to show restraint. States do not simply have negative incentives 
in avoiding harm caused by a general trade conflict, but they also have a positive 
incentive in keeping the overall relationship afloat.  
The more narrow point is that a commercial or ‘normal’ politics is not 
harmonious. It is messy, though disputes are far less severe than one’s in the military-
security realm. The broader point is that the system is increasingly pushing states to 
become status-quo participants in a trading world. Indeed, China appears to be behaving 
much like a “status-quo” state. To a remarkable extent, China has been willing to tie itself 
to the global commercial order:  
Table V: Average contribution of exports and investment in tradable sectors to total 
GDP growth during the years 2001-2008 
Country or Bloc  Exports + Investment in Tradable 
Sectors as a percentage of GDP 
growth 
China 60% 
G-7  16% 
Euro Zone 30% 
Source: Kai Guo and Papa N’Diaye, “Is China’s Export-Oriented Growth Sustainable,” 
International Monetary Fund (August 2009)  
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Between the years 1990-2000 the average contribution of exports and investment in 
tradable sectors accounted for 40% of China’s GDP growth. As the above table shows, 
during the years 2001-2008 this figure had risen to a dramatic 60% of GDP growth. 
China’s success has been due to its willingness to become the ‘workshop of the world.’ 
In general, a confederate structure produces similarity because the sys em 
pressures states to become more like specialized trading states. Specialization implies 
functional differentiation, a dimension that drops out of Neorealist theory because ‘like-
units’ are said to perform similar tasks.207 An anarchic structure pushes states toward 
autarky. An open system pushes the state to specialize. There is no formal assignment of 
functions, but specialization has led to dissimilarity.208 States are still like-units because 
each performs similar functions internally, but when the system is examined as a whole, 
one quickly notices that states are doing different things. Some, like the US, do many 
things. Others, like Britain, specialize in banking and finance. China has specialized n 
low-tech manufacturing while India in services. Still others export commodities and 
natural resources. Waltz saw a world of like-units because his focus is mainly pol tical: 
each state has some governing entity, a military, and various regulatory organs. When 
viewed from the lens of political-economy, the picture is much different. Even though 
there is a general convergence in terms of productivity levels among advance  countries, 
there is still a great deal of specialization if one examines particular industries.209 In an 
open world states must find ways to participate, and then they must specialize.  
                                                
207 Waltz, Theory, pp. 93-97 
208 Similarly, Rosecrance argued that the ‘trading world’ “is composed of nations differentiated in terms of 
function. Each may seek to improve its position, but because nations supply different services and proucts, 
in defense as well as economics, they come to depen upon each other.” Rise of the Trading State, p. 24 




At first glance, my argument seems to parallel familiar liberal arguments claiming 
that states have chosen to become more like trading states because they wish to make 
greater absolute gains. In the mid-1980s Richard Rosecrance observed the following: 
Since 1945 the world has been paralyzed between trading and territorial 
imperatives. One group of states has largely focused on trade, keeping their 
military expenditures limited; another group, particularly the superpowers and 
certain Middle Eastern states, has engaged in arms races, military interventions, 
and occasional war.210 
 
By the end of the century, Rosecrance was arguing that the post-war trading states—
states such as Japan and Germany—were evolving into a new form of “virtual state,” 
epitomized by the likes of Hong Kong.211 According to the author, the rise of the virtual 
state has ushered in a new era of peaceful forms of international politics; it ha  been 
marked by the overall replacement of security politics with forms of peaceful competition 
among an important, powerful, and growing cluster of states. In The Rise of the Trading 
State, a state’s political orientation—conceptualized in terms of the military and 
territorial pole on the one hand and the trading pole on the other—largely depends upon 
the individual state’s choice.212 What is missing from Rosecrance’s account is precisely 
that which is provided by a systemic perspective. It is not simply the case that states 
value prosperity and the gains that can be achieved through institutionalized cooperati n; 
most importantly, states are moved by competitive pressure. A systemic perspective 
incorporates important insights not adequately captured by extant liberal th ories, 
namely, that there is a competitive structural logic at play. The value added of a liberal 
systemic theory is in explaining how the leading power western order has created 
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powerful systemic incentives, network externalities that condition the strategic b havior 
of states.  
A bonding strategy implies both a commercial as well as an institutional side. To 
be a successful trading state, admission must be gained into key multilateral 
institutions—WTO, IMF, World Bank, OECD.213 To be integrated is to become a full-
fledged member of these institutions. States that are left out find themselves at a decided 
competitive disadvantage. Lloyd Gruber has argued persuasively that when supra ational 
institutions are initially created, others are forced to participate, even though they often 
prefer the (non-institutionalized) status quo, because leading states are able to go ahead 
without them.214 Not surprisingly, outsiders work hard to gain membership. States are 
willing to make costly domestic adjustments toward this end. The institutional cre 
exercises power over outsiders by threatening to exclude. Power is exercisd through a 
process of ‘conditionality.’215 Membership, loans and grants come with strings attached. 
Many times, these conditions are quite intrusive. Surprisingly, smaller stats are often 
eager to accept and implement them; sometimes they go above and beyond the stipulat d 
demands. Much like freshmen seeking membership in a fraternity of upperclassmen, 
weaker players are rushing for inclusion in core institutions. To rush for inclusion is to 
prove oneself to be an exceptional candidate. States seeking membership frequently 
sacrifice autonomy and implement “recommendations” and “advice” in exchange for 
membership and other benefits.216   
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How does a systemic perspective differ from functional institutional arguments? 
The first thing to note is that Neoliberals have never claimed to offer an alter ativ  
systemic theory to that of Neorealism. However, it is certainly true, as Neoliberals claim, 
that states find institutions attractive because of the benefits they provide.217 It is also true 
that states value institutions because they tame power by binding actors.218 What is 
missing from liberal institutional arguments is the idea that those who opt out of the 
Western institutional order place themselves at a great competitive disadvantage by 
excluding themselves from the ‘network.’ Institutional bonding is a vital strategy if a 
state wishes to remain competitive. The Western order is not simply easy to join and hard 
to defeat,219 it is impossible not to join if you want to avoid self-defeat through isolation. 
Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first Prime Minister, said it well: “Countries that make 
themselves relevant [to the world] become better off, those who opt out, they suffer.”220 
To avoid North Korea’s predicament you must pursue strategies adopted by South Korea. 
This is why outsiders—states like China who are extremely jealous of their sov reignty 
and harbor suspicions of the outside world—have been willing to make major sacrifices 
in state autonomy in order to gain inclusion into the order. 
For states, the single most important cost of bonding is loss of autonomy. 
Whether by subjecting itself to global market forces, increasing interdependence with 
rivals, or by institutionally limiting the range of choices available, bonding has the 
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overall effect of reducing a state’s autonomy.221 King John signed, and his successors 
reissued, the Magna Carta to preserve the throne. In so doing, the kings relinquished 
some of their sovereignty. In the long run it allowed them to stay in business. This isthe 
King’s Dilemma. To maintain the foundations of power, sovereigns are forced to let go of 
their autonomy.222 Sooner or later, states realize that competitiveness hinges on their 
willingness to relinquish control. According to Waltz, “States do not willingly place 
themselves in situations of increased dependence.”223 He is correct. But in an open 
system the state is stuck between a rock and a hard place: bond and be competitive or 
cling to your autonomy and ‘fall by the wayside.’ Indeed, nowhere is the King’s 
Dilemma more pronounced than in China where the Communist Party’s legitimacy is tied 
to economic growth.224 The Communist Party wants to stay in power. To maintain its 
power it must deliver growth. To deliver growth it must be willing to sacrifice autonomy 
by continuing its policy of “Reform and Openness.” For these reasons the PRC was 
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willing to endure fifteen years of negotiations, making concessions, adjusting pol cy and 
sacrificing autonomy, all of which culminated in its 2001 accession to the WTO.225  
Systemic pressures, incentives and disincentives, have emerged as a byproduct of 
the coactions of the system’s leading commercial powers. Those inside of the Western 
commercial order face strong incentives to stay in; those on the outside face strong 
incentives to get in. This is so because the system has created powerful network 
externalities. These forces go a long way in explaining China’s foreign policy behavior in 
the reform era. As Moore and Yang argue,  
Once economic development was identified as the overriding national priority—a 
decision that itself arguably originated in part from an assessment of China’s 
external environment—the parameters of successful and unsuccessful 
development strategies were largely set. For China the only effective option was 
to pursue modernizations through reform and opening. As regards foreign policy, 
the necessary corollary was cooperative foreign relations that would allow China
to achieve the economic revitalization necessary to ensure its long-term national 
security (or, alternatively, regime survival).226  
 
If the prosperity motive and competitive pressure have led China to pursue a strategy of 
bonding, is the PRC likely to abandon this strategy merely because US relative power is 
declining?—or, why bite the hands that feed you? 
 The system induces bonding behavior which tends toward its own reproduction 
and expansion. Bonding behavior has the effect of increasingly tying individual state 
prosperity interests to the continued viability of the commercial order as a whole. 
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Prosperity interests and competitive pressures have led states like China and I di  to join. 
While bonding—foreign investment and export led growth more specifically—has 
enabled them to transform into commercial juggernauts, integration has also converted 
them into important stakeholders in the commercial order itself. Balancing and revisionist 
strategies are self-defeating, indeed irrational, if the foundation of state power itself—
economic strength—is critically linked to the likely targets of balancing a d the very 
order to be revised.227 For the leading states, regardless of whether they might be 
plausibly included within a cohesive security community or not, the commercial order is 
simply too big and too important. If this is true, China has much incentive to uphold the 
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institutional order is easy to join and harder to overthrow. See, “The Rise of China: Power, Institutions, and 





Levels, Causes, and Theory Testing 
 
 Systemic theory is theory of state action. It is a theory that explains how the 
system’s principal actors together form a structure which confronts actors with certain 
opportunities and constraints. These opportunities and constraints are a function of the 
strategic environment formed through the coactions of the system’s principal actors. 
Systemic theory gives general reasons that lead the observer to expect that states will 
respond to this strategic environment in similar ways. Because systemic theory explains 
why states are likely to pursue certain strategies in response to external conditions, it 
must be a theory of foreign policy.  
Much of the recent debate among Waltz and his realist competitors seems to be 
riding on an unhelpful distinction between theories of “international politics” and theories 
of “foreign policy.” Waltz himself has placed a great deal of emphasis on this 
distinction.229 Christensen and Snyder see systemic theory as concerning itself with 
systems and their properties while foreign policy theories focusing on the behavior of 
specific states.230 Fareed Zakaria sees foreign policy theory as concerning itself with the 
motives, intentions, goals and preferences of states toward the outside world at various 
historical moments.231 For his part, Waltz asserts that he is in the business of systemic 
                                                
229 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 72 
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theory and charges that scholars like Stephen Walt have not produced new theories but 
are engaged in “a description of how makers of foreign policy think when making 
alliance decisions.”232  
The cottage industry of modified neorealist approaches are all driven by a single 
concern: these individuals aim to explain specific cases of state behavior. Neorealism is 
not particularly helpful in this regard because it yields indeterminate expectations of 
behavior. Christensen and Snyder, for instance, argue that two opposite behaviors (chain-
ganging and buck-passing) can be derived from Waltz’s theory under the same 
circumstances.233 To resolve this problem they cross-fertilize Neorealism with Robert 
Jervis’ theoretical work on the security dilemma.234 While Christensen and Snyder 
attempt to preserve the theoretical integrity of Neorealism by resting their analysis on the 
international politics/foreign policy distinction, there is a deeper problem which t s 
move cannot veil.  
 This move, and the distinction upon which it rests, is pernicious on two counts. 
First, what is being said, in effect, is that systemic theory should not be understoo  a  
theory of state action—it is only concerned with “properties of systems.” But systemic 
theory is and must be a theory of state action. If balances recur from time to ti e, they 
recur because states act—either through internal buildups or external alignments—so as 
to form balances. Systemic theory is premised on the understanding that structure 
conditions actor behavior by causing some strategies to dominate over others. It aim  to 
explain behavior of the part through an understanding of the system as a whole. Systemic 
                                                
232 Waltz, “Evaluating Theories” APSR Vol. 91, No. 4 (1997) 
233 Christensen and Snyder (1990) set out to explain why states “chain-ganged” in the multipolar pre-1914 
European system while a similarly configured system l d to “buck-passing” behavior prior to 1939. 
234 see Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” World Politics 30 (1978) 
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theory can only gain support to the extent that states are found to behave in a way 
consistent with the expectations of the theory. As Randall Schweller correctly observes,  
…even systems theories must investigate historical cases of state behavior and 
foreign policy to see if the actors spoke and acted in the manner predicted by the 
explanation, the case unfolded and events occurred in the order predicted, and the 
details of the case conform to the explanation’s predictions.235 
Second, the distinction renders systemic theory, an otherwise powerful tool, 
utterly impotent. If it cannot say anything about the behavior of particular gre t powers, 
what can it do? At a minimum, a useful theory must explain how under some conditions 
patterned behavior will emerge while under other conditions it will not. What then can 
we expect systemic theory to accomplish? On this score, Waltz is slippery: 
A theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies of nations while 
claiming to explain only certain aspects of them. It can tell us what international 
conditions national policies have to cope with. To think that a theory of 
international politics can in itself say how the coping is likely to be done is the
opposite of the reductionist error.236 
But structural realism does say something about how states are likely to cope: “A self-
help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less 
effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will 
suffer…balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system.”237 
Balances occur because some states will balance against power and survive while others 
will fall by the wayside. Either systemic theory can explain state action or it cannot, but it 
cannot both explain state behavior and at the same time not explain it. Waltz correctly 
believes that systemic theory can capture patterns of behavior. If it claims to do this, it 
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must be a theory of state action.238 If it is a theory of state action it must be a theory of 
foreign policy because state actions are manifest in the policies they make.  
 The entire debate is a response to an inherent problem in the study of international 
politics. Systemic theory explains how possibly dissimilar states are likely to respond to 
the same systemic signals in a similar way. But like dissimilar individuals responding to 
the same social milieu, dissimilar states will often react differently to the same signals. 
The basic fact is that there will be variation in the foreign policies of states. A major 
source of this variation is to be found in the domestic politics of dissimilar actors while 
other forces may be operating at the international level as well. Systemic theory must 
make a major concession: unit-level forces matter a great deal. The so-called 
“Neoclassical Realist” school has already arrived at this intuitively attractive conclusion: 
“systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at th  unit-level.”239 
The conclusion points to the important possibility that systemic and unit-level analyses 
can complement each other.  
 Common ground, like calls for bipartisanship, arouses feelings of warmth and 
fuzziness. Because most scholars privilege a certain method or level, the spirit of 
synthesis is likely to be short-lived unless we succeed in elaborating a definitiv  method 
for establishing the complementary analytic operation of each level. But first, why not 
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A Unified Theory of International Politics? 
 Following Anthony Giddens and others, it is attractive to think of agents and 
structures as co-constituted.240 The ‘duality of structure’ captures the insight that agents 
produce and reproduce structures at the same time that their behavior is conditioned by 
social structure: 
The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of 
phenomenon, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the 
duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium 
and outcome of the practices they recursively organize.241 
Though Waltz pushes all agency out of his theory, he does not in fact deny the 
importance of agency. Instead, the idea is to isolate a realm—in this case the system and 
its structure—so as to understand it independent of other potentially important causes. A 
careful reading of Waltz also reveals that his theory is in fact based on an understa ing 
of the duality of structure—after all, the anarchic structure arises from the interactions of 
the system’s principal actors. In the end, this duality means very little becaus  the 
anarchic structure has existed since time immemorial and will continue to exer  the same 
pressures so long as the system is not transformed into a formal hierarchy, a rat er 
unlikely possibility. The point is simply that the ‘duality of structure’ is a fundamental 
premise of systemic thinking—agents produce and reproduce structures, structures 
condition the behavior of agents. There is continuity revealed in patterned behavior 
because structure leads dissimilar actors to act in similar ways.  
Admitting the duality of structure is the easy part; what one does with this insight 
is likely to be much more controversial. In the interest of producing a general th ory, 
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Waltz in effect denies any role for agency. As a practical matter, he’s little concerned 
with how agents produce and reproduce the anarchic structure. So long as there is no 
hierarchy, there is anarchy. So long as there is anarchy, it will condition behavior in ways 
predicted by Neorealist theory. Ultimately, Waltz’s is a theory of how structu es 
influence agents. This move has been the target of an important line of critique. The 
theory only has a reproductive logic and none that is generative. It explains continuity but 
not change.242 This is the case precisely because Waltz never does focus on agents and 
how they might in fact produce or change social structures.  
Taking seriously Giddens’ insight about the duality of structure, Alexander Wendt 
among other things, sets out to correct this deficiency in Waltzian systemic thinking. 
Wendt’s is mainly a theory about how agents intersubjectively produce structures (or 
cultures) that in turn work to condition relations among actors. Cultures, while having 
path-dependent qualities—that is, they tend to be ‘self-fulfilling prophecies—can 
nevertheless change. Because ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ they are perfectly 
capable of creating alternative identities and cultures during repeated roun s of 
interaction. To admit the possibility that actors can change collective identity and culture 
does not help us answer the question of whether they will and in what circumstances. 
Wendt offers an elaborate account of how this change might happen, but offers no 
concrete propositions relating to the circumstances under which particular changes c  be 
expected to take place. This is not a failure on Wendt’s part, but rather, reflects the nature 
of the subject matter itself.  
Admitting the appeal and accuracy of the ‘duality of structure’ does not solve our 
quandary. There is a practical tradeoff: a theory built on this insight cannot yield 
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generalized explanatory propositions and theoretical expectations. That is, we can unify 
agents and structures but this will come at the cost of theory. Such an effort cannot yield 
explanatory expectations independent of a deep description of the subject of interest. It 
cannot abstract away from the specific actors and the context of their interaction nd 
produce expectations about how they will behave. In short, it can only serve as a 
framework for descriptive history. Giddens’ acknowledges as much when he distance  
his work from theories that produce “explanatory propositions of a generalizing type.”243  
The basic dilemma is this: taking the duality of structure seriously gives us greater 
descriptive accuracy but it comes at the cost of generalized theoretical power. Now, why 
is this so? Agency is by definition something that is quite contingent and unpredictable. I  
is a subject that is not amenable to general theorizing. The problem is compounded 
because social structures are produced and reproduced by multiple such unwieldy agents. 
It is certainly true that agents can have a large impact. Napoleon successflly mobilized 
the French by essentially inventing nationalism. This changed the social milieu as other 
states were forced to follow suit and adopt this innovation. The innovation itself was a 
development that was quite historically contingent. Structural theory yields explanatory 
expectations of behavior because it gives us reason to believe that actors will behave in a 
similar way when confronted with similar circumstances; the study of agency cannot do 
so because actors do things for any number of historically contingent reasons which are 
difficult, or indeed impossible, to specify a priori.  
Historians are quite suspicious of general theorizing of the kind fashionable in 
political science, though some historians do find value in general propositions.244 By and 
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large, historians feel much more comfortable closer to the ground—on the lower rungs of 
the ladder of abstraction—while the political scientist is more willing to climb higher in 
the hopes of finding generalized knowledge. The greater primacy of place one gives to 
agency and contingency, the more one is gravitating toward the descriptive history end of 
the continuum. In principle, one can theoretically explore the relationship between ag nts 
and structures—the ways in which each might operate upon the other—but this can only 
add up to a conceptual scheme or framework. An explanatory theory it is not. In the end, 
one can have a unified scheme or an explanatory theory, but not both.  
If general theorizing is not to be abandoned, then structure must be isolated and 
theorized independently of agency and the interaction of each upon the other, 
understanding fully that this move is both descriptively inaccurate, misleading, and 
theoretically imperfect. Structural theorizing has limits. Its strength lies in its ability to 
yield general explanatory expectations; it is limited in its ability to explain change and 
account for anomalous behavior. The agent-structure question is a persistent problem in 
social theorizing. Giddens offers a way to solve it but with a price. In my estimation, the 
cost is not worth the benefit. Unified schemes cannot and should not replace general 
structural theories—lest we concede that general social theorizing is imposs ble. Nor does 
this imply that unified frameworks be abandoned either. They may serve as a useful way 
to study change, this being, necessarily, a more descriptive enterprise. 
  
Synthesis and Theory Testing 
 
 If not done properly, synthetic approaches often lead to confusion, frustration, and 
alas, an entrenching of loyalties. At the risk of unjustly pigeonholing a number of 
106 
 
scholars, it is generally the case that realists privilege the systemic level while liberals 
gravitate toward bottom-up explanations. Each often uses the other as its foil. In this 
clash of paradigms, in recent times, Realism has found itself on the defensive. In the 
decades following World War II everyone was a Realist; more recently some have asked 
“Is Anyone Still a Realist?” The most pronounced trend among Realist scholars is their 
newfound attention to non-systemic variables.245 Oddly, the only thing that unites these 
scholars is their continued commitment to power and the systemic level and their 
willingness to move beyond it. Beyond this, there is little agreement on what variables 
should be included and how systemic signals are filtered through domestic processes. In 
short, Neoclassical Realism lacks a clear content—that is, common assumptions, 
variables and hypotheses—and a shared method. If systemic and unit-level variables 
matter, how can they be synthesized while still preserving the analytic integrity and 
explanatory power of each? The pragmatic impulse to expand and enrich Realism runs 
the risk of setting us back in terms of theory development. The danger is that theory will 
be reduced to a descriptive approach. If we’re not prepared to abandon the possibility of 
general theorizing in international politics, a great deal of theoretical work remains to be 
done. If a synthesis is needed, the way in which it is done is of the utmost importance.  
 Systemic and unit-level explanations are often thought of as competing. This is 
partly true, and should remain so. While it is important to pose them in opposition it is 
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also useful to consider the ways in which they might complement each other. To say that 
two things complement each other suggests that they succeed in compensating for each 
other’s weaknesses while exploiting their strengths. Logically, in order to discover ways 
in which they might complement each other requires us to understand the nature of each. 
 Unit-level approaches are a bottom up mode of theorizing. Explanations of 
international behavior are arrived at through an analysis internal to the state it elf. Here, 
scholars may focus on interest groups, bureaucracy, the structure of government, 
individual leaders, ideas and identity, and so on. While scholars have developed more 
general and parsimonious bottom-up theories,246 it is generally the case that the bottom-
up method yields a greater diversity of more descriptive scholarship. One suspect this 
fact can be traced to scholarly disposition but also the nature of the subject mattr.
Domestic politics is a rich arena. Once the billiard ball has been cracked it’s hard to 
decide what to focus on and what to ignore. Ultimately, bottom-up explanations have a 
strong tendency to dissolve into rather thick description. As with many vices, this too has 
a virtuous side. A bottom-up approach can better capture variation and contingency. 
Domestic politics is in constant flux. Certain groups hold sway one day; the next they are 
marginalized. One party is in power today; tomorrow they’re out. One regime exists for 
now; a different constitution is adopted shortly thereafter. These changes are often quite 
important. Bottom-up approaches are able to capture them.  
 By contrast, systemic theory is a top-down method of thinking. It explains how 
the interaction of multiple big actors conditions the behavior of each individually. Unlike 
bottom-up approaches which are highly specific and contingent, systemic explanations 
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wield explanatory power which is more parsimonious and general. Whereas domestic 
political analysis is biased toward factors internal to the state, systemic theory is directed 
toward external causes. External pressures and opportunities are ill captured by an 
approach that focuses solely on domestic dynamics, just as a systemic theory is not 
equipped to capture internal causes.  
 Before exploring the ways in which unit-level approaches can compliment 
systemic theory, we must be clear about what it is that systemic theory can deliver. We 
have noted that systemic theory operates at a certain level of generality. The system’s 
structure sends general signals; pushes, pulls, rewards and punishes actors. In short, the 
structure causes certain strategies to dominate over others. Indeed, many of the most 
important social science contributions employ this theoretical form. Consider the game of 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ or Olson’s collectiv  action 
problem. In each, the nature of the situation leads some strategies to be more attractive 
than others. Structural logics have been falsely accused of being deterministic, or 
precluding the possibility of actor agency. But notice how, for example, large groups 
regularly overcome the collective action problem even in the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms. Nor are structural logics inherently indeterminate, or incapable of yielding 
clear expectations of actor behavior. This charge is misguided as overwhelming patterns 
of behavior should emerge.  
The first point is that systemic theory operates at a certain level of generality. It 
yields predictions but not of the form actor A will do X at time T. It does make 
predictions of the form actor A will employ a family of strategies (XYZ) over the course 
of a longer period of time. What this means is that actors will gravitate toward a 
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particular family of strategies, say, economic and institutional integra ion, multilateral 
cooperation, openness and liberalization, for instance. Strategies can be thought of as 
belonging to a family where they share a common object: to boost prosperity and enhance 
economic competitiveness. A family of strategies will have multiple members and each 
member multiple variants. Systemic theory predicts that states will overwhelmingly 
gravitate toward a certain family of strategies given the extant structure. Because 
structures operate by rewarding and punishing actors, specific historical snapshots and 
events can neither confirm nor disconfirm the theory. Rather, systemic theory must be 
evaluated by studying long-term trends in state behavior. Although specific historical 
events may be of great interest, systemic theory must be judged by a sequence of such 
events. 
 Systemic theory does not purport to explain everything, but it does claim to 
explain a number of big patterns. To be useful, the claims of the theory must be clearly 
articulated and the standards for judging them known. A useful theory is one that can be 
defeated. Testing systemic theory requires us to seek out patterns of behavior, each 
consisting of a series of actions and events. Since there are a variety of different kinds of 
evidence, the relative importance of these must be known. The theory claims that actors 
confront strong systemic signals; the logic predicts that actors will by and large pursue 
dominant strategies. Category I evidence consists of behavioral expectations that flow 
directly from the logic of the theory—states will pursue membership in core ecnomic 
institutions at great cost, they will work to attract FDI, they will pursue policies designed 
to integrate themselves into the commercial confederacy, they will make costly domestic 
adjustments to effectuate integration, they will try to create regional and global stability 
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conducive to open economic rivalry. Confidence in the theory is reduced to the extent 
that category Ievidence contradicts the expectations of the theory.  
 Processes such as economic cooperation and integration, institutionalization, are 
distinctly liberal. International politics, however, is colored with illiberal vents and 
trends which appear to contradict the overall spirit of the theory. The theory does not 
purport to explain everything but neither is it satisfying to dismiss all else as noise. 
Category II evidence includes everything not captured in category I. It includes evidence, 
potentially relevant to evaluating the theory, but not directly derived from it. The salience 
of this evidence is established by drawing clear linkages to Category I imperatives. Thus, 
China’s violent suppression of the Tiananmen demonstration (a Category II event) had a 
strong bearing on its international reputation and valued economic relationships wit  
leading commercial powers (a Category I link). Or, Russia’s recent military adventure in 
Georgia (a Category II event) led to a disruption of diplomatic relations with the US and 
leading European powers, jeopardized G8 membership and its WTO bid, and led to large 
capital flights (Category I elements). Because there are spill-over effects and issues are at 
times linked, structural imperatives will influence behavior in other non-economic arenas. 
Or, actions taken in another policy domain may impact a state’s lot in the commercial 
arena. The theory gains added confirmation whenever states show restraint motiva ed by 
a desire to avoid disrupting Category I processes (economic integration, etc.). If it is not 
costly from the vantage point of Category I imperatives and interests, the evidence can 
neither confirm nor disconfirm the theory. The costliness of these actions must ultimately 
be determined on a case by case basis. If actions are unlikely to trigger structural 
pressures, structural imperatives are less of a factor in a state’s decision to pursue a 
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particular action. If this is the case, illiberal behavior has little bearing on the overall 
validity of the theory.   
 The nature of international politics is such that the major players cannot for long 
remain on the sideline. While they must act, states will often do so foolishly. Most 
decision making is done under conditions of imperfect information. Decision makers will 
often misjudge the conditions they face, miscalculate the costs, and err in their
assessments of the likely impact of their actions. Systemic theory predicts that foolish 
states will pay a price. Some are resolved to resist while some are more capable of 
bearing the cost. Either way, the course may be unsustainable in the long run because
isolated, unilaterally assertive, and revisionist states will experienc heavy losses in terms 
of relative competitiveness. In recent years, Russia and the US have been trav li g down 
this road. Russia’s windfall oil revenues hardly mask the country’s dire economic reality;
meanwhile, its aggressive foreign policy has resulted in political isolation nd set-backs 
in its integration into the commercial order. For Russia’s Cold War rival, two presidential 
terms of unilateralism and overreach have made it abundantly clear that US power has 
limits. States whose competitiveness is in rapid decline are likely to make serious policy 
adjustments more in line with systemic imperatives.  
Our discussion points to three kinds of evidence: First, evidence showing that 
states pursued long-term strategies consistent with the expectations of the theory. This 
evidence becomes stronger where shown that these actions are costly and burdensome. 
China’s GATT/WTO accession process was long and tortuous, large concessions and 
costly adjustments were made. Second, we should look for evidence showing that states 
either acted or showed costly restraint in other areas so as to facilitate or not disrupt 
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integration into the confederacy. China’s participation in the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime, six party talks with North Korea, China’s courting of ASEAN, the restraint it 
showed in not devaluing its currency during the Asian financial crisis, or the relative 
restraint it has shown over Taiwan may all suggest that China’s desire to integrate has 
had strong spill-over effects. President Clinton’s failed effort to link human rights to trade 
might suggest that these have limits. And third, by now it is known that structures operate 
by rewarding some actors and punishing those that fail to adjust to systemic imperatives. 
Systemic theory is confirmed wherever states make costly adjustment after realizing that 
their chosen policies were leading to dramatic losses in competitiveness. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and China’s embrace of reform and openness are dramatic instances. 
These are big and important cases but less visible examples abound. After Tiananmen, 
China found itself increasingly isolated, integration into the commercial confederacy had 
suffered a setback. Instead of assuming a confrontational posture toward what it 
perceived as an openly hostile international community, the PRC recommitted itself to 
reform and opening up while for the first time embracing multilateralism in a big way. 
The mishandling of Tiananmen was a costly mistake; the Party had to work hard to make 
up lost ground.  
In general, the utility of systemic theory rests on the presence or absence of 
overwhelming trends. A trend is a sequence of actions and events that falls into a 
discernible pattern; an overwhelming trend is the dominant pattern in the universe of 
actions and events during a given period of time. We know that those patterns are 
composed of a sequence of strategic actions taken by individual states. Systemic theory 
says something about the types of strategies these states are likely to employ. In studying 
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particular actors, overwhelming patterns in strategic behavior should emerge when thes  
actors are studied over a longer period of time. When the time horizon is longer and the
dependent variable more general, systemic theory is at its strongest. It explains, for 
instance, why there is a striking continuity in Chinese foreign policy strategy over the last 
three decades—captured by the phrase “reform and opening up to the world.”  The PRC 
has pursued a strategy of institutional and economic integration, openness and 
liberalization because these strategies promise success in the prevailing confederate 
international system.  
As one narrows the focus in time and demands greater specificity in content, the 
explanatory power of systemic theory begins to break down. If one wishes to know why 
China began opening up after 1978 but not two years prior, or why China proceeded 
incrementally by, for instance, creating Special Economic Zones a  opposed to wholesale 
market reform and opening, then systemic theory is insufficient. China’s actions are 
captured by our concept of a ‘family of strategies’ but the specific policies and reforms 
are variants of the family’s different members. When greater specificity s demanded, 
both in timing and content, answers must be sought elsewhere. One obvious place is the 
domestic realm. As Peter Gourevitch explains, 
The international system, be it in an economic or politico-military form, is 
underdetermining. The environment may exert strong pulls but short of actual 
occupation, some leeway in the response to that environment remains…A purely 
international system argument relies on functional necessity to explain domestic 
outcomes; this is unsatisfactory, because functional requisites may not be 
fulfilled. Some variance in response to external environment is possible. The 
explanation of choice among the possibilities therefore requires some examination 
of domestic politics.247 
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This is a point that Waltz himself understands: “Structurally we can describ  and 
understand the pressures states are subject to. We cannot predict how they will react to
the pressures without knowledge of their internal dispositions.”248 Put in no uncertain 
terms, systemic theory must be complemented by domestic political analysis if it is to 
answer certain questions of interest.  
Systemic theory is weakest when asked to account more specifically for the 
content and timing of actions and events. Incidentally, bottom-up approaches are 
strongest precisely in this regard. In its form and method, domestic political analysis is 
better equipped to account for contingency and variation. Bottom-up approaches 
complement systemic theory precisely because they compensate for its grea est 
weakness. If bottom-up analysis can be put to the service of systemic theory, is the 
reverse true as well? Because domestic politics is a realm of contingency and flux, 
bottom-up scholarship has difficulty rising above the noise. The problem with descriptive 
accounts is not that they arrive at the wrong answers; they often arrive at the right 
answers and a whole lot more. Because there’s a lot going on, it must all be very 
important. Systemic theory doesn’t solve the problem entirely but it does direct attention 
at certain aspects of strategic decision making. Once the spotlight is cas on these objects, 
a more lucid picture may emerge. Systemic theory draws attention to continuities in 
strategic behavior—bi-polarity and the Cold War imperative go a long way toward 
explaining four decades of American foreign policy behavior. Furthermore, once a single 
action or event is considered as a piece of a larger whole, it may appear in a new light. 
Jigsaw puzzle enthusiasts know that the partial images and colors of an individual piece 
are often meaningless until incorporated into a larger puzzle. The discussion thus far a  
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left an important question untouched: if different levels can complement each other, how 
might this to be done?  
 
The Research Program: A preliminary sketch 
 
 Synthesis should never lead to a mindless mixing of variables—this being the 
most unhelpful manifestation of ad hocery. The complementary approach is not a blender 
drink—which tastes great and makes us feel good, but because the mixture is something 
greater than the individual ingredients therein, it is difficult to discern which ingredients 
cause what sensations. To complement is to be analytically distinct but work together in 
the service of the same goal. The overall research program must be guided by a clear 
method of study. First, we must be clear about the nature of both unit- and system-level 
theories, a question addressed above. If used to complement each other, our research 
program must be guided by a clear understanding of the nature of each and the particular 
virtues brought to bear. This is not a profound philosophical insight, but derives from 
common sense—different lenses are appropriate for different kinds of observations.  
 Different lenses are put the service of the same project for the purpose of building 
a coherent body of knowledge. The edifice under construction is at once diverse and 
unified. It is unified because the program is geared toward understanding the operation of 
the system and the patterned behavior of individual states therein; diverse because in 
accounting for variance and anomaly, a vast array of differences will be brought t  light. 
This is a consequence of our stated premise: there will be variation in the way dissimilar 
states respond to similar structural imperatives.  
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 Our research program is an ambitious enterprise that seeks to bridge various
levels of analysis in a coherent way. Waltz’s seminal M n, the State and War was both 
helpful and unhelpful. Helpful because it led us to think more clearly by isolating causes 
operating at different levels; unhelpful because it, when combined with his later works, 
isolated the levels and discouraged cross-level inquiry. To this day, much IR scholar hip 
is imprisoned by a levels construct introduced in 1950s. It is increasingly clear, though, 
that isolating the levels is theoretically untenable and practically undesirabl . Our 
program is guided by the object of inquiry and the utility of different theoretical tools
available—it is a pragmatic venture. Inspired by the general principles reached thus far it 
is tempting to jump right in, but progress will not be forthcoming if our program is not 
conducted pursuant to some sensible design. Approaching the matter pragmatically, it 
makes sense to think of the program in terms of three phases.  This is not to imply that 
any one phase is more important or must be completed before the next can begin, but it 
does suggest that sequence matters. Each phase has a different dependent variable, akes 
place at a different level of analysis, and varies in scope: 
Phase I: The System. If systemic theory wields no explanatory power it makes little sense 
to proceed any further. The first task is to establish that there are indeed important 
systemic forces at work. The dependent variable at this stage is the system as a whole. 
Naturally, this is the province of systemic theory. If systemic theory is not useful at this 
level it should be abandoned outright. This phase must precede the others because 
conclusions arrived at will decide whether systemic theory is a device worth taking
seriously. Work at other phases may proceed if preliminary findings and the intuitions of 
scholars suggest that systemic forces are probably at work. This phase is characterized by 
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the broadest scope, both in the number of actors included and the time horizon studied. 
The expectations have been outlined in more detail elsewhere but overall we should 
expect to find overwhelming trends in state behavior. The major power confederacy 
becomes consolidated roughly in the 1970s when it transforms from a hegemonic order to 
a multilateral cluster. Beginning roughly at this time we expect to find that states begin to 
respond to the commercial confederacy by adjusting their strategies so as to become 
integrated into and better compete in the system’s dominant commercial arrangement. 
We should find that states overwhelmingly begin to flock to the institutional core of th
confederacy and pursue policies of liberalization and openness. Evidence unearthed at 
Phase I does not prove that systemic forces are at work, it merely establishes that macro 
trends are consistent with the expectations of the theory.  
Phase II. The State. If sufficient plausibility is established for the operation of systemic 
forces, Phase II zooms in, taking a closer look at particular state actors. The unit of 
analysis shifts from the system to the grand-strategies of particula states. The goal at this 
phase is to identify specific actions and policies which appear to fall into a more general 
pattern. The unitary actor assumption is retained because the object of inquiry does not 
require us to explain their exact origin and content, but merely to establish that actions 
and policies can be captured by a larger family of strategies. Overall, the goal is to 
identify patterns and similarities in the ways individual states have responded to systemic 
signals over a longer period of time. While we expect to find patterns and similarit es, a 
great deal of variation will be unearthed as well. This variation demands explanation.  
Phase III. The Domestic Sphere. The unitary actor assumption must be relaxed if we are 
to account for the specific origins, timing and content of policies and actions identified a  
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Phase II. Put differently, Phase III seeks to account for variation. Much of this variation 
can be captured by a bottom-up domestic politics approach. The domestic sphere is what 
gives each states response to the same external signals their unique character. The object 
of investigation shifts from a grand-strategy, or a sequence of similar actions and events, 
to specific policies and actions. A systemic theory is not able to account for this variation. 
It accounts for similarity across actors but not differences among their various responses.  
 
 
Prime Movers, Intervening Variables and Anomalies 
 
 If conclusions arrived at during Phase II study suggest that particular states are 
gravitating toward strategies consistent with the expectations of systemic theory, we can 
presume that systemic forces are the prime movers of those particular units. A prime 
mover is the initial cause that sets things in motion toward an expected outcome. 
Structure, as a cause, can be thought of as a prime mover only if systemic trends and the 
grand-strategies of important players are consistent with the theoretical account. 
Assuming this to be the case, the prime mover is the initial impetus and driving force 
behind strategic action.  
 Because there is variation in the way states respond, prime movers do not 
determine behavior. Rather, other variables intervene to shape the overall outcome. 
Because there is similarity in outcomes, prime movers are implied; because there is 
variation, intervening variables are also at work. Because states are vastly dissimilar, 
their internal characteristics and operations diverse, intervening variables will be many in 
number. While certain generalizations may be possible, the study of these interv ning 
variables is likely to be historically contingent, broad ranging and more descriptive.  
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 The discussion has proceeded as if all intervening variables are to be found at the 
domestic level. This is hardly the case. Intervening variables operate at the domestic and 
international levels. Our theory by no means has a monopoly on causes at the 
international level!  Second, intervening variables may operate in multiple ways. Some 
may impede the prime mover while others may enable it. For example, in the case of
China, conservative domestic political factions and industry resisted reform early on; 
over time, China’s integration has given rise to an ideological sea change and a whole 
range of new stakeholders and interests who both enable further reform and integration 
and resist retrogression. When China embarked on reform and opening-up it faced a 
threatening regional strategic environment: the Soviets to the north, India to the sou , as 
well as Japan, South Korea and the US to its west. One suspects that this complex 
security environment might have complicated China’s decision to pursue integration and 
deepen interdependence with these regional rivals. As years passed, China’sengagement 
of regional players has altered this security environment in important ways, thus enabling 
further integration. These various dynamics are extremely important to understand. In the 
abstract, prime movers trump intervening variables. When a boulder is trundled off the 
side of a mountain it moves downward at increasing speed; its precise trajectory is 
influenced by objects which it encounters on the way. Other variables—like trees, shrubs, 
soft-sand, stones etc.—are likely to influence the location of the boulder’s final resting 
spot. Intervening variables shape the direction but the primer mover is the main driving
force of the outcome observed. Of course, it is not at all true that structure always trumps 
other intervening variable. The status of a prime mover is affirmed if most act rs, most of 
the time, behave in ways consistent with the theory. If this is true, cases that contr dict 
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the expectations of the theory are said to be anomalies. In the case of an anomaly, other 
variables overwhelmed structural causes. Put differently, the intervening variables 





Continuity and Change 
 
 Structural realism has been persistently criticized for its inability to account for 
change.249 Anarchy, it has been said, has a reproductive logic but not one that is 
generative. Structural differences, between multi- and bi-polarity, assume centrality while 
explanations for shifts from one structure to the next are not offered. Anarchy, as opposed 
to the distributions of power which may vary, is a constant feature of international life. 
Self-help and the logic of self-preservation are said to prevail in the absence of a formal 
government over governments.  
 To entertain a structure of confederacy is to admit that systemic transformation 
has occurred. Not simply structural shifts in the distribution of power but a basic 
transformation of the system’s deep structure. Informal social structures aris  
spontaneously from the interaction of the system’s big players. Structures condition the 
behavior of agents. Patterned behavior emerges because behavior is conditioned by 
structure. Structures endure because agents reproduce them in predictable ways. 
Structures then, are inherently resistant to change. Structural change occurs because 
agents are able to overcome structural pressures and alter the basic nature of multi-player 
                                                
249 For Ruggie’s insightful and elegant critique see Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998) Ch. 5; also Alexander Wendt, Social Theory; Buzan, 
Little and Jones, The Logic of Anarchy 
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interaction. One quickly sees why systemic theory has difficulty explaining structural 
transformation. Systemic theory explains patterned behavior. It explains why tructures 
are reproduced in predictable ways. In brief, it explains continuity. Transformati n occurs 
because forces outside of the theory’s logic and machinery succeed in replacing it.  
 Structural transformation occurs when one deep structure is replaced by another—
confederacy replaces anarchy, for example. Neorealism assumes this can appen only by 
the creation of a world state. The assumption is wrong. Transformation has occurred 
through the emergence of great power social cohesion. A structure of confederacy is not 
static. Its reproductive logic contains an evolutionary tendency. As the structure is 
steadily reproduced it solidifies and expands. As the gravitational sphere of core 
interaction grows, greater numbers of players are brought into its orb. As structure 
conditioned relations persist, they become more entrenched. Material, ideational and 
institutional linkages have a strong path-dependent quality. Systemic theory generates 
















 China’s Foreign Policy: A Plausibility Probe 
 
 In the literature there is a consensus, based on the overwhelming factual record, 
that in the late 1970s China dramatically shifted its posture toward the outside world. The 
record clearly demonstrates that post-Maoist foreign policy grand-strategy has primarily 
focused on economic development through domestic reform and integration into the 
world economy. Beyond that, scholarly consensus erodes. China scholars disagree on the 
fundamental causes or sources of China’s behavior, its overall significance to world 
politics, and its future trajectory.  
On the sources of China’s behavior scholars advance two types of explanations, 
and combinations thereof: internal sources like bureaucratic politics250 and those 
emphasizing external causes like the anarchic structure and globalization.251 In studying 
China’s behavior most scholars draw attention to both internal forces and external 
influences, although the literature predominately favors internal causes.252 Reasonably, 
these multi-level explanations emphasize for instance how, after the failures of the 
‘Cultural Revolution,’ the Communist Party has sought to secure the foundations of its 
                                                
250 Susan Shirk, How China Opened Its Door: The Political Success of the PRC’s Foreign Trade and 
Investment Reforms (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994); Kenneth Lieberthal and David 
Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992); Jude Howell, China Opens Its Doors: The Politics of Economic Transition 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993) 
251 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Thomas Moore, China in the World Market: Chinese 
Industry and International Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 
252 See for example David Lampton, ed. The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of 
Reform (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds. China Rising: 
Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005) 
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power by delivering prosperity and stability domestically; meanwhile the PRC’s policy 
has been influenced by external forces like international institutions, economic 
interdependence and various security dynamics, for example.  
 On the second and third question, scholars disagree over what China’s behavior 
actually means. Realists remain skeptical about China’s intentions.253 For them, China is 
opportunistic and potentially revisionist. The government is seeking to modernize its 
military and grow its power. China’s cooperative and benign posture is likely to be 
temporary. As China enters the ranks of the great powers, hegemonic ambitions are sure 
to arise.254 For the pessimists, it is nearly inevitable that the PRC will begin to throw its 
weight around in the region. Optimists, while remaining cautious, see the potential for the 
unfolding of another scenario.255 Many see China as developing a strong vested interest 
in the global market system. They point to China’s compliance with rules256 and its 
socialization within international institutions.257 While realists and power transition 
theorists predict conflict, others see the potential for China’s peaceful integration into the 
international (or ‘Western’) society of states.  
                                                
253 See for example Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: 
Knopf, 1997); Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2008); Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) 
254 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics 
255 For more optimistic assessments see Alastair Iain Joh ston and Robert Ross, eds. Engaging China: The 
Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999); Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc Blanchard, 
eds. “Harmonious World” and China’s New Foreign Policy (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008); Yong 
Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds. China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); also, Lampton, ed.The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy   
256 Yong Deng and Thomas Moore, “China Views Globalization: Toward a New Great-Power Politics?” 
The Washington Quarterly (2004); Margaret Pearson, “China in Geneva: Lessons fr m China’s Early 
Years in the World Trade Organization,” in Alastair I in Johnston and Robert Ross, eds. New Directions in 
the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) 
257 Ann Kent, “China’s International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations,” Global 
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 Where does a systemic explanation fit and what can it contribute to this important 
debate? 
 
The China Puzzle 
China has a long tradition of Realpolitik strategic culture.258 Thomas Christensen 
refers to China as the “high church” of Realpolitik thinking.259 Since the founding of the 
People’s Republic in 1949, China has been a heavy-handed autocratic regime that has 
isolated itself from the world community. Suffering repeated instances national 
humiliation, starting with the Opium Wars, at the hands of imperial powers, China has 
always viewed the outside world with suspicion. Historically, the state has been 
extremely jealous of, and uncompromising in its preservation of national autonomy.  
Meanwhile, China’s development strategy under Mao closely paralleled that of 
the Soviet Union. The PRC employed price control mechanisms to lower the costs of 
capital, raw materials and labor, and subsidized heavy industries so as to make the 
viable. The key to development under this model was to upgrade heavy industries—the 
commanding heights—since these set the advanced economies of the world apart from 
the rest. Meanwhile, import substitution and high tariffs were key features of China’s 
foreign economic policy. In 1978 China had virtually no foreign investment. The PRC 
was inward looking and largely closed. Meanwhile, the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution seriously damaged China’s capacity for innovation in technology and 
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productive capacity—intellectuals and specialists were brutally targeted by these 
purgatory campaigns.    
In the absence of a large convulsion or crisis, one expects grand-strategy to follow 
a linear path.260 By the 1970s China had developed an entrenched communist political 
culture and identity. It was thoroughly embedded in institutional structures. Leaders had a 
vested interest in the perpetuation of the order. Meanwhile, because of its strategy of 
favoring heavy-industry, these became exceedingly powerful. Domestically, there was a 
strong coalition of government and industry groups who benefited from the closed 
command economy. The combination of ideology, institutions and industrial sectors all 
worked to reproduce the PRCs overall tendency toward centralized rule, national 
autonomy, and planned economic activity. While the 1966-69 Cultural Revolution was a 
failure, by the late 70s the country had stabilized. As Susan Shirk notes, 
…there was nothing inevitable about Chinese leaders’ move to launch an 
economic reform drive in late 1978. China was not experiencing an economic 
crisis, and indeed the economy was operating more efficiently than the Soviet
economy.261 
 
In 1977 China’s growth rate was 7.8 percent; increasing to 11.7 percent in 1978.262   
 
 In light of its history, institutional milieu, and political culture, any reform seems 
odd; given the state of the economy at the time, dramatic reform seems peculiar; 
considering the nature of the reform path taken, one is justly puzzled. ‘Realist’ China’s 
strategic trajectory has been increasingly market oriented, open, and multilateral. Instead 
                                                
260 Jeffrey Legro argues, for instance, that “national changes will occur to the degree to which the 
expectations of particular dominant ideas are defie by events, negative consequences result, and some 
socially viable alternative exists.” Rethinking the World, pp. 16-17. Large scale shifts in grand-strategy are 
brought about, in large part, by the failures evident in the dominant orthodoxy.  
261 Shirk, How China Opened Its Door, p.10 
262 China Statistical Yearbook, 1992. (Beijing: State Statistical Bureau). 
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of blocking foreign economic forces it has worked hard to attract them. While China’s 
military has grown; China has not militarized, transforming itself into a garrison state. By 
most accounts, China has pursued a policy of ‘peaceful integration.’ In addition to its 
renewed commitment in the UN, China has helped create, sought membership in, or 
engaged a whole array of global and regional, economic as well as security 
organizations—the WTO, IMF, APEC, ASEAN (+3), the ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), G-8, G-20 and the OECD. But what explains 
China’s emergence as a “status-quo” member of the international community?  
The success and pace of reform was largely due to the political skill of one man: 
Deng Xiaoping. For historians, his exact motives are unclear. What is known is that the 
Cultural Revolution was unpopular and Deng himself viewed it as a failure. After Mao’s 
death, Deng cautiously assigned blame to Mao for ‘gross mistakes’ made during the 
Cultural Revolution. During 1967 and 68 the revolution did lead to some economic 
turmoil as industry was disrupted, although industrial and agricultural output was much 
higher in 1969 than 1966. Regardless, 1978-79 seems to be a pivotal time. In charge of 
foreign affairs, Deng gained popularity abroad. In 1978 he visited a number of countries 
including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Korea. In January of 1979 he spent a week 
in the US; later that year he visited Japan.263 Deng was already committed to reform but 
his tours reinforced the urgent need for change. 
Throughout the reform period Deng repeated the Party’s commitment to 
socialism. But there was a growing disjuncture between Dengist reforms and Mao’s 
vision of Chinese socialism. ‘Seek truth from facts’ led to a fundamental reevaluation of 
                                                




basic socialist principles. In China, it would have been political suicide for any leader to 
openly denounce socialism and embrace the pillars of free market capitalism. But again, 
actions always speak louder than words; and words do not always convey their intended 
meaning. Deng paid lip-service to Mao while dismantling his economic system, arting 
with its greatest achievement: the collectivized system of agriculture. In 1982 Deng, 
speaking before the 12th National Congress, called for “socialist modernization” to be 
achieved through “policies of reform and opening up to the outside world.” He 
introduced a new national objective, “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” a phrase 
which translates to something like free market capitalism with Taiwanese, Japanese, 
Singaporean, and in general, Western characteristics. This was the political genius of 
Deng Xiaoping and his allies. From 1979 on, the PRC’s reforms proceeded incrementally 
but precipitously. 
A number of important causes led to the PRC’s strategic policy shift. Gregory 
Chow identifies four: 
First, the Cultural Revolution was very unpopular, and the Party and the 
government had to distance themselves from the old regime and make changes to 
get the support of the people. Second, after years of experience in economic 
planning, government officials understood the shortcomings of the planning 
system and the need for change. Third, successful economic development in other 
parts of Asia—including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, 
known as the “Four Tigers”—demonstrated to Chinese government officials and 
the Chinese people that a market economy works better than a planned 
economy…Fourth…the Chinese people were ready for and would support 
economic reform.264 
 
The PRC may have launched some reforms absent systemic signals, but the nature of that 
reform would have been markedly different. Systemic theory claims to explain the 
international dimensions of China’s foreign policy. Basically, China realized that in order 
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to compete it had to integrate itself into the expanding core of the commercial order led 
by the US, Germany, Britain, Franc and Japan. Logically, China’s stated goal of 
“modernization” only makes sense when coupled with some understanding of what it 
means to be modern. To be modern, in short, is to be more like the leading powers in the 
system. What the PRC came to realize was that the miraculous success of Japan, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and South Korea was not only due to market reforms but their overall 
integration into the global commercial order. For these countries, economic growth and 
modernization were driven by foreign investment and exports. China wanted in on the 
action; this required that it open its doors and attract investment, and gain access to key 
markets in Asia, Europe and North America. These objectives were best accomplished, 
China learned, through a policy of liberal reform, openness, engagement and 
integration.265 As a practical matter, China sought to emulate successful states, adopting 
reforms that worked for others, mainly Asian neighbors. Many of China’s reforms closely 
resembled those undertaken years earlier in Taiwan, such as China’s agricultural reforms 
and the creation of Special Zones. 266 
Scholars have argued that the Communist Party’s reform agenda is driven by its 
desire to maintain power.267 Indeed, few governments have exhibited a similar level of 
existential paranoia. Deng was quite successful in exploiting this fear. In 1992 he 
                                                
265 As Moore and Yang argue, “Once economic development was identified as the overriding national 
priority—a decision that itself arguably originated in part from an assessment of China’s external 
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Transformation, pp. 57-60. In each case, the state proceeded by reducing government intervention and 
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admonished his comrades, “If we don’t continue to improve people’s living standard, if 
we don’t continue to build the economy, there will only be a dead-end road for our 
Party.”268 The extent to which the Party’s fear is grounded in objective political reality is 
unclear; after all, between 1948 and 78 the Party seemed to maintain control despite its 
command economy, closed society and numerous political convulsions. Conservatives in 
the Party have argued—quite reasonably—that reform and opening up had undermined 
the Party’s rule by eroding ideology and social cohesion. The Tiananmen demonstrations 
seem to support their overall conclusions. Nonetheless, it is evident that there is a 
perceived link between reform and the Party’s political viability. This after ll is the 
King’s Dilemma; to maintain the foundations of power, leaders feel forced to relinquish 
control and autonomy. Even more significant than the Party’s insecurity, however, was 
its realization that the PRC was quickly losing ground relative to its rivals nternationally.  
For Deng and his allies, the writing was on the wall. Our theory suggests that 
China’s grand-strategy has been conditioned by the external strategic environment: the 
PRC confronted a core of commercial powers and their junior partners who were soaring
ahead. Whatever socialism had delivered it had not succeeded in closing the gap. Deng 
was keenly aware of this: 
Profound changes have taken place and new leaps have been made in almost all 
areas… we must be clear-sighted and recognize that there is still an enormous gap 
between the level of our science and technology and that of the most advanced 
countries…Backwardness must be recognized before it can be changed. One must 
learn from those who are more advanced before he can catch up with and surpass 
them.269 
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After visiting a Nissan plant in Japan in 1978, Deng remarked, “today I have learnt what 
modernization is like.”270 Deng’s foreign visits only confirmed what he already knew to 
be true: the PRC was not only backward, but falling by the wayside as well. In 1950 
China’s GDP was twice as large as Japan’s; by 1980 Japan’s GDP was substantially 
higher than that of China.271 By the 1980s Taiwan’s per capita income was twenty times 
higher than the mainland’s.272 Other Asian countries like South Korea and Singapore 
were leaving the Dragon in the dust as well, to say nothing of the leading Western 
powers. Meanwhile, China could point to few socialist success stories; even the Soviet 
Union was in trouble. In a 1984 interview, Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party, opined: "since the October Revolution [of 1917], more than 
60 years have passed. How is it that many socialist countries have not been able to 
overtake capitalist ones in terms of development? What was it that did not work?" 273 As 
Deng saw it, the success of others was in great part due to their ability to benefit from a 
global production and trading system. China was lagging because it found itself on the 
outside: 
Reviewing our history, we have concluded that one of the most important reasons 
for China’s long years of stagnation and backwardness was its policy of closing 
the country to outside contact. Our experience shows that China cannot rebuild 
itself behind closed doors and that it cannot develop in isolation from the rest of 
the world.274 
                                                
270 Quoted in Barry Naughton, “Deng Xiaoping: The Economist” in David Shambaugh, ed. Deng Xiaoping: 
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 Internally, the Maoist course was largely sustainable; externally however, China’s lack 
of competitiveness was simply unacceptable.  
After Mao’s death in 1976 there were three conceivable directions in which the 
country could have moved. First, the PRC might have simply continued on the course set 
by Mao himself. Indeed, powerful conservatives including Chairman Hua Guofeng and 
the ‘Gang of Four’ showed a strong propensity toward continuity. Second, the PRC might 
have pursued internal reforms while remaining closed to the outside world. As a result of 
the failures associated with the Cultural Revolution, elements within the party had fallen 
into some popular disfavor while many believed that the agricultural and industrial 
systems had fallen into disrepair. Third, the course actually chosen, internal reform
combined with an ‘open door’ policy. Internal causes, like bureaucratic politics and the 
fallout from the Cultural Revolution are insufficient to account for the international 
dimensions of China’s reform policy. The Cultural Revolution, after all, was an interal 
affair. Internal reforms, which would have preserved the party’s power and the PRC’s 
autonomy, would have sufficed to erase the legacy of the Revolution. The question for 
bottom up theorists: Why, if not necessary, did the PRC pursue such a radically different 
foreign policy?     
 Our theory assumes that states, like China, are prosperity seekers—they seek to 
grow wealth and enhance security. Deng’s reform agenda had two pillars: development 
through reform and opening up to the world. A bottom up preference aggregation model 
doesn’t get us very far. In principle, systemic and domestic explanations should arrive at 
a similar account because foreign policy ultimately emerges out of domestic poli cal 
processes. The difference is that bottom-up accounts explain foreign policy solely by 
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reference to internal dynamics, whereas systemic theory contends that leaders, to a large 
degree, respond to external signals. Leaders still have a choice, but the attractiveness of 
different choices is a function of expected consequences. In an open system, the 
consequence of isolation is a severe loss in competitiveness. Bottom-up scholarship can 
offer an explanatory account by describing how power struggles unfolded and ultimately 
led to the outcomes seen.275 These descriptive accounts are valuable, and indeed 
indispensable. But here, they run into a problem: if one is to explain the precise nature of 
reform, a bottom-up model doesn’t help us understand why China embraced strategies 
which its neighbors and the Western world had pursued for years and decades. Why open 
up and liberalize? Why invite foreign capital? Why embrace international institutions? 
Even agricultural reforms seemed to result from China’s emulation of the succ s  of 
Taiwanese reform policies in this sector. Describing domestic politics tells us, rather 
precisely, what happened, but fails to explain why. If leaders, to at least some degree, 
respond to external signals then a model which focuses exclusively on bureaucratic and 
domestic politics will be misleading and incomplete.276  
 In the 1990s something remarkable takes place. The PRC takes a hard turn toward 
multilateralism. During these years China becomes a key founding member and active 
participant in a number of important multilateral institutions including ASEAN Plus
Three (APT), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shanghai Cooperation Organizatio  
(SCO), and the East Asia Summit. The extent to which these institutions matter is 
unclear, but their symbolic significance is undeniable. All the while, China becomes 
increasingly active in APEC and the UN while pursuing membership in the GATT/W O. 
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276 This insight is the basis of the complementary approach developed in the next chapter which explains 
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To the surprise of many, China took a leadership role in the Six Party Talks on the Nort 
Korea nuclear issue. Bottom-up theory has a difficult time explaining why. For systemic 
theory, the answer is relatively straight-forward. China was keenly aware th t its 
prosperity gains flowed from its continued integration into the commercial order. China’s 
success was driven by foreign investment and exports. After the Tiananmen debacle, 
China became isolated by the international community. Leading commercial powers saw 
China as an oppressive, backward, and threatening regime. China was being punished 
and pariah status threatened to derail modernization. Unlike Russia, China could not fall 
back on its natural resource endowments. The PRC’s greatest concern: China’s bid for 
the GATT/WTO was moribund. To regain the ground lost, China had to prove itself a 
cooperative member of the international community. Being a status-quo state was not 
sufficient; China had to prove itself an exceptional team-player.  
 This is the essence of a rushing strategy. When you rush for inclusion, you go 
above and beyond what is expected of extant members. Those pledging must overcome a 
strong presumption. To enhance prosperity and be competitive, China had to integrate 
into the commercial order. China had its sights on the biggest prize of all, a seat at the 
GATT/WTO table. To get there the PRC had to defeat the ‘China threat’ theory and 
establish itself as a cooperative member in good standing. Multilateralism proved the 
ideal vehicle. The PRC’s strategy of regional engagement enabled it to demonstrate a 
willingness and ability to embrace multilateralism and international norms. While having 
certain advantages, engagement in Asia was not China’s end, but a means by which 
China could pursue integration into the system’s core. China’s ultimate goal is to join he 
ranks of the leading commercial powers.  
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 Since Deng first outlined its contours in the late 70s and early 80s, China’s 
foreign policy grand-strategy has been remarkably stable. While there have been a 
number of bumps in the road, China has not backpedaled on its policy of ‘opening up to 
the world.’ Rather, China’s engagement of the outside world has only accelerated. This is 
perhaps somewhat surprising since the world has not always embraced China. After 
Tiananmen, foreign tourism and foreign investment declined, aid programs were 
suspended and diplomatic contacts disrupted. Many conservatives within the Party 
believed that Western influences and media played a large role in fueling the subversive 
student movement. The Party was worried about its very survival. Deng’s successor, 
Jiang Zemin explained how some students were “misled by foreign media, misunderstoo  
what happened in the country during the turmoil…and engaged in some extremist acts.” 
Despite this, the PRCs policy of sending students abroad would continue.277  
 The PRC has always been suspicious of the outside world; in the early 90s these 
fears were especially acute. Communist regimes, both large and small, were falling one 
after another. Socialism and autocracy, as models for growth and governance, were under 
sustained fire. Meanwhile the West had imposed sanctions and become highly critical of 
China on questions of human rights.  Foreign pressure increased, most notably in the way 
President Clinton tried to link trade to human rights. In April of 1990 Deng remarked, 
“Everyone should be very clear that, in the present international situation, all attention of 
the enemy will be concentrated on China. It will use every pretext to cause tro ble, to 
create difficulties and pressures for us.”278 Still Deng urged patience and cautioned 
against a hard-line posture. Many though were running out of patience. In April 1993, 
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116 officers officially complained that China’s concessions to the US had “impaired the 
dignity of the Chinese people, damaged the image of the Chinese nation, undermined the 
glorious tradition of the People’s Liberation Army, and dampened the army’s morale and 
combat effectiveness.”279  
Meanwhile, conservatives were expressing opposition to further reform of the 
planned economy. Given the domestic and international climate, one might have 
expected China to pull back on its reform and open door policy. The fact remained: the 
opportunity costs of opting out of the world capitalist system were simply too great. Deng 
and his allies understood the stakes, working hard to contain hard-line impulses. In 1992, 
sensing that reform had become bogged down, the aging Paramount Leader set off on his 
Southern Tour and was holding no punches: “We must not act like women with bound 
feet” he told an audience; “Anyone who is against reform” Deng warned, “will be put out 
of his office.”280 Before this, Jiang Zemin, a reform minded leader, was responsive to 
conservative elements within the party. Those days had come to an end. Deng and his 
allies had succeeded in marginalizing conservative elements in the Party.  Reform 
proceeded—for the first time the term “market socialism” entered the reform dialogue. 
Five years after the Tiananmen incident, Jiang opined that “a bad thing has been turn d 
into a good thing” as “our reform and opening program has gorged ahead with steadier, 
better, and even quicker steps.”281 
Curiously, by 1996 a major shift in Chinese public opinion had taken place. The 
people, it seemed, were now questioning the wisdom of reform and the ‘opening up’ 
policy. An immensely popular book, China Can Say No, epitomized the sea change that 
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had taken place. The central thesis of the book: a nefarious Western plot, masterminded 
by the US, was unfolding, designed to contain China by attacking it on human rights, 
copyright laws and Taiwan. The Communist Party, the authors suggested, were overly 
accommodating of the corrupting and oppressive Western forces. In the early 90s 
pressure was mounting from within the Party; by the mid-90s it was being felt from he 
general public. Still the PRC forged ahead with its policy of market socialism nd 
opening up to the outside world.  
 Several notable confrontations must be accounted for. Most important of these is 
the 1996 Taiwan crisis. Disapproving of the direction in which its politics were moving, 
the PRC moved to intimidate Taiwan. Leading up to March elections in Taiwan, the PRC 
began to conduct military exercises, transferring troops to Fujian province (across the 
Straight) and launching ground-to-ground missiles. In response, US aircraft car iers and 
battleships were sent to patrol the North end of the Straits. While tensions ran high, the 
crisis soon receded. Henry Kissinger met with Jiang during the period and later recalled,  
I [Kissinger] said to him that when I saw Chairman Mao, he said that China can 
afford to wait a hundred more years to resolve the Taiwan situation. I asked 
President Jiang, ‘Well, is that still true?’ The President answered, ‘No, it’s no 
longer true. That was twenty-four years ago; now we can only wait seventy-six 
more years…’282 
 
Before year’s end, Jiang and Clinton were planning state visits during the coming year or 
two. China had made it clear that it would not tolerate an independent Taiwan; it was also 
clear though, that China would continue its policy of opening up to the world. A 
compromise was arrived at, in principle tenuous, but in practice quite enduring: Sino-
American cooperation would accelerate as long as the US did not support Taiwan’s 
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independence and China did not use force. Over a decade later, this vague and unresolved 
status-quo still prevails. Of course, the status-quo also depends on Taiwan not pushing 
the envelope; here again, the US has played a moderating role in restraining the island’s 
political impulses.  
 For realists, China’s behavior is puzzling. From a Waltzian perspective, it is 
unclear why China has been increasingly willing to sacrifice autonomy and increase 
dependence on foreign powers. Further, there is no hard-balancing to be found—no one 
is balancing anyone. Instead, China has been pursuing a strategy of bonding. In China, 
realists find a country that has pursued a continuous strategy variously labeled “peaceful 
rise,” “peaceful development” and now “harmonious world.” Realists are left to speculate 
about the possibility of “deceptive revisionist tactics”283 and matters inevitably taking a 
turn for the worse in due time.284 These accounts find support within their own theoretical 
constructs but very little confirmation in actual events. Sensing this problem, others fall 
back on theoretically tenuous and underdeveloped institutional ‘soft-balancing’ 
explanations.285  
Constructivists, for their part, are fond of arguing how institutions and interaction 
shape identities and interests. Assuming this to be the case, what leads states to engage 
each other and embrace institutions in the first place? China has a history of autarky nd a 
communist identity; it is a nation with deeply rooted suspicions of the great powers. Why 
has China embraced the outside world? Frankly, constructivists don’t have an answer. 
The work of one author, Alastair Iain Johnston, epitomizes the problem. He has written 
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two extraordinary books. In the first, he argues that China has a culturally rooted tradition 
of realpolitik.286 The purpose of this book is to demonstrate that China’s realist 
disposition is rooted in a domestic political culture and not caused by the material 
international structure. In a second book, Social States, Johnston explores how 
socialization micro-processes, within institutional contexts, change the normative 
dispositions and identities of actors.287 One is left to wonder, why did China with its 
realpolitik political culture and identity embrace multilateral institutions to begin with? 
Johnston’s project jumps from autarkic realist China to China as embedded in an 
institutional milieu. If identity evolves through institutionalized interaction, how and why 




 The theory maintains that states are prosperity seekers. The theory is not 
concerned with all state behaviors but only those with an international dimension. States 
must pursue goals within a system occupied by other states. Systemic theory claims that 
prosperity seeking strategies are conditioned by great or major power relations. The 
system’s dominant configuration is a major power commercial order. To be competitive, 
minor powers must pursue a strategy of integration. Over time, states that fail to adjust to 
the dominant game will fall behind. A desire to better their lot combined with losses in 
relative power and overall competitiveness will lead them to adjust their strategic course. 
As the commercial confederacy solidifies and expands, outsiders will find it ever mor  
difficult to resist its gravitational pull.  
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 It is tempting to conclude that China’s behavior can be captured by sole reference 
to market reforms and the forces of capitalism. Globalization theorists have focused too 
narrowly on markets without appreciating important political dimensions. At bottom, he 
commercial confederacy is both a political and an economic arrangement. The major 
powers and their junior partners have created a political and economic order which has 
allowed for the emergence and continued operation of a global marketplace. Economic 
globalization presupposes that active major powers create and participate in insitutio , 
manage the global economy and work to create a stable environment conducive to open 
economic rivalry. When speaking of China’s integration we cannot simply focus on 
internal reforms and external economic ties, but its behavior and participation in the 
politico-institutional realms as well. 
 The theory is a work in political economy in so far as it suggests that international 
politics and economics interact in important ways. Policies and reforms that may appear 
to be strictly economic sometimes have a political dimension just as actions which may 
appear to be political often have an economic dimension. When speaking of ‘integration’ 
and ‘engagement’ I am not solely referring to economic processes and behaviors. 
Integration into the commercial confederacy cannot simply be reduced to trae flows and 
FDI, although this is a big part of it. To be integrated is to be a member of the 
institutional core; to behave like a responsible stakeholder; to accept and internalize 
dominant norms. Thus, we must keep in mind that the commercial confederacy is a major 
power configuration that is characterized by important economic and political dyn mics 
that interact in important ways.  
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While singling out China for special consideration, we should not avoid losing 
sight of the broader theoretical claim: the commercial confederacy has altered the nature 
of international politics, not just for China. The structure reproduces a climate of peaceful 
commercial rivalry because it disposes states to act in ways that perpetuate the system’s 
dominant logic. Below I will endeavor to show that aspects of China’s behavior can be 




 An internal bonding strategy refers to measures taken internally to draw in 
external economic actors. The strategy is peculiar since it implies losses in the host 
state’s autonomy; it may lead to domestic dislocations, often imperils domestic bu iness 
and sometimes represents an affront to national pride, as when foreign companies 
purchase landmarks and properties which carry special symbolic significance. 
Nevertheless, internal bonding is an important strategy to enhance international 
competitiveness. China’s internal bonding strategy took the form of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs). Initially, four such zones were established. Later, in 1984, fourteen cities 
were opened. The purpose of these zones is to boost development and international 
competitiveness by attracting outside investment and increasing exports.   
When Shenzen was first designated a special economic zone in the late 70s it was 
little more than a fishing village. After billions of dollars in foreign investment poured in, 
it was transformed into a booming metropolis. SEZs offer business friendly infrastructure 
and are usually located in coastal areas conducive to export. The government lures 
foreign companies with the promise of cheap labor, generous tax incentives, and special 
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business laws, working where possible to encourage joint ventures between Chinese and 
foreign companies. From the beginning, SEZs were a cornerstone of China’s policy of 
reform and opening up: 
A special economic zone is a medium for introducing technology, management 
and knowledge. It is also a window for our foreign policy. Through special 
economic zones we can import foreign technology, obtain knowledge, and learn 
management, which is also a kind of knowledge. As the base for our open policy, 
these zones will not only benefit our economy and train people but enhance our 
nation’s influence in the world.288 
 
China has experimented with free trade zones, characterized by lower tariffs and other 
zones are specifically designed to attract particular industries, most notably those 
specializing in high-tech products for export.  
Since these zones were first created, foreign investment has flooded into China. In 
1984, five years after the Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures was announced, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to just over a billion dollars. In 1994 the figur
had risen to just under $34 billion and by 2004 FDI rocketed to an astonishing $60 
billion. As Gregory Chow notes, roughly 80 percent of the world’s top 500 companies 
had invested in China by 2004.289  
China’s experiment with SEZs was designed to attract capital and facilitate 
transfers of technology. But more broadly, China aimed to get on board a growing trend 
in the globalization of production and industrial relocation. The idea of a special zone 
was of course not hatched in China. For years, other Asian countries had developed 
special Export Processing Zones (EPZs) designed to attract foreign investment for export 
manufacturing. Like China’s zones, the EPZs enjoyed preferential treatment. In creating 
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these zones China was adopting a concept pioneered by South Korea, Taiwan and 
Malaysia.290 For purposes of systemic analysis, several important conclusions must be 
drawn. In creating Special Zones China was emulating more competitive neighbors. 
These neighbors were in turn responding to a growing trend in globalized production. 
Globalized production of course, was led by the major powers of the commercial 
confederacy. In 1980, the US, Japan, West Germany, France and Britain accounted for 74 
percent of the world’s FDI stock.291 During the 80s, more than 90 percent of interfirm 
alliances were located in the economies of North America, Western Europe and Japan.292 
Until recently, globalization has overwhelmingly been a ‘North-North’ phenomenon. Put 
differently, it’s a game created by the leading commercial powers; a game which China 
was intent on playing.   
China’s strategy is not simply about development, it is about being competitive. 
Competitive states are plugged into the global production grid. Foreign investment not 
only brings with it jobs but technology and superior management techniques. For states 
like China, foreign investment has helped them become leading export countries. But for 
the ruling party, a strategy of internal bonding can be costly and dangerous. The state ha  
undertaken fundamental internal reforms the exact consequences of which are hard to 
predict. Faced with the King’s Dilemma, the Communist Party has steadily relinquished 
autonomy so as to make gains in prosperity and competitiveness, thus, they hope, 
securing the foundations of power in the long run. Reform has involved risks though, as 
when Jiang called for the People’s Liberation Army to rid itself of all busines  interests in 
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1998. Most significantly, perhaps, the ruling party has loosened its grip on the Chinese 
economy and society. While Mao’s 1966 Cultural Revolution was designed to brutally 
eliminate communist political opposition—“intellectuals” and “capitalist roaders” as they 
were called—in his 2001 speech commemorating the 80th anniversary of the CCP, Jiang 
Zemin announced that businesspeople and private entrepreneurs were now welcome in 




Today, China is one of the world’s leading trading states. During the Mao era, 
China was a closed society; the volume of trade it conducted with the outside world was 
negligible. In 1975 the country’s total imports and exports amounted to less than $15 
billion. After a decade of Deng’s ‘open door’ it was over $100 billion; by 2002 it was 
well over $600 billion and just two years later it stood at a whopping 1.1 trillion 
dollars.293 In 2006, the volume of trade was well over $1.5 trillion while the country held 
the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, amounting to over $1 trillion.294 These 
figures highlight the extent to which China has been willing to tie itself to the global 
market. China has not only sought integration into the global market but deepened its 
commercial ties with states that it has had historically rocky relations with, including 
South Korea, Japan and the US—recently surpassing Mexico as America’s second largest 
partner after Canada.  
 After being severed for decades from the institutional order of the core, in the late 
70s China began the recovery of its membership. In 1980 it was admitted into the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund. Membership in the GATT/WTO would prove 
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much more elusive. After fifteen years of protracted negotiations in which China made 
significant concessions, she was finally admitted in late 2001. Before it had even gain d
formal admission into the WTO, China was demonstrating its commitment to liberal
reform. According to World Bank data, in a period of five years China sliced its mean 
tariff rates in half. In 1992 they were more than 40 percent; by 1997 they had been 
reduced to less than 20 percent.295 At the APEC’s Osaka summit China took the world by 
surprise when it unveiled plans to develop a convertible currency, cut tariffs by 30 
percent, eliminate quotas on 170 products, and reform taxation codes so as to better 
accommodate foreign investment.296 Later, China used the forum to announce further 
tariff reductions and its intention to address copyright laws, reflecting its willingness to 
comply with WTO mandates.297 WTO membership has had a significant effect on 
internal reform and foreign direct investment. Membership has resulted in China ope ing 
up new sectors to foreign investment, including telecommunications, banking and 
finance, and service industries. China has also agreed to eliminate export quotas and legal 
limits on domestic sales, measures which attract further investment.298 
Rushing behavior implies that actors work hard to prove themselves capable and 
worthy members of the club. China’s accession to the GATT/WTO was long and 
tortuous. Often, the perception from Beijing was that the leading commercial powers, 
especially the US, were making excessive demands of the PRC. The view was not 
unreasonable seeing as numerous Eastern European countries were admitted in the 1970s 
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under much less imposing conditions. Further, negotiations were rocked by political 
events such as Tiananmen, cross-Straight tension, and the 1999 bombing of a Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade. Nonetheless, negotiators returned to the table time and again. 
Margaret Pearson notes how even during periods of strained Sino-American relations, 
over the question of Taiwan for instance, “China made policy changes and agreements 
designed in part to facilitate its WTO entry.”299 Evidence suggests that China was 
working hard to gain admission. Just prior to Zemin’s Washington visit in 1997, the PRC 
announced further tariff reductions; as the Asian financial crisis swept through the region 
China refrained from devaluing its currency even as neighbors including Japan did so; in 
1999 Zhu Rongji arrived in Washington with a package which caught negotiators off 
guard because it essentially made concessions on virtually every item the USgave 
priority.    
Two months prior to its formal entry into the WTO, President Zemin assured 
attendees at the APEC meeting in Shanghai that “once inside the WTO, China will 
strictly comply with the universally acknowledged market rules, implement open, 
transparent and equality-based policies of trade and investment and endeavor to promote 
a multi-directional and multi-level opening-up in a wide range of areas.”300 By and large, 
China has kept its word. With the possible exception of sovereignty related issues and the
question of Taiwan, China has upheld the organization’s rules and norms, and has not 
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behaved differently than any other similarly situated state in its strategic attempts to 
manipulate the regime to its advantage.301  
The economic institutions of the commercial confederacy, most notably the WTO, 
have given rise to a peculiar phenomenon. In realist theory, international institutions are 
epiphenomenal, instruments of the great powers. The argument is that institutions help 
the extant great powers effectuate their interests and maintain their powsition within 
the system. But in the case of China and other rising powers, these institutions, which 
they neither created nor control, are primary vehicles by which these states acquire the 
power and prestige necessary to enter the core of great powers in the first place. Instead 
of seeking to control and redefine these regimes, secondary powers are showing a 
surprising willingness to redefine their own interests and reform domestic sy ems so as 
to better comply with their mandates. Much like a freshman rushing for admission into a 
fraternity of more established upper-classmen, China is trying to integrate itself into a 
cohesive great power core through a strategy of economic engagement and participation 
in multilateral institutions.  
China’s turn toward multilateralism is also evinced in the government’s activism 
in its own neighborhood. In 1991 China became a ‘consultative partner’ of ASEAN. By 
1999 government officials were entertaining the idea of a China-ASEAN Free Trad  
Area (CAFTA). In 2001 leaders agreed to create a free trade area within ten years. China 
has already taken concrete steps to engage certain ASEAN states by unilaterally moving 
to offer preferential trade conditions. At China’s leadership, the ASEAN + 1 (China) has 
morphed into the ASEAN + 3, now involving South Korea and Japan. China’s 
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involvement with APEC has also evolved. While initially opposed to further 
institutionalization of the forum, China has become increasingly amenable to its 
increased salience in regional affairs.302  
Ever since international setbacks suffered after the Tiananmen debacle, China has 
worked hard to restore its reputation internationally. Per Machiavelli, it is advantageous 
for the Prince to be feared. This is one lesson in political theory China has patently 
ignored. The government has gone to great lengths to defeat the “China threat theory” 
and assuage international unease over its growing economic and military power. This 
assessment is not only based in official statements of the government but concree actions 
as well. Roughly around the mid-90s China begins to embrace multilateralism in a big 
way. In 1996, Beijing declares that it will join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and 
two years later condemns India and Pakistan for violating the international norm. While 
some suspected China of colluding with North Korea, the government moved to take a 
more active role, participating in multiparty talks over the nuclear issue. In 2001, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established between Russia, China and a number 
of other former Soviet republics. In 2003 China entered a non-aggression pact, the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation, under the auspices of ASEAN. China has also stepped up its 
involvement in the UN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), moves which mark a 
clear departure from its past inactivity in these arenas.303  
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To counter lingering international fears over China’s growing power, in 2003 
Chinese strategists proposed the concept of “peaceful rise” which was soon adopted by 
government officials. Mysteriously, the phrase disappears from the official d scourse just 
five months after its adoption, replaced by an even more benign set of objectives: “peace
and development” and “harmonious world.”304 These measures, which collectively 
amount to a sweeping global public relations campaign, are specifically aimed t 
reassuring the international community of the country’s peaceful intentions. Far from the 
harm predicted by offensive realists, China recently unleashed a highly coordinated, 
premeditated national “charm offensive” intended to win over a skeptical international 
community whose eyes were keenly fixated on the Beijing games. The record supports 
the conclusion that China has behaved much like a “status-quo power.”305     
 If China is not Machiavellian, many fear it is following Sun-Tzu and Maoist 
strategies of deceiving the world, building strength only to turn aggressive later in the 
game. While plausible, the theory finds little support in the empirical record. It also fails 
to account for the possibility that China will become fully integrated into the major power 
core of the commercial confederacy. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that China is 
becoming socialized as a result of its integration.306 Whether China has internalized 
international norms is questionable.307 What is fairly certain, however, is that China’s 
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elite increasingly believe in markets and liberalization. As a result of experience and 
learning, China has changed. As Pearson notes in the context of GATT/WTO, “Learning 
[has] occurred directly through channels of influence, such as the need for China to adop  
GATT/WTO standards in order to join the organization, and indirectly as more and more 
Chinese officials became convinced that deeper economic integration was both beneficial 
and necessary.”308 In the case of China’s economic policy, material consequence and 
normative appropriateness are not in conflict. In the end, China may have no reason to 
revise the order because her prosperity and security are tied to its continued viability. 
While there is little reason to believe that China’s motives are sinister, there is some 
evidence suggesting that the journey may be changing the traveler.  
 
China’s Grand Strategy Trajectory: “One central task, two basic points” 
The above analysis raises interesting questions for IR theory. The early 1980s 
mark a dramatic shift in China’s posture toward the world. But what factors explain the 
timing and nature of the shift? Our theory claims that a large part of the answer is found 
at the systemic level. In short, China was forced to confront Lee Kuan Yew’s question: 
Make yourself relevant to the world or suffer? If China wished to prosper, let alone 
compete on the world stage as a relevant power, the government had one viable choice: 
integrate. In its neighbors China found countries whose fortunes had been greatly 
improved by export led growth. There was only one attractive game in town, and China 
has proven to be one of the more adept and wily students in the class.    
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 For all of the bends in the road, China’s foreign policy has been remarkably 
stable. From Deng to Zemin to Hu Jintao, China’s leaders have steadily pursued a policy
of opening up and engaging the world. This is not only evinced in official statements but 
concrete policies as well. If anything, engagement and integration have only acceler ted 
and deepened. Over the course of a few decades China has emerged as one of the world’s 
leading trading states. At the same time, China’s preference for bi-lateral engagement has 
been replaced by a strong commitment to multilateralism. It is hard to deny that China 
has come to accept international norms of economic openness and multilateral 
cooperation. Hard-line conservatives, suspicious of and intent on derailing reform, have 
been steadily replaced by a new generation of Dengist acolytes—technocratic, pragmatic 
and committed to reform.309 Meanwhile, the party has tied its very legitimacy to the 
success of its reform and integration policy; a policy whose successes are driven by 
foreign investment and exports. Frankly, the major commercial powers and their junior 
partners can be credited for the China miracle. The Communist Party understas this: 
In today’s world, a country can hardly develop in isolation. The Chinese 
Government will unswervingly implement the opening up policy. It will more 
vigorously promote all directional, multi-tiered and wide range opening up and 
take part in international economic cooperation and competition at greater width 
and depth.310 
 
Systemic theory advances a two stage model. In the first, states like China are 
pulled into  
the commercial confederacy by the prospect of making material gains and enhancing 
their competitiveness. They are also pushed by the prospect of falling behind. Because 
the major powers have created an institutionalized trading order, the opportunity costs of 
                                                
309 For a discussion of China’s ‘Third Generation’ elite see H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong, “The 
Foreign Policy Outlook of China’s “Third Generation” Elite” in Lampton, ed. The Making of Chinese 
Foreign and Security Policy 
310 Jiang Zemin, “Speech to Fortune Global Forum 2001,” Hong Kong, May 8, 2001.  
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opting out are high. In the second phase, states become locked in. Changes have occurred 
along three dimensions. First, there has been a process of material integration as China 
has tied itself to the commercial confederacy. In just two years, from 2002 through 2004, 
China’s trade volume expanded by an annual rate of 30 percent. By the end of 2004, trade 
volume was nearing 70 percent of China’s GDP!311 Second, there has been a process of 
institutional bonding. China now has a stake in the core institutions of the commercial 
confederacy, most notably the WTO. And third, there is an ideational lock-in. Reforms 
have fundamentally changed Chinese society and the government has begun to 
internalize international norms, particularly those relating to economic integration. They 
believe in economic liberalization because it has worked for them. The ideological 
transformation is quite striking: China has embraced an entirely new developmental and 
economic model focused not on centralized command, heavy industry, import 
substitution and autarky, but markets, light industry, export led growth and economic 
openness. Liberal reform and openness are now the ideological cornerstones of the 
Communist Party’s current platform. Ideology is not ironclad but it is sticky. When added 
up, there is reason to believe that China will continue on its trajectory of reform and 
integration.312 
 In 1987, the Thirteenth National Congress elaborated the principle of “one central 
task, two basic points.” The central task: economic development. The two basic points: 
                                                
311 Chow, China’s Economic Transformation,  p. 316 
312 Interestingly, in a 1984 interview Deng remarked that, “Invigorating our domestic economy and opening 
to the outside world are long-term, not short-term, policies that will remain unchanged for at least 50 to 70 
years. Why? Because quadrupling the GNP, which will take 20 years, is only our first step and will be 
followed by a second, approaching the level of developed countries, which will take 30 or 50, let’s say 50, 
years…By then it will be even less likely that the policies will change. If anything, we shall open up still 
more.” Selected Works, Volume II, pp. 86-87  
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overall adherence to the Four Cardinal Principles313 and the policy of reform and opening 
up. Reform has amounted to an embrace of markets while rejecting bourgeois 
liberalization. “When we say we are opposed to bourgeois liberalization” Deng remark d, 
“we mean we are opposed to wholesale Westernization of China, to abandoning Party 
leadership and the socialist system.”314 The new essence of socialism is “liberation and 
development of the productive forces, elimination of exploitation and polarization, and 
the ultimate achievement of prosperity for all.”315 To achieve modernization, however, 
the Party has tolerated increasing levels of economic inequality.316 If markets are 
consistent with socialism and inequalities tolerated, all that is substantively left of the 
Four Principles is Communist Party rule. If the official definition of “one central task, 
two basic points” is viewed in light of the actual policy course pursued, the definition can 
be redefined: China is pursuing economic development and modernization through 
reform and the opening policy, implemented by a CCP controlled government. Once we 
see through the Marxist rhetorical flourishes, a task not difficult, it becomes clear that the 
PRC has stayed quite true to its overarching grand strategy. Much of China’s foreign 
policy behavior is captured by the economic lens. Political and economic strategies of 
integration and openness emerge as the obvious choice as soon as prosperity seeking 
                                                
313 To keep to the socialist road and to uphold the people’s democratic dictatorship, leadership by the 
Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.  
314 Deng, Selected Works, Volume II p. 233 
315 Ibid. p361 
316 In 1992, Deng remarked on the subject: “Our plan is as follows: where conditions permit, some areas 
may develop faster than others; those that develop faster can help promote the progress of those that lag 
behind, until all become prosperous. If the rich keep getting richer and the poor poorer, polarization will 
emerge. The socialist system must and can avoid polarization. One way is for the areas that become 
prosperous first to support the poor ones by paying more taxes or turning in more profits to the state. Of 
course, this should not be done too soon. At present, we don’t want to dampen the vitality of the developed 
areas or encourage the practice of having everyone “eat from the same big pot”. Ibid. p 362 In other words, 
for now its capitalism, socialism can wait.  
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states accurately assess the opportunities and constraints that the internatio al 
environment presents.  
History teaches the scholar humility and advises caution when making 
predictions. Many learned observers draw different conclusions from the same evidenc . 
Ultimately, facts are theory laden. We shouldn’t be afraid of going out on a limb—
where’s the sport in being rigidly cautious?—but neither should we be overconfident in 
the soundness of our intellectual constructs. So far, what I have done is to draw out 
logical conclusions from our theoretical machine. It goes without saying, but must be said 
anyways, that theories are caricatures of reality. They must be subjected to sustained 
scrutiny.  
 
For Further Research 
This chapter has not, and does not claim to have established any empirical truths. It is 
best thought of as a plausibility probe.317 China, it seems, is a hard case for the theory. 
The country has a manifestly illiberal history and political culture; its historical 
experience with the system’s great powers has been painful; during the reform era the 
regional security environment—relations with the US, India, the Soviet Union and 
Japan—were by no means benign; internally, there was strong political, institut onal and 
inertial opposition to market reform and opening up. For most liberal democracies, 
economic integration simply requires that these states externalize policies and values 
which already prevail internally; in the case of China, political and economic integration 
has required deep ideological, legal, regulatory and economic shifts. Whether China can 
                                                
317 According to George and Bennett, “Plausibility probes are preliminary studies on relatively untested 
theories and hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted.” Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) p. 75 
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say no is a question worth asking.318 It has certainly had numerous reasons to do so, but 
the fact remains: the PRC has not said no to the world. A plausibility probe aims to draw 
empirical attention to a new and potentially attractive theory. The probe’s findings are 
preliminary and incomplete. The surface has barely been scratched.   
For us to gain confidence in the theory, two things must be accomplished. First, 
we must demonstrate that China’s motivations correspond to those outlined in our 
theoretical account, a challenging task.319 The crux is to establish clear links between the 
prosperity motive, competitive pressure, and the international dimensions of China’s 
chosen grand-strategy. Our theory claims that China’s strategic course has been 
conditioned by the confederate structure. That is, China has pursued strategies of internal 
and external bonding because these produce the desired result given the extant strategic
environment. A confederate structure leads certain strategies to dominate over others. 
States compete with each other to make gains. States will gravitate toward dominant 
strategies; if they fail to do so they will fall behind. In short, this requires us to 
demonstrate that China’s foreign policy strategy is, to a large degree, driven by these 
competitive structural dynamics. And furthermore, that China is aware of them. Because 
the internal workings of the Communist Party are murky, and leaders can rarely be lied 
upon to say what they actually mean, it is difficult to find the smoking gun. The 
following kinds of evidence would seem to be the most compelling: more evidence 
                                                
318 The China Can Say No title was inspired by a similar 1989 book written by Akio Morita and Shintaro 
Ishihara titled The Japan That Can Say No. It is perhaps worth asking: why has Japan not said no? 
319 Waltz famously asserted that systemic theory says nothing about actor intentions: “Balance-of-power 
theory claims to explain a result (the recurrent formation of balances of power), which may not accord with 
the intentions of any of the units whose actions combine to produce the result.”  Theory of International 
Politics, p. 119 On this point, I depart company with Waltz. Actors intentionally and consciously pursue 
strategies of external and internal bonding. They do so, furthermore, for the reasons outlined in the theory. 
This is an important point. The theory of structural confederacy can be nailed down and defeated. It can be 
defeated in one of two ways: either by finding a disjuncture between our expectations of actor behavior nd 
their actual behavior, or a disjuncture between the posited intentions of actors and their actual intentions.  
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suggesting that leaders were highly concerned about the development and technology 
gap; further evidence demonstrating a belief, on the part of leaders, that to be competitive 
internationally required internal reforms and opening up to the outside world; findings 
demonstrating a belief on the part of leaders that to succeed China could not oppose the 
commercial confederacy but had to join it; findings demonstrating a fear of ‘falling by the 
wayside’ if economic integration and membership in multilateral institutions were not 
pursued; findings demonstrating that Chinese leaders were concerned about losing 
autonomy but proceeded nonetheless fearing a decline in prosperity and losses in 
international competitiveness; and finally, more evidence showing that China 
intentionally emulated the strategies of other successful commercial states.  
This chapter has endeavored to show that China has pursued strategies of internal 
and external bonding.320 Our theory leads us to expect that China’s engagement of the 
world will be most intense in the economic arena. However, China realizes that to be a 
core commercial power requires it to move beyond an exclusive focus on economic 
cooperation. This implies that China is being socialized by the system—it is looking less 
and less like a realist autarkic power and more and more like a liberal trading state. This 
is a kind of macro-socialization in which China increasingly fits the major commercial 
power mold, assuming a certain role and coming to resemble leading powers like Japan, 
Germany and the US. This implies that economic effects have spilled over into other 
important realms. If this is the case, how might these effects be discerned? 
                                                
320 Indeed, the evidence I have produced is not new. I have relied primarily on secondary sources. The 
contribution is novel because it presents existing evidence in a new light. The value added of examining 
existing findings through the lens of a new theoretical paradigm is likely to be large. A systemic lens leads 
us to focus on certain aspects of China’s behavior, in so doing it may lead to a reevaluation of existing 
findings and the discovery of new ones as well.  
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   Systemic theory claims to explain China’s overall strategy of liberalization, 
openness, institutional integration and economic engagement—issue areas and behavioral 
expectations which are directly derived from the theory’s logic (Category I). In Chapter 
V a second category was identified: separate issue areas and behaviors t t may be linked 
to Category I imperatives. For conceptual clarity we will attempt to place v rious issue 
areas into separate categories; in all likelihood, they will be more interdep n ent than the 
schema suggests. The following is one possible way to conceive of some of these issu  
and domains: 
 
Category I IMF, World Bank, GATT/WTO, G-8, G-
20, OECD, ASEAN, APEC, FDI, SEZs, 
(externally driven) market reform and 
liberalization. 
Category II Taiwan, nuclear weapons and proliferation, 
Russia-China relations and the SCO, Sino-
Japanese relations, Sino-US relations, Sino-
India relations, Sino-European relations, 
China and North Korea, China in the UN, 
China and the ASEAN/ ARF, China-Iran, 
China-Sudan. 
 




• Do actions and developments in a Category II domain have clear implications for 
China’s interests in a Category I domain?  
 
Does China’s strategy of integration become manifest in these other domains? There are 
several ways in which this spill-over effect might be observed. Systemic signal  may 
induce China to take affirmative measures in another domain, for instance, by engaging 
smaller neighbors within the ASEAN forum—to open markets, assuage fears and build 
its reputation. Or alternatively, is China’s leadership role in the multiparty nuclear talks 
with N. Korea at least partly motivated by a similar objective? Second, structural 
pressures may lead China to refrain from taking certain actions that might disrupt more 
pressing Category I goals. For example, might it be that China’s patience over the 
question of Taiwan or the restraint it has shown as a UN veto player is partly motivated 
by an overriding commercial interest in becoming further integrated into the core? Why 
has China not balanced anyone? Is political neutrality motivated by a similar i perative?  
• If China’s policies proved costly, did the government make adjustments or try to 
repair damage done? 
Systemic theory claims that actors will by and large respond to systemic signals over a 
longer period of time. Because there is agency, and structure is not the only causa  
mechanism in operation, states will invariably act in ways contrary to the theory’s logic. 
The theory holds that some actions will trigger negative feedbacks—ignoring the 
dominant strategy can be costly. The theory gains confirmation wherever states adjust 
their policies in response to these negative feedback effects. For example, China’s 
cooperative and multilateral posture in the 1990s might be understood as an effort 
designed to repair the damage done by Tiananmen and revive its GATT/WTO bid.  
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Bonding behavior has a distinctly liberal character. It is manifest in 
multilateralism and institutionalization, policy coordination and cooperation, economic 
engagement and during times of crisis, even mutual aid. In contrast to a realist systemic 
theory, the spirit of our theory is more optimistic. It is tempting to conclude that illiberal, 
uncooperative, obstructionist, or Realpolitik behavior is prima facie evidence against the 
theory. There are two responses to these challenges. First, systemic theory makes claims 
about broader patterns and not isolated cases. It is confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis 
of overwhelming patterns of behavior—it is concerned with an ocean of events and not 
any particular swell or whitecap. Second, much goes on in international politics unrelated 
to the logic of the theory. Systemic theory says nothing about such cases because they ar  
beyond the scope of the theory. This point is the source of much unhelpful confusion and 
so bears repeating: Category II findings which are either unrelated or not costly in terms 
of a Category I imperative, however illiberal, are not germane to the evaluation of the 
theory. To defeat the theory, one must produce evidence of patterned behavior that is 
costly and contrary to the expectations of the theory. The longer these patterns persist, th  
more damaging the evidence becomes. Over the last several years, Russia’s behavior 
appears to fit such a pattern; while this trend is potentially important it is too hort a 
period to draw definitive conclusions.   
 This chapter represents a plausibility probe because it fails to deliver adequate 
answers to the questions raised. This is so for the following reasons. First, the job cann t 
be accomplished in the space of a single chapter, and perhaps not even in a single book. 
This fact, of course, is rather unsatisfying. Fundamentally, the questions are ot only 
beyond the scope of this chapter but the empirical aptitude and specialized knowledge of 
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the author. The intended contribution of this work is theoretical. Theory requires a certain
disposition and skill set, empirical work another. Mastery of each is a truly rae talent. 
Third, there is a basic reality theorists are reluctant to admit. Most often, to be a theorist 
is to be a partisan for a particular theory—it is common for a theorist to revisehis 
construct but rarely does one abandon it. At bottom, the theorist is rarely best suited to 
test the theory. Not simply because of a particular skill set but a biased disposition as 
well. In building a large abstract intellectual construct one often becomes its prisoner. 
This is rarely true for mid-range hypotheses or modifications of larger theo ies.321 It takes 
courage to concede, but I fear my lens is irredeemably tainted by my own paradigm.  
This reality points toward a welcomed division of labor in the social sciences. 
There is always a risk that we’ll find that which we set out to look for, discounting or 
ignoring evidence that does not fit our preferred account. If science is to be objective, it 
must control this unhelpful tendency to the extent possible. In the physical sciences, the 
problem is not as acute. In the social sciences it is more prevalent. A division of labor is 
helpful because the investigator may not have as great a vested interest in the final
outcome.322 Second, broader participation allows us to exploit the unique talents and 
specialized knowledge of a greater number of scholars. Each of us has our limits, but 
these limits can be overcome through collaboration. We know that scientific 
advancement is a collective enterprise. Ultimately, our work is judged by a community of 
scholars. Good ideas have staying power, but great ideas succeed in getting others to 
engage them. That a theory persuades its author is hardly impressive. That it succeed  in 
                                                
321 By no means do I intend to imply that those engaging in mid-range theorizing or testing of auxiliary 
hypotheses are biased. These scholars are primarily empiricists who dabble in theory. Every empiricist 
must know theory because it is theory that guides th  empirical investigation.  




persuading the scholarly community is. It is my aim to raise big possibilities, defend their 



























By way of conclusion 
 
 The dissertation set out to accomplish a number of ambitious goals. Embarking on 
this journey my primary aim was to advance a novel systemic theory of international 
politics. I soon came to realized that the project contained two separate but related
theoretical enterprises: First, I found it necessary to explain how a leading power 
configuration with distinctly liberal features came into existence, and how its overall 
cohesion was sustained. As many liberals have argued, anarchy—understood as a 
Hobbesian ‘state of war’—is a grossly inadequate empirical description of international 
relations today. In my encounter with liberal IR theory I found much insight, much to 
use, but ultimately no framework that I believed to be wholly adequate to the task. Hence 
I found it necessary to develop a novel theoretical account of social cohesion in IR.  
 In the second part, I set out to build a novel systemic theory based upon the 
premise that the system was no longer dominated by opposing great power poles, but 
rather, a cohesive confederacy of leading powers. The commercial confederacy evolves 
out of a US dominated western subsystem following WWII. After the Cold War comes t  
an end in 1989, the configuration suddenly consists of the world’s leading commercial 
powers.  
 For the leading powers and their junior partners, collectively the OECD, unity is 
maintained by a relatively thick social cohesion—based as it is on the mutually 
reaffirming interaction of commercial interest, liberal values, and robust institutions. The 
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confederacy is characterized by two impressive features: its overall succes  and sheer 
size. This has brought into being a gravitational sphere that conditions the behavior of 
both those inside and outside of this political entity. To be competitive in the confederate 
system, states are led to pursue a distinct set of politico-economic bonding strate ies.  
 The “next generation” of theorists always faces an annoying hurdle: new theories 
must always demonstrate their superiority vis-à-vis existing theories. Thi  tendency 
naturally flows from the Lakatosian premise that theories should be accepted until 
replaced by better theories. But supposing two separate theories, explaining the same 
phenomenon, are found. The burden of demonstrating superiority almost always falls on 
the newer of the two. That is, to be accepted, novel theories must demonstrate that they 
explain cases better than do existing theories, or alternatively, that they explain existing 
cases and new cases as well. My own marketing strategy employs the latter.  
 Early on I ran into a big problem: the behavior of liberal, democratic, capitalist 
countries (that initially drew my interest) was vastly over-determined. Pace among these 
states was over-determined. Cooperation among these states was over-determined. 
Variants of liberal institutionalism including that of Robert Keohane and John Ikenberry, 
constructivist identity theory of Alexander Wendt, the security communities approach 
advanced by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, not to mention the large body of 
democratic peace literature with its many variants, all account for peace and cooperation 
among these states. And though my theoretical explanation is different, though also 
similar to many of these accounts in important ways, and though it contributes somthing 
new, I found it rather impossible to get any empirical leverage. There were simply too 
many explanations and the predictions generated were too similar.  
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 Fortunately, I discovered that my theory’s greatest strength was in explaining the 
behavior of big, non-Western, non-democratic, and illiberal states. The obvious and most 
important candidate is China, though Russia, and large emerging democracies like India 
and Brazil merit consideration as well. Most of these liberal theories either do not 
generate predictions regarding their behavior, or, predict the very opposite of what my 
own theory leads us to expect. Following Michael Doyle, for example, democracies c n 
be expected to remain at peace, though democracies are more likely to war against non-
democracies. Kantian identity theory does not gain much traction because many of these 
states do not, or only partially, share the liberal Western identity founded on democracy, 
free markets, and human rights. Institutional theory gains some traction but it is less
helpful in explaining the behavior of states that are not a part of the institutional core. 
China joins the WTO in 2001 but its dramatic shift in grand strategy began in the late 70s 
and early 80s. Institutional explanations help us explain the behavior of states once they 
become a part of the institutions but find less traction in explaining the behavior of states 
formally outside of them. 
 Commercial liberals, most notably Richard Rosecrance, emphasize trade and 
economic interdependence. The systemic theory of confederacy shares much in common 
with these, as primary emphasis is placed on commerce and the prosperity motive. The 
theory of confederacy differs from these in important respects. First, it is a systemic 
theory that explains how the behavior of the part is conditioned by the configuration of 
the whole. Second, commercial liberals do not have a general explanation for why states 
either decide to pursue “trading state” strategies or not. Many see markets nd democracy 
as closely linked, yet one of the most interesting recent developments involves the 
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emergence of politically illiberal free-market states, most prominently in Asia. These 
developments support the overall conclusion that the behavior of these states is not driven 
by liberal political reform, or Hegelian ideational dialectics, but more by a prosperity 
motive, and most of all, competitive pressure.  
 Having succeeded in distinguishing myself from my intellectual kin, the task of 
identifying a foil proved much easier; though here too I ran into difficulties. Realist 
theories generate clear predictions regarding the behavior of these rising, non-western 
powers. They almost universally predict trouble. But one important variant of Realist 
theory, hegemonic theory, predicts stability so long as a preponderant power reigns.
Many realists see stability and cooperative behavior as evidence of a bandwagoning 
propensity. Because the US is so much more powerful than the rest, others are left with
only one choice: join it. But hegemonic stability theory suffers from a number of easily 
identifiable difficulties. For example, it is unclear why integration and cooperation is 
most pronounced at the regional level—most notably in Asia and Europe—if stability and 
cooperation are supposed to revolve around the US. Second, in the area of political-
economy the US has become less active since the 1970s. The US has provided less 
hegemonic benefits and performed fewer functions in the commercial arena than it has in 
the security realm.  
 Most interestingly, I believe we are witnessing a political experiment of epic 
proportions. If the US declines relative to other major powers—that is, if there is a r turn 
to a multipolar distribution of power—then hegemonic theory, like all Realist variants, 
predicts trouble. Or, if the US ceases to perform hegemonic functions, the theory also 
predicts trouble. It now appears that the US is less willing to play the role of ‘Globo-
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Cop.’ In other words, what has been happening in the economic sphere for decades is 
now taking place in the security realm as well. Not only is the US doing less, it appears 
that global power and influence are becoming more evenly distributed with the rise of 
China and India. In the event that these important trends continue, according to 
hegemonic realists, security competition will ensue, economic cooperation will 
breakdown, and multilateral institutions will be strained. Realists foresee various rather 
dire “Back to the Future” scenarios.  
 On all fronts the stage is set for an interesting and worthwhile empirical 
exploration.    
 
Significance of the project—or, the “so what” question 
 Having been to a few dissertation defenses, I know that one question recurs over 
and over again, so allow me to anticipate it here. Despite the project’s many (present) 
shortcomings, the one thing it cannot be criticized for is irrelevance. The subject matter 
and the ideas contained in the preceding pages are big and important.  
 First, the project is theoretically ambitious. I have not set out to refine an existing 
theory but build an entirely new one. I’ve been influenced by a wide range of thinkers to 
be sure, but the project itself is quite novel. At a time when systemic thinking in IR is 
virtually moribund, I have tried to revive it by offering a new theory. The project is 
theoretically unique in that it incorporates many liberal variables into a systemic analysis, 
usually thought to be the exclusive domain of realism, and in so doing it challenges the 
prevailing conventional wisdom. 
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 In addition to advancing a novel systemic theory, the project introduces an 
innovative framework for studying social cohesion in international politics. Thi 
framework represents a paradigmatically neutral effort to account for group cohesion. It 
draws on the field’s dominant paradigms while at the same time challenging them while 
synthesizing key insights. This framework, after further theoretical development, may 
emerge as foundation for research in its own right with general application to a wide
variety of cases. Presently, Chapter II lays the groundwork for later work though it has 
the potential to become much more.  
 This is a parsimonious theory that generates clear expectations of actor behavior 
amenable to empirical investigation and falsification. It tells us how important actors are 
likely to behave, the strategies they are likely to pursue, and offers theoretical explanation 
to account for observed behavioral patterns. It’s a theory of state action. Or put slightly
differently, I have tried to construct a theory that can be defeated, and therefore one that 
is scientifically useful. In order to satisfy this requirement I have tried to overcome a 
prominent difficulty in Waltzian systemic thinking. In Chapter V I have begun to sketch 
out a methodology for the testing of systemic theory, one that innovatively combines 
systemic and unit-level analysis in a single research program. Systemic th ory, I have 
argued, is a powerful tool but its empirical application poses special challenges. Waltz 
constructed a theory which was virtually impossible to defeat; many of his intuitio s 
were correct, though the international politics/ foreign policy distinction inappropriately 
shielded the theory from damaging evidence.   
 Third, this is a general theory whose propositions can be applied to a wide array 
of actors. The theory claims to explain the behavior of a number of big and important 
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states. One of the most important theoretical and empirical debates ongoing in the field 
today concerns the strategic behavior of China. To many, China’s rise is worrisome 
because it has the potential to destabilize the international system with devastating 
consequences for us all. It is not immediately obvious how the US and others should 
respond to China’s ascent; depending upon who you ask, prescriptions range from 
balancing and preemption to constructive engagement. Assessing China’s grand-trategy 
and its likely future trajectory is of the utmost importance.   
  While it is clearly significant, the dissertation is vulnerable to the gen ral 
criticism that it is incomplete. This is true. There is a fine line between being ambitious, 
and falling short as a result of over-ambition. I think this criticism is short-sigh ed on 
several grounds. First, in a sense the whole construct rests on each of the parts that make 
up the whole. Because my end goal was to develop an entire theoretical system, I simply
could not ignore any of the parts that together comprise it. Initially I wanted to focus on 
theory to the exclusion of empirics and methodology. I soon realized that in order to build 
theory I also had to be thinking about methodology and empirical application. My goal 
was to produce a novel systemic theory but in order to be persuasive I had to explain how 
the system came to be dominated by a core cluster of commercial powers; unlike realists, 
who simply assume anarchy, I was saddled with the necessary task of explaining 
cohesion among these states. Some chapters are more developed than others. Chapter IV 
(“A Systemic Theory of International Relations”) is closest to completion, with Chapter 
II (“Social Cohesion and International Politics”) is also getting there. Others need more 




From Dissertation to Book—the road ahead 
 As I see it, I’m about five years into a ten year project. Much of the work has been 
done. Much work is yet to be done. Some of the yet to be accomplished tasks are 
obvious, some will become evident with the passage of time.  
 My stated aim in the dissertation was to deliver a novel theory. I think I have 
largely accomplished this, at least to my own satisfaction at this time. Though much 
refinement, and perhaps some development, is yet to be done, I feel I have reached the 
limits of what I can hope to accomplish in the context of a dissertation project. The 
logical next step is to deliver these ideas to the field in the form of stand-alone articl s. 
Development and refinement is likely to be spurred by this critical encounter. It is 
difficult to foresee what will emerge at the other end of this process. What is almo t 
certain is that things will look at least slightly different from the way they are now. This 
process, I have come to believe, is fundamental to good scholarship. 
 The empirics are preliminary and tentative. The dissertation includes a chapter 
length plausibility probe that lends the theory support in one critical case. This has been a 
highly useful and important exercise. Though I initially resisted empirics, I have come to 
realize that good theoretical work absolutely requires that the theorist also be engaged in 
some level of empirical investigation.  
Yet I also believe it to be true that the social sciences are inherently more 
susceptible to the corrupting influence of researcher bias. Partisans of given theories 
almost always find that which they set out to look for. Though I try to remain cognizant 
of this, and control for my own predispositions and prejudices, I fear I am perhaps 
irredeemably a prisoner of my own paradigm. I may be alone in admitting this, but I’m 
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almost certainly not alone in having this unhelpful disposition. But what I initially 
believed to be a flaw I have come to see as a possible asset.  
Science, I believe, is a collective enterprise. The best way to advance this science 
is to have many acute minds engaged in this common pursuit. Good scholarship must 
leave something for others to do, whether theoretical development or empirical 
investigation. To exhaust a subject is just bad strategy. Second, I believe in a scie tific 
division of labor for two reasons. Theorists and empiricists often have different skill sets. 
It is rarely the case that the same individual can at once produce original and cre tive 
theories while at the same time run objective and sophisticated empirical tests. Thi  can 
result in a variety of unhelpful outcomes. For example, some hamstring theoretical 
constructs in order to satisfy methodological requirements and preferences. Or 
conversely, theories are cobbled together in order to fit the data—in other words, trying 
invent an ad hoc theory to confirm the data as opposed to letting the data confirm or 
disconfirm an established theory. Oddly, the field has come to expect that the “good”
scholar is both a creative theorist and sophisticated empiricist. At the end of the day, in 
most cases, it is an unreasonable expectation and does more to impede scientific progress
than it does to advance it. Not only does a single individual often lack the necessary skill 
sets to do both tasks well, but such scholarship is also more prone to the problems of 
researcher bias that we’re trying to control.  
An important caveat is in order. Here I have in mind the big paradigmatic debates, 
and not so much the mid-range theorizing typical of most empirical studies. To refine 
paradigmatic theories so as to make them more amenable to empirical investigation is 
helpful and often necessary. Every empirical study has a theory chapter, and this should 
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always be the case. But work that aims to contribute empirical knowledge, and in the 
process refines a theory, is quite different from work whose primary goal is to develop 
novel theoretical machinery. Just as every theorist must dabble in empirics so every 
empiricist must also dabble in theory.   
To reconcile these two considerations—the need to engage empirics on the one 
hand but avoid bias and account for my own limited skill set on the other—the 
“plausibility probe” proved the ideal vehicle. The plausibility probe is a preliminary 
investigation. Its main goal is to lend a new theory initial credibility and to attract broader 
interest. It does not purport to formally “test” a theory. It does not aim to produce 
definitive “findings.” The probe may, and is likely to, serve as a springboard fr more in 
depth and sophisticated study. It also functions to refine and develop the theory’s 
propositions.  
This is precisely what I’ve tried to do in Chapter VI. First, I am not a “China 
specialist.” I do not speak mandarin. I’ve never been to China. I’ve relied exclusively on 
secondary literature written in the English language, most of it written by American 
scholars or non-American scholars based in universities within the US. To the extent tha  
I have engaged Chinese China scholars, I have done so through reviews of their 
scholarship written by China scholars in the US. These admissions should not destroy th  
credibility of my argument, but rather, confirm that the work is far from finished. The 
plausibility probe aims to lend plausibility to the theory, draw interest, and engage the 
scholarly community. Finally, I hoped to demonstrate that, though not a China expert, I 
can nevertheless be a useful participant in this dialogue. I believe I have accomplished 
some of these more modest goals.  
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In the book project I intend to include two additional probes, one exploring 
Russia’s and another India’s foreign policy grand-strategies. Much like China, t ese two 
important states embark on dramatic reform paths at roughly the same time. In India, 
reform got underway in earnest under the leadership of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao 
and his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh in the early 1990s. India’s turn to 
liberalization and openness, like China’s, is all the more striking given the country’s 
economic and political history. For decades leading up to reform, India pursued a closed 
door economic policy combined with Soviet style industrialization programs—that is to 
say, it had many features of a centralized command economy. This economic strategy 
was inspired by the Gandhi’s ideals of economic self-sufficiency which became a corner 
stone of first Prime Minister, Jawarhalal Nehru’s plan for India. Given its colonial past, 
the prevailing political culture was one of great suspicion of the Western world. Since the 
reform era began, India has become impressively integrated into the global commercial 
order.  
Likewise, Soviet reform began in the mid to late 1980s after Gorbachev assumed 
power and the unsustainable nature of the country’s economic course began to set in. A 
number of factors precipitated the fall of the Soviet Union—the country’s failing 
agriculture sector, inefficient industry, falling oil prices, and the global arms race—but 
perhaps most significant among them was the realization that the Soviet model coul 
simply not compete with the dynamism of Western global capitalism and the advant ges 
derived from global production networks. If the West could not be beaten, like China, the 
remaining alternative was to join it.  
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Russia is in many respects an interesting and hard case for the theory. Economic 
reform and integration occur rapidly under Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar, the architect 
of Soviet “shock therapy.” But unlike in China, economic reforms failed to produce the 
desired results. Throughout most of the 90s, Russia’s economic predicament was dire. 
While China’s process of reform and integration has steadily grown, Russia’s road has 
been more tortuous. Russia’s relations with the core commercial powers of the West have 
been characterized by periods of thawing and cooperation but also times of suspicion, 
conflict, and retrenchment. The reasons for this are not exactly clear though I have 
become increasingly impressed by the so called “resource curse” thesis. The mportance 
of oil and gas to Russia’s economy and the Kremlin’s budget have influenced politics in 
important ways, while at the same time windfall profits from high oil prices have given 
Russia the freedom to defy international norms and West. Resource endowments have 
both shielded Russia from international pressure—Western Europe’s dependence on 
Russian energy—while making it more immune from the consequences of an aggressive 
foreign policy, like capital flight for instance. Though Russia strikes one as a bit of a 
“rogue state,” the country has nonetheless pursued bonding strategies in many important 
respects, albeit not nearly as aggressively as China and India to be sure. I think my 
exploration of Russia’s foreign policy grand-strategy is likely to reveal important 
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